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INTRODUCTION 
 
For many, the introduction by the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty of a range of 
significant human rights provisions marked the coming of age of the EU as a human 
rights actor.  While 2009 has been understood to be the high point of the EU human 
rights regime, the low point has been identified as the silence of the founding treaties in 
the 1950s. In this sense, the traditional narrative commences with the total absence of 
any reference to human rights in the three founding European Community Treaties  
and describes the gradual emergence and progressive advancement of a powerful EU 
human rights regime over the ensuing decades.  
However, history has certainly shown that the EU’s road for human rights has not 
always been uphill. As Professor Angel Viñas, Director for Multilateral Political 
Relations and Human Rights within the European Commission between 1997 and 
2001, once said, “the battle for human rights was sordid in the extreme”. Even if with 
the entrance in the new millennium Europe showed a growing support for human 
rights, behind the scenes a never-ending struggle has taken place, demolishing, in 
many cases, the few achieved results.  
This dissertation, through the recall of the traditional narrative of progress, wants to 
make an analysis of the most relevant victories and defeats of the European’s human 
rights battles. It does so by returning to the origins of the EU in the 1950s and 
comparing the ambitious but long forgotten plans for European Community 
engagement with human rights, with the actual developments, which occurred over the 
subsequent 60 years. Besides, considering the development and implementation of an 
effective external human rights policy can only be undertaken in the context of 
appropriate internal institutional arrangements, the following chapters will treat both 
internal and external dimensions of human rights, following as far as possible a 
chronological order.   
The first chapter begins with the familiar account of the EU's engagement with human 
rights issues, which tells us that while the Council of Europe and its leading instrument, 
the European Convention on Human Rights, were established in 1949 with the primary 
purpose of promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, the European 
Communities subsequently founded in the 1950s were almost entirely devoted to 
economic integration and left the task of human rights protection to the broader sister 
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organization in Strasbourg. In so far as human rights issues made their way onto the 
EC's agenda, this was mostly in a reactive response by the European Court of Justice 
to challenges posed to its authority by national constitutional courts that were 
concerned about the standards of protection in EC law for domestic constitutional 
rights. The silence of the founding Treaties confirmed the supremacy of economic 
interest in the European arena during the 1950s, leaving a “loud silence” in the draft of 
the Treaty of Rome of 1957.  
Although human rights did not figure in the original Treaties, they steadily gained in 
importance from the late 1960s.  During those years Europe made a first step through 
the foundation of a EU’s development policy, which saw the strengthening of the 
relationships between the Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific states 
(ACP) and the European Community.  Over the following decade, these states gained 
their sovereignty and because of the ex-colonial bounds with EU member states, it was 
important to build up cooperation within a brand new approach. The “Uganda 
Guidelines” grounded the relations on a legal basis enhancing the partnership between 
European Economic Community and these states. However, the “sanction policy”, 
adopted by the Community to suppress gross human rights violations carried out by 
ACP countries, didn’t work for long. In a few years came along three Lomé 
Conventions, each one of them with the purpose to create a broader and enhanced 
relation between the partners, but at the same time with no references to human rights.  
Moreover, in the same years, a predominant role was played by the EC Nine, 
particularly in the sphere of the EPC. The main aim of the European member states 
was to obtain a successful outcome of the Helsinki Conference of 1975, in order to 
safeguard and promote definite West European interests and values in the CSCE final 
agreement. Human Rights in this context should have been the connection between 
East and West, becoming part of the new European “Identity”. 
The second chapter marks the transition towards a completely new dimension, which 
starts to develop in the 1990s. In the post Cold-War era, changes in the external 
environment, as well as internal reforms, required a re-focusing of human rights and 
democratic strategies, in particular to ensure that these issues would permeated all EU 
policies. A major step in integrating human rights and democratic principles into the 
EU’s policies was taken with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 
1993. Since then, human rights has become one of the objectives of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a constant and stable feature of EU external 
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relations. A clause defining respect for human rights and democracy as an “essential 
element” of the EU external relationship was included in all agreements with third 
countries.  Under it, all cooperation, association, and free-trade agreements concluded 
by the EU with third countries were bound by respect for human rights. 
The human rights clause represented a new model for EU external relations as well as 
for international cooperation, and had implications for the development of international 
rules concerning trade-related human rights policy and for the accession of third 
countries in the European Union during the following years.  
As Maastricht Treaty, also the Lomé Convention signed in 1990, had some new 
features. Lomé IV, and later the modified Lomé IV bis, became the first development 
agreement to incorporate a human rights clause as a “fundamental” part of 
cooperation. According to the clause any violation would lead to partial or total 
suspension of development aid by European Union.  
Despite Lomé’s achievements, in 2000, after the expiration of Lomé IV (bis), Cotonou 
Agreement will come into action introducing a new approach and a broader partnership 
while preserving the fundamental instruments of the previous Conventions. With 
Cotonou, political dialogue in the ACP-EU agreement will become the main Instrument 
of the EU, marking a new stage for Europe due to this change of politics. However, if 
on one side dialogue will become an effective instrument to seat at the table with 
countries previously overshadowed, on the other side it will also represent a weakness 
for the Union, due to a lack of efficacy of its measures.  
The second chapter closes with the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 1997, and which 
represented another significant step forward. The Treaty reaffirmed the EU’s basic 
principles introducing a mechanism to sanction serious and persistent breaches of 
human rights by EU Member States. Its entry into force brought a variety of new 
demands, which would be sufficient in themselves to require a thorough rethinking of 
the Commission’s human rights activity. This rethinking, however, put the Commission 
in the middle of a real “paper fight” concerning the Budget Lines of the EU human 
Rights funds and programmes. This battle will be the focal point of the third and last 
chapter.  
In relation to a very large number of countries, the Commission has played a vital, 
constructive and often innovative role in supporting human rights and democracy 
initiatives, providing funds for election support and observation, and ensuring 
	  	   8	  
humanitarian assistance. However, it had also to deal with a large number of problems. 
First of all the fragmentation of responsibility, meaning that none of the bureaucratic 
entities responsible for human rights policy was large enough to develop the range of 
staff and the level of expertise required to contribute to the development of the 
consistent, transparent, efficient, credible and conspicuous human rights policy to 
which the Union aspired. Secondly the lack of coordination related to a general lack of 
transparency, and lastly, and even more problematic, the issue of the legal basis. For 
these reasons 2000 has been a transitional year for the Commission in its delivery of 
assistance for the promotion and protection of human rights and democratic values.  
Following the central role accorded to the respect for human rights and democracy by 
the Amsterdam Treaty, and the adoption in April 1999 of Council Regulations 975 and 
976, the Community had at its disposal a comprehensive and coherent basis for the 
implementation of human rights and democracy budget lines, in order to provide them 
a legal basis under Chapter B7-70. This Chapter B7-70, entitled ‘European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)’, was created by an initiative of the European 
Parliament in 1994, which brought together a series of budget headings specifically 
dealing with the promotion of human rights. The management of human rights and 
democracy programmes spread across several departments of the Commission. The 
DG Development had a unit responsible for these measures in the ACP States. DG 
External Relations was instead responsible for the programmes in central and eastern 
Europe, the new independent States, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and Asia, but 
it was also responsible for all B7-70 budget lines, by fusing the former Human Rights 
and ACP unit with the Human Rights and Democratization unit.  
Of course internal fights lacked very little. Those fights, tackled through an assiduous 
exchange of internal notes, occupied time and energy of the Commission for many 
years, creating a clime of incertitude and mistrustful.   One of the central debates over 
the first decade of the new millennium was about budget lines and related launched 
programmes of the Commission, as far as concerned human rights promotion. The 
European Human Rights Foundation, which was established by the same Commission 
with the European Parliament and human rights NGOs with the aim of distributing 
funds to human rights organizations world-wide through the European Human Rights 
Fund (EHRF), had a contract with the European Commission since its origins. The 
incertude in 2000 about renewing or not the contract, created opposite fronts that gave 
life to many inner battles.  
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Other significant developments contributed to cause further internal tension.  In fact, for 
the first time in 2000, the human rights and democratization unit of the External 
Relations Directorate General assumed world-wide responsibility for all 11 human 
rights and democracy budget lines under EIDHR, all under the remit of a single 
Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten. In May, the Commission launched 
an ambitious reform package for the management of external assistance programmes. 
The package provided for a ‘radical overhaul’ of programming, the integration of the 
project cycle with a single body in charge of implementation (EuropeAid), the extensive 
devolution of project management to Commission delegations, and measures to deal 
with old and dormant commitments. However, only one year later, the Commission 
services started arguing for a significant reduction in the budget lines, raising in 2001 
the number of five lines under Chapter B7-70. In the same year the Commission 
services responsible for Human Rights and Democracy (notably AIDCO and RELEX) 
started a new “notes’ battle” concerning an additional reduction of the budget lines from 
five to one.   
The external action of the Commission was guided by the principles contained in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was officially proclaimed at the Nice Summit in 
December 2000. This represented the coherence between the internal and external 
aspects of the EU’s action in the field of human rights that the Commission made 
efforts to achieve. The Charter enshrines the very essence of the European aquis 
regarding fundamental rights, and introduced some important innovations. However, 
only in 2009 with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the Charter will become legally 
binding.  The Lisbon Treaty also enshrined a commitment to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights; one of the measures Europe was waiting since 1950.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
FROM THE 1950s TO THE 1970s:  THE ECHR AND THE SILENCE 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
1.1 THE ECHR COMPROMISES 
 
Simply as a European Bill of Rights, the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms offered little that was exceptional on the international scene. 
What was extraordinary about the Convention was the Strasburg’s enforcement 
machinery. The heart of its efficacy had been for almost 50 years1 provided by two 
crucial optional clauses: Article 25, which gave individuals as well as states the right to 
petition the European Commission of Human Rights for relief, and Article 46 that gave 
the European Court of Human Rights judicial jurisdiction to hear and try cases already 
reported upon by the Commission. Particularly relevant in the early days of the 
Convention was whether or not a European state would agree to accept individual 
petition and judicial jurisdiction. Historically, the Europeans were familiar with bills of 
rights but, unlike Americans, they were generally unfamiliar with judicial enforcement of 
those rights. Domestically they trusted the legislative and executive branches of 
government rather than the judicial branch of fundamental freedoms2. In the 1950s the 
question was whether Europeans would be willing to empower an international 
commission and a court to safeguard human rights. As it is easy to imagine, at the 
beginning the European governments were reluctant to accept those optional clauses, 
but over time and one-by-one the members of the Council of Europe consented to the 
clauses. What had been originally conceived as legal options became perceived in 
Europe as politically non-optional. Indeed by 1995 all 30 states then party to the 
Convention had accepted both Article 25 and 46. However, despite the successful 
result, the path toward the unanimous acceptance had been long and tortuous. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1    Until November 1998. The Commission’s functions were merged into the Court in 1999 providing  a 
significant change in the machinery system.  
2    J.Frowein, European Integration Through Fundamental Rights, Journal of Law Reform, 1984, p.19. 
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The Congress of Europe convened by the International Committee of Movements for 
European Unity was held at the Hague from 8 to 10 May 1948; it included 633 
delegates from sixteen countries3 and observers from ten others4. The purposes of the 
congress were to demonstrate the wide support for the cause of European unity, 
providing a new impulse to this movement and to make practical recommendations for 
the accomplishment of its objectives. Between the participants there were a number of 
former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, many members of Parliament and 
leading citizens from different sectors of the community, that were not going to become 
members of the Consultative Assembly. The President of Honor was Winston Churchill, 
and the chairmen of the three committees of the congress were M. Paul Ramadier, a 
former Prime Minister of France, M. Paul van Zeeland, a former Prime Minister of 
Belgium, and Salvador de Madariaga, a former Spanish Foreign Minister.5 In the 
Message to Europeans adopted at the final plenary session the delegates proclaimed:   
“We desire a United Europe, throughout whose area the free movement of persons, 
ideas and goods is restored; 
We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of though, assembly and 
expression as well as the right to form a political opposition; 
We desire a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this 
Charter; 
We desire a European Assembly where the live forces of all our nations shall be 
represented;  
And pledge ourselves in our homes and in public, in our political and religious life, 
in our professional and trade union circles, to give our fullest support to all persons 
and governments working for this lofty cause, which offers the last chance of peace 
and the one promise of a great future for this generation and those that will 
succeed it.6 
At the beginning of 1949 the International Juridical Section of the European Movement 
was set up and started working to prepare a draft Convention in which the Contracting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3    Austria 12, Belgium 18, Britain 140, Denmark 32, Ireland 5, France 185, Germany 51, Greece 18, Italy 
57, Liechtenstein 3, Luxembourg 8, the Netherlands 59, Norway 12, Saar 5, Sweden 19, Switzerland 
39.  
4    Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Spain the USA and 
Yugoslavia.  
5    A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe, Manchester University Press, 2006, p.88. 
6    Ibidem, Churchill was not speaking on behalf of his nation. In those years he was chef of the opposition 
forces and Great Britain, instead, was firmly contrary to a possible European Federation project. 
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Parties would undertake to uphold the fundamental liberties of their citizens and 
establish a European Court to adjudicate in cases of alleged violation. The prepared 
draft was then submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, with 
recommendations concerning the importance of the Court item.  
The European Convention took most of its structure from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 
December 1948. The Declaration was a tool of soft law, this means it didn’t contain 
legally binding obligations, but its authors wanted to have “a moral value and authority 
which is without precedent in the history of the world”7. The Declaration in this way 
gave expression to what had to become principles of law recognized and acted upon 
by States members of the UN.8 
Once the Declaration was proclaimed the General Assembly instructed the 
Commission on Human Rights to give priority to the drafting of a Covenant containing 
legal obligations for States and measures of implementations. In 1952 the General 
Assembly opted for 2 different Covenants: one concerning economic, social and 
cultural rights and the other on civil and political rights. In 1966, after the submission of 
the drafts to the ECOSOC and the General Assembly the two Covenants and the 
Optional protocol to the ICCPR were approved.  
When the Council of Europe started its work in 1949, it found ready to hand the 
statement of rights contained in the UDHR, while it was already available the first draft 
of the UN Covenant prepared by the Commission on Human Rights of the United 
Nations. The Committee of Ministers, despite the recommendations received, did not 
include human rights on the draft agenda, which it drew up for the first session of the 
Assembly in 19499. Afterwards, three proposal relating to human rights were made by 
different groups of representatives, and the Assembly itself proposed to include on its 
agenda the study of “measures for the fulfillment on the declared aim of the Council of 
Europe in accordance with Article one of the Statute, in regard to the maintenance and 
further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7     L. Harees., The Mirage of Dignity on the Highways of Human “Progress”, Authorhouse, 2012, p.171. 
8   H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, British Yearbook of International Law, 
1948, p.354. With the passage of time the Declaration has acquired greatly increased authority by 
virtue of its reaffirmation by the General Assembly on several occasions, its incorporation by reference 
into national constitutions and otherwise. Some authors now consider it as a statement of customary 
international law.  
9   Consultative Assembly, Minutes of Proceedings of the Second Sitting, 11 August 1949. A.H. 
Robertson, Human Rights in Europe…. p.32. 
10   M. W. Janis, R. S. Kay, A. W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law Text and Materials, Third Edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p.212. 
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The fear of creating a duplicate of the UN Declaration, creating as consequence 
confusion between the two organizations, because of the setting of two different 
treaties on the same matter, made the Committee of Ministers voting against the 
inclusion of the item on the Assembly’s agenda. Winston Churchill replied to this 
decision saying “a European Assembly forbidden to discuss human rights would indeed 
have been ludicrous proposition to put to the world”11.  
 
The insistence of the Assembly on the definition of the human rights issue led to the 
1949 formal proposal of establishing an organization within the Council of Europe to 
ensure and guarantee the respect of human rights. The first question toward the 
establishment of a human rights system of protection was about the rights that should 
had been protected. Basically the question was: Should they be limited to the common 
rights as in the American Bill of Rights or in the French Declaration, or should the 
Convention include social and economic rights?  
Together with the proposed list of fundamental rights the Assembly requested all 
member states to respect the fundamental principles of democracy (hold free elections, 
universal suffrage, secret ballots etc.) in order to guarantee the respect of the rights. It 
was then to be left to each signatory state to determine the ways and the rules by 
which ensure those rights and guarantee the application of the principles. Moreover, for 
a successful system it was also proposed, and then accepted, the creation of two 
important new organs: a European Commission for Human Rights and a European 
Court of Human Rights.  
In November 1949 a Committee of governmental experts was appointed to conclude a 
draft of the Convention that was then elaborated by the Committee of Ministers and 
that mostly followed the definitions of the Commission on Human Rights of the UN. In 
this context, one of the sagest decisions had been that to establish detailed definitions 
of rights to be protected, in order to let governments know whether or not their internal 
laws were in conformity with the Convention.  
During the 1950s several new proposal and changes had been made and discussed 
during the sessions held by the Assembly, but despite the need in many issues to 
compromise, important changes were made. As Lord Layton stated, “I regard the 
Convention watered down as it is, as a most important landmark in European history.”12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11   Consultative Assembly, Official Report of 17 August 1949, Debates of the Assembly, 1949, Vol. I 
p.284.	  
12   Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p.118. 
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Thus, the European Convention, despite all its difficulties in achieving results, 
represented in 1950 a new technique in the drafting of treaties, which resulted from the 
dual nature of the Council of Europe. On one side the Consultative Assembly (the 
parliamentary organ) that proposed the conclusion of the Convention, and on the other 
side the Committee of Ministers (the governmental organ), which acted on that. The 
Council of Europe’s technique of making conventions has been one of its most 
successful achievements, resulted in many other consecutive and equally successful 
conventions.  
After fifteen months of negotiations between 1949 and 1950, the United Kingdom 
deposited the first ratification on 8 March 1951. The Convention entered into force on 3 
September 1953 and the First Protocol on 18 May 1954. However, the Convention will 
have to wait until 1974 to obtain the ratification by all the members of the Council of 
Europe. 
 
1.2   THE SUPERVISORY ORGANS UNDER THE CONVENTION  
 
The authors of the Convention believed it was not sufficient to impose the Contracting 
Parties to respect the different rights and freedom; they required also some measures 
of international control. In other words national obligations were not enough, it was 
necessary an international machinery to reinforce them. In this respect the Council of 
Europe followed the principle already established by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1948, according to which the proclamation of the UDHR would be 
followed by another instrument providing for “measures of implementation”. This idea 
was clarified in Article 19 of the Convention, asserting the establishment of the Court 
and the Commission of Human Rights “to ensure the observance of the engagements 
under-taken by the High Contracting Parties”13.  Thus, under Article 59 of the ECHR, 
members of the Commission and of the Court were entitled, during the discharge of 
their functions, to the privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe and in the agreements made thereunder.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13   M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practices, Sixth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p.264. 
14   D. Gomien, D. Harris, Leo Zwaak, Law and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the European Social Charter, Council of Europe Publishing, 1999, p.31.  
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1.2.1 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
 
The members of the Council of Europe agreed on the idea of the Assembly that a 
European Commission was needed. This Commission had to be an impartial, 
international body to which complaints could be made in the event of any member state 
failing to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention. The relevant provisions of the Commission were contained in the third 
section of the Convention, which was constituted by Articles 20-3715.  According to the 
Convention the number of members had to be equal to that of the Contracting Parties 
and that the members did not have to represent states. Thus, the members had to be 
independent from their governments.  
Its principal functions were to investigate presumed violations of the Convention and to 
draw up reports concerning those violations. So, from its very beginning, the 
Commission had an intermediate position in the system of European Human Rights 
law. On the one hand, it was meant to shield the Court from a possible deluge of 
individual complaints, a function that also protected the traditional sovereignty of the 
member states. On the other hand, the Commission was meant to serve as an 
international institution directly accessible to individuals, a radical change from 
traditional state-centered international legal process. Thus, the Commission had 
become not only an intermediary between individual and states but also between 
individuals and the Strasbourg Court. Complaints about violations of the Human rights 
protected by the Convention were sent first to the Commission. According to Article 24 
of the Convention, states could refer to the Commission “any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention by an other High Contracting Party”16. Article 24 permitted 
any contracting state to complain about the conduct of any other contracting state 
regardless of the nationality of the injured individual. Furthermore the Convention 
provided that a state might agree to permit private parties themselves to petition the 
Commission for relief. This aspect of the European law had to be found firstly in Article 
25: The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15   Ibid.	  
16   Directorate of Human Rights Council of Europe, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights, Springer-Science + 
Business Media, B.V, 1962, p.140. 
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Parties against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes 
the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High 
Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any 
way the effective exercise of this right17.  
The Commission’s three principal functions, which were filtering complaints through 
admissibility proceedings, mediating disputes through the process called “friendly 
settlement” and fact-finding, and reporting on admitted but unsettled disputes, have all 
been absorbed since 1999 by the reformed European Court of Human Rights18.  
 
1.2.2 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
During the negotiations of the Convention different opinions arose regarding whether or 
not a European Court should be created at all. Lots of doubts were due to the 
preferable number of judges and to the admission of the right of individual petitions.  
So, since the proposal to create a court with compulsory jurisdiction did not receive the 
support of the majority, it was not included in the draft Convention. A compromise 
solution was then found out, toward the involvement of an optional provision 
concerning whereby the Court would had jurisdiction only in respect of those states 
which expressly accepted it by making a declaration. On the date of entry into force of 
the Convention only three States had accepted the right of individual petition 
(Denmark, Sweden and Ireland) and two the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
(Denmark and Ireland)19. Once, during the following years, the acceptances of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had been received, the procedure for the election 
of the judges was put in motion. Under Article 3920 of the Convention, the judges were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17   European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), Article 
19. 
18   M. W. Janis, Richard S. Kay, Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law Text and Materials, 
Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.75 
19   A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: Being an Account of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 Nov. 1950, of the 
Protocol thereto and of the machinery created thereby: the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights, Manchester University Press, U.S.A, Oceana Publications 
Inc. , 1963, pp.91-92. 
20   ECHR - ARTICLE 39 - Friendly settlements  
     1. At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned 
with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as 
defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.  
     2. Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 shall be confidential.  
     3. If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by means of a decision, 
which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached.  
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elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe from lists of persons 
nominated by the member states. This somehow repeated in reverse the procedure for 
the elections of the members of the Commission of Human Rights, who, under Article 
21, were elected by the Committee of Ministers from a list of names drawn up by the 
Consultative Assembly on the basis of lists proposed by the national delegations, each 
of which put forward three candidates. The participation of both organs of the Council 
of Europe was thus secured in the election of both the Commission and the Court. The 
membership of the Court has changed considerably with the time because of deaths, 
resignations, new elections and the admission of new members of the Council of 
Europe; despite that the requirement requested by Article 3921 had always been 
respected. 
 
1.3  THE EEC TREATY OF 1957 AND THE SILENCE POST-RATIFICATION 
 
The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Communities (EEC) in 1957, 
made only indirect references to human rights22. These can be found specifically in 
Article 7 (non-discrimination on account of nationality)23 and also in Article 119 (equal 
pay for equal work by men and women)24. More important than the treaty’s failure to 
identify non-discrimination as a human right has been the treaty’s lack of intention to 
set out that principle as a human right. The Treaty of Rome, as legal instrument 
establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies 
of Member States25, was distinctly focused on economics and the elimination of 
market-distorting measures. Discrimination that was not based on grounds specific to a 
particular type of employment was seen in that context quite simply, as inefficient. It is 
true that Article 2 of the Treaty provided: “The Community shall have its task by 
establishing common market… , an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between the States belonging to it…”26, however, the goal of a higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     4. This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise the execution 
of the terms of the friendly settlement as set out in the decision. 
21   Ibid. 
22   Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature March 25,1957 and 
entered into force January 1,1958.  
23   Ibid., Article 7 of the ECC Treaty reads, in relevant part, “Within the scope of this Treaty, … any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited…” 
24   Ibid., Article 119 of the ECC Treaty reads, in relevant part, “Each Member State shall…maintain the 
application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work”. 
25   Ibid., Article 2. 
26   Ibid. 
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standard of living was more directed at ensuring an adequate food supply in Post-War 
Europe than the protection of the second and third generation of human rights27. 
Indeed, the provision regarding the maintenance of labor standards recited: “Member 
States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved 
standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonization while the 
improvement is being maintained”.  
The Treaty of Rome then was little more than a trade agreement, either in fact or in 
aim, but not at all a decent tool of protection of human rights.  
 
It has to be underlined that there was no explicit decision to exclude all reference to 
human rights, or to rule out any role for human rights protection in those two treaties. 
On the contrary, the European Economic and Euratom Communities were intended to 
serve the “human ideal of brotherhood” shared by the six member states.28 In the 
aftermath of the failure of the EDC (European Defense Community), however, it was 
made the decision, in accordance with the Messina Resolution provisions, to establish 
the EEC29, remaining close to the terms of the Resolution and excluding in so doing 
any discussion of any issue that was not expressly mentioned in the Messina 
Resolution. This strategy was strongly supported by Spaak, at that point Belgian 
minister for Foreign Affairs, who chaired the relevant committee (the Intergovernmental 
Committee on European Integration) and prepared the report that led ultimately to the 
drafting of the EEC Treaty.30 In particular, he was determined to avoid any subject that 
was not expressly mentioned in the Messina Resolution, in so doing avoiding the many 
controversial and political issues that led to the downfall of the EDC and EPC treaties.31  
The subject of human rights protection was actually raised during the drafting process. 
It seems that an attempt was made by the German delegation during the drafting of the 
EEC Treaty to include in the treaty a human rights “reservation clause” similar to that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27   F. M. Abbott, C. Breining-Kaufmann, and T. Cottier, International Trade and Human Rights, Foundation 
and Conceptual issues, The University of Michigan Press, 2006, pp.314   
28   Statement of Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, EEC and CECA Treaty Negotiations, Rome 25 March 
1957,  http://www.ena.lu/discours-paul-henri-spaak-occasion-signature-traites-rome- rome-25-mars-
1957-010000644.html  
29   The aim of the resolution was to revive the process of European integration by focusing on economic 
inte- gration and the establishment of a common market. Resolution of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of the ECSC in Messina, CM3/NEGO/006, June 1955, 
http://www.ena.lu/resolution_adopted_foreign_ministers _ecsc_member_states_messina_june_1955-
2-987  
30   Now simply known as the Spaak Report, it was formally entitled the Brussels Report on the General 
Common Market and adopted in June 1956. 
31   P.H. Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-66, Littlehampton Book Services 
Ltd,1971, p.87. 
	  	   20	  
contained in the draft EDC treaty. Article 3 of the EDC treaty had articulated the 
subsidiarity principle and indicated that the EDC would not take measures impinging on 
protected human rights and freedoms. The individual’s fundamental human rights were 
thus placed as a wall against the exercise of power by the new Community and as a 
constraint on the way in which the conferred powers were to be exercised. The 
German proposal for a similar clause in the EEC Treaty was rejected by other 
delegations, for two basic reasons: the perceived risk that member states might invoke 
such a clause to refuse particular Community actions, thereby undermining Community 
goals; and the difficulty or impossibility of attending to all of the different sets of rights 
protected under the various member state constitutions without subordinating 
Community laws and goals to those multiple and varying requirements. 
In other words, by the time that the EEC and Euratom Treaties were drafted, the 
prevailing vision of the new European system had changed. It was no longer to be one 
that would have a substantial role in promoting and protecting human rights, and it 
would not work alongside the Council of Europe and the ECHR system for that 
purpose. A new strategy of limited, functional, step-by-step progress toward closer 
European integration was adopted instead. The powers and ambitions of the new 
Communities were to be narrowly determined by the common-market mandate outlined 
in the Messina Resolution. Human rights protection was not to be addressed. 
 
The German delegation’s vision was that human rights would served as a negative 
constraint on the integration process, as a residual core to be protected against the 
institutions and potential intrusions of the new Community, just as against any 
institutions of government. The delegation’s effort to introduce human rights into the 
EEC treaty obviously failed, but not because of any specific objections to the 
Community’s having a defined role in the area of human rights. Over a decade later, 
this same vision of human rights would actually re-emerge and consequently begin to 
shape the Community’s conception of human rights. What propelled this later 
reshaping of the Community legal order was a series of cases brought by German 
litigants before the ECJ. 
So the silence of the 1957 treaties on human rights is best understood as no more than 
a consequence of a decision to rethink the optimal path toward closer European 
integration and to follow a path of gradual integration instead of taking the single giant 
step toward European political community. In other words, anything more should be 
read into that silence; for example, that it reflected a decision by the drafters or 
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governments that human rights matters should remain outside the scope of the new 
Communities or that the Council of Europe would be better placed to supervise 
questions of human rights in the new Communities and their member states. On the 
contrary, once the Council of Europe was firmly established as a forum for specific 
kinds of intergovernmental cooperation, the more integration-oriented states took the 
view that it was not the appropriate forum for closer European integration; the two sets 
of European organizations were perceived as moving on different, although parallel, 
paths. The Council of Europe was established as a broader, European organization for 
intergovernmental cooperation on a range of issues that included human rights and 
cultural, educational, health, and economic matters. The monitoring and coordination 
mechanisms of the Council of Europe were not seen as a substitute for some of the 
possible functions of the Communities, even in the field of human rights. By contrast, 
the European Communities were a vehicle for states to pursue closer and deeper 
integration through a system in which they conceded some of their sovereign powers 
and accepted a significant degree of supranational control and influence by the new 
organization. The gradual strengthening of the ECHR and the European Court of 
Human Rights certainly sustained the interest of the Communities in maintaining close 
links with the ECHR system, including its Court, and the question of EEC accession to 
the ECHR was repeatedly considered, albeit always as a first step toward the 
Community developing its own policy on human rights. But the question of the EEC’s 
own engagement with human rights issues (both internally and externally) and the 
desirability of establishing a more explicit EEC human rights dimension continued to be 
raised throughout the early years and decades of the Communities’ existence. A series 
of initiatives in the 1960s and the early 1970s are especially noteworthy in this context, 
including the Fouchet Plan of 1961, which proposed that it would be “the aim of the 
Union . . . to contribute thus in the Member States to the defence of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and democracy,”32 the 1968 European Commission declaration 
on completion of the customs union, which called for the next steps forward toward 
political union based on a “Europe of the peoples” and concerned with “human 
problems,” and the 1970 Davignon report33 on political union, which asserted that “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32   Article 2 of the proposed treaty drawn up under the Fouchet Plan and presented at the Bonn 
Conference of 1961. (Draft Treaty - Fouchet Plan I, Art. 2 , Nov. 2, 1961.)  
33   http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aa190000  
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united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect, and the liberty and 
rights of man, and bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments.”34 
More generally, the pragmatic decision to remain close to the Messina Resolution 
indications and to avoid the failure of the EEC Treaty did not imply that the newly 
established EEC had no aspirations for the Communities to develop into a broader and 
deeper political project. On the contrary, various provisions of the Treaty, including the 
preamble (“determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”) and the mandate in Article 138.3 for direct elections to the 
European Parliament, suggest that the aspiration for closer union and broader political 
integration was not abandoned, but only postponed. 
 
1.4 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT BETWEEN THE 1960s 
AND THE 1970s  
 
Between the late 1960s and the early 1970s the world had to face lots of changes, and 
Europe in particular had been subject of a reshape due to a new European Integration 
process. As far as concern Western Europe, changes in political leadership took place 
almost at the same time in the most important countries: from De Gaulle to Pompidou 
in France, from Kiesinger to Brandt in West Germany, from Wilson to Heath in Britain35. 
These changes led to new opinions, new policies and new goals, whose developments 
left an important sign in the European Community. Values that had been part of the 
Western Europe for decades became part of the past in a few years. Europeans left 
behind their former reconstructionist approach adopted after the World War II entering 
a new path. Also the political sphere had to take into consideration such developments 
in its decisions, at its national, regional and international level. 
 
After the Treaty of Rome, which left many open questions about a policy on human 
rights, Europe lived years of silence, incertitude and more than a few clashes. A 
relevant role during those years had been the one of the Council of Europe, which, 
once again came back in the European ground making a step forward trough the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34   G.M. Gaspare and H.Tareko, Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality: How Democracy 
clauses Help Democratic Consoldation and Deepening, Routledge, 2015, p.107. 	  
35   A. Varsori, G. Migani, Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s, Entering a Different World, 
European Interuniversity Press, 2011, p.2. 
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construction of a new policy strongly requested by the public opinion.  On October 18, 
1961, the European Social Charter opened for signature, evolving over time as it had 
been for the ECHR. The document entered into force only four years later, on February 
26, 1965, with the scope to complement the ECHR by establishing a regional European 
system for the protection of economic and social rights. All but six of the forty-seven 
member states of the Council of Europe became parties to the original Charter and 
most of them ratified also the successively revised Charter.  
Despite the relevant adherence of the Member States, the Charter revealed itself as a 
single act with few further developments. After the ratification, in fact, Europe returned 
to the previous silence that characterized the years after the Treaty of Rome.  
Paradoxically, the Community during the 1970s obtained much more successful results 
on the matter of human rights in external relations than in the internal sphere.  The only 
considerable aftermaths within the Community were made under the pressure of some 
Member States, mostly in the economic and social sphere and thanks to the 
actions/decision taken by the European Court.  So, little by little, human rights concerns 
started to appear in the European Economic Community agenda, but from the internal 
point of view, they gained recognition as general principles of law whose protection 
was to be assured by the Court.  The Court affirmed the importance of human rights 
and their place within the EEC legal system, and consequently human rights became 
no longer foreign to the integration process. Moreover, in June 1979, the European 
Parliament had been, for the first time, elected by universal suffrage and became the 
main advocate of human rights, channelling the demands of the European Public 
Opinion.  
 
Together, in many European Member States the ECHR provisions were incorporated 
into national law and the European integration process proceeded rapidly. On 1 
January 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joint the European 
Community, raising the number of Member States to nine. The short but brutal Arab-
Israeli war of October 197336 resulted in an energy crisis and economic problems in 
Europe. The last right-wing dictatorships in Europe came to an end with the overthrow 
of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974 and the death of General Franco of Spain in 
1975. The European regional policy started to transfer huge sums to create jobs and 
infrastructure in poorer areas, giving a small but noteworthy contribute to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36   The war was fought by the coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Siria against Israel from October 6 
to 25, 1973. The fighting mostly took place in the Sinai territories that had been occupied by Israel 
since the Six-day War of 1967. 
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development of people’s economic and social rights. The repression exercised by the 
above mentioned regimes in the late ‘60s and in the ‘70s, and the attention this 
repression was given, for example by the European Parliament, at the time made the 
EEC draw consequences for its relations with them. As regards Greece, the EEC had 
concluded an Association Agreement37 of indefinite duration with the country in 1961, 
which was meant to pave the way to full membership. The coup d’état of April 1967 
and the subsequent military regime in Greece counteracted this course of affairs and 
caused a freeze of the implementation of the Association Agreement38 that was only 
activated from September 1974. On 1 January 1981 Greece acceded to the European 
Community. Relations with Spain and Portugal were instead for a long time limited to 
what was perceived to be absolutely necessary from a commercial point of view, such 
as the preferential trade agreements of limited duration concluded between 1970 and 
1972. After the Portuguese revolution in 1974 and the death of Franco in 1975, the 
relations were gradually intensified and culminated in Community membership as from 
1 January 1986.  Basically, the Council of Europe in those years maintained the same 
flexible approach as previously. In the case of Greece, which under its military dictators 
had earlier resigned from the Council of Europe and denounced the Convention, the 
new Government pledged to restore democracy was allowed ample time between 
renewal of ratification and acceptance of the two key clauses (article 25 and 46). A 
similar Council benevolence was shown to Spain and Portugal, where applications for 
membership followed swiftly upon the ending of their military dictatorships. In the case 
of Portugal, after its “carnation revolution”39, the Council was content for it to enter 
reservations to six different Convention articles, all of which continued until 1987. 
Clearly in these cases the dominant goal was to nurse these states back to democratic 
health, in full awareness by this time that the Convention implementation machinery 
and the extensive case-law had made conformity with Convention guarantees a much 
more daunting prospect than had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37   On 9 July 1961, Greece and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed an Association 
Agreement that provided for the possibility of future accession. The Agreement would enter into force 
on 1 November 1962. See http://aei.pitt.edu/960/1/enlargement_greece.pdf  
38   At the time the Commission took the position that because the Association Agreement contained no 
cancellation provisions, there was a legal obligation to implement the Agreement. The solution to the 
dilemma was found in minimal implementation of the Agreement (named “current administration”) 
which in practice freezed the relations. Some members of the European Parliament argued that the 
rupture of democratic structures in Greece changed circumstances to such an extent that resorting to 
the clause rebus sic stantibus would have been justified. Others argued that maintaining the 
relationship would have allowed political influencing of the situation as well as contact with the 
opposition.  E.R. Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993, pp. 182-185. 
39   C. Salm, Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s. European Community Development Aid and 
Southern Enlargement, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p.102. 
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1.5  THE NINE AND THE “THIRD BASKET” OF THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL 
ACT (1975) 
 
The years of the second half of the 1970s were labeled as the ones in which the grand 
détente quickly deteriorated: not only did the Soviet invasion of Afganistan of in 
December 1979 mark the end of the 1970s, but it opened the period of a new Cold War 
that would find its end ten years later with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  In such a 
panorama the Helsinki conference represented the most obvious symbol of détente , 
as weel as its shortcomings, misgivings, wrong hopes and misperceptions. When the 
Final Act had been signed, it came to be alternatively considered as the climax in a 
new relationship between East and West or the mere official recognition of the 
European balance that had been opened in the mid-1950s with the early détente. 
However, in a few years, owing to the new Cold War, the Helsinki agreement appeared 
to be void of any meaning, with the obvious exception of the human rights issue. For 
some time opinion-makers, as well as politicians and diplomats seemed to regard the 
emerging struggle for the recognition of human rights in Eastern Europe as a 
development that very few CSCE negotiators, if any, had been able to foresee.40 
 
The "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" was formally opened on July 
3, 1973, continued at Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975, and was 
concluded at Helsinki on August 1, 1975. The thirty-five participants included all the 
eastern and western European states, except Albania, regardless of their size, the 
Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, the Papacy, and the three "mini-states" of 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino.  The final agreement, which was signed on 
August 1, 1975, included four sections relating to: questions involving the security of 
Europe; cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the 
environment; cooperation in humanitarian and other fields; and the "follow-up" to the 
conference. The final act did not follow the lead of the Universal Declaration or of the 
United Nations Covenants in providing that "everyone has the right to" a number of 
fundamental rights and freedoms; rather, it provided that "the participating States will 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. . .... “ Thus, in accordance with the 
whole philosophy of the final act, the action of states rather than the situation or 
behavior of individuals was the target of the human rights provisions. The first three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40   Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, How the West Shaped the Helsinki 
CSCE, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., Brussels, 2009, pp.206-208. 
	  	   26	  
sections of the actual text of the final act are commonly known as three "baskets", the 
third of which concerned human rights. 
The impact of the “basked” found during the years opposite opinions. On one side 
scholars denied that this agreement would mark the beginning of a new era of detente 
and cooperation in Europe. The believe such hopes, have been disappointed because 
little changed, and the old atmosphere of mutual suspicion seemed to continue almost 
unabated for many years. On the other side many as Angela Romano did, argued that 
the Helsinki Conference was not only the long hoped goal of Moscow’s policy towards 
Europe, but also the consequence of the development in Western positions, especially 
as far as the leading West European nations were concerned.  
 
As the Nine members of the EC were so committed to a successful outcome of the 
conference, their leaders focused their attention on issues that would both safeguard 
and promote definite West European interests and values in the CSCE Final 
Agreement. This was the reason why the Nine singled out the Human Rights Issue as 
the most relevant one.41 The West’s preoccupation with bringing the human rights 
issue within the ambit of cooperation in the CSCE was reflected in the Act both in the 
Decalogue42 and in the establishment of a third basket on cooperation in humanitarian 
fields. From the outset, the West was demanding support for greater freedom of 
movement for persons, ideas and information between countries which, in spite of their 
geographical proximity and cultural affinities, found themselves divided by the Iron 
Curtain. By giving such support, the countries of the West also sought to contribute to 
resolving specific humanitarian problems concerning, for example, binational marriage 
or meetings of families living in different States. Their challenge was to overcome the 
Soviet opposition to the entry on the agenda of an international conference of items 
which, for the Soviets, fell within their national competence — and, in particular, came 
under their sovereign right of control over entry to and exit from their territory by their 
own nationals or the need to protect Socialist citizens from Western attacks on ideology 
— and bring into East-West relations the key to their future transformation.  
 
Although the First Meeting relating to the Follow-up to the CSCE, held in Belgrade, 
failed specifically on account of the categorical refusal by the countries of Eastern 
Europe publicly to take stock of human rights matters, the countries of the West 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41   Ibid. 
42   See Principle VII on human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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succeeded, as from the Second Follow-up Meeting in Madrid, in extending the scope of 
the third basket to encompass religious and trade union freedom and to visa and 
immigration matters. That triggered more detailed discussions, in particular after the 
meetings of experts, first in Ottawa in 1985 on respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and then in Berne in 1986 on contacts between people. 
However, it was not until the Third Follow-up Meeting in Vienna (1986–1989) that a 
new phase was initiated in that area with the introduction of the ‘human dimension’ of 
the CSCE. From then onwards, that comprehensive concept, comprising the 
humanitarian issues of the third basket and the commitments relating to Principle VII, 
would closely link human rights and security. Furthermore, preparations had been 
finalized for monitoring the implementation of commitments by way of a “human 
dimension mechanism” based on requests for information and bilateral diplomatic 
meetings. In addition, a three-stage Conference (in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow) 
on the Human Dimension of the CSCE was entrusted with considering the application 
and development of the Vienna mechanism.  
 
1.6 SOLANGE I AND THE ISSUE OF THE EEC ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 
 
Always in the mid 1970s, the European Economic Community saw its role and powers 
questioned, opening a debate concerning particularly the fundamental rights 
recognized and assured by its Constitution.  The promoter of this international debate 
was Germany, which, through the internationale Handelsgesellschaft case43 brought to 
light a very important question for the West German government, the Community and 
the other Members: did the “Community law” of the EEC supersede the fundamental 
rights established in Germany’s basic law? Of course the issue concerned not only 
Germany but all the Member States.   
Article 24 of the German constitution permitted the transfer of sovereign powers to 
intergovernmental institutions. Thus, in general the German courts had no difficulty in 
accepting the supremacy of Community law. However, one issue that did cause some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43   Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (1970). The Common Agricultural Policy permitted exports only by exporters who obtained 
an export licence, on a deposit of money, that could be forfeited if he failed to make the export during 
the licence’s validity period. The Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH claimed that the licensing 
system was a disproportionate violation of their right to conduct a business under the German 
constitution, because it did more than was necessary to achieve the public objective at hand. Alina 
Kaczorowska-Ireland, European Union Law, Routledge, New York 2016, pp.236-238. 
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difficulty was the question of whether Community law could take priority over the 
inalienable fundamental rights contained in the German Basic Law. In this case the 
German Constitutional Court stated that in the present state of evolution of the 
Community it would not renounce its right to uphold German fundamental rights in the 
face of a conflict with Community law. The Constitutional Court did not accept that 
Community law had to take priority even over German fundamental rights in cases 
brought before the European Court. However, on the facts of this case the German 
Court accepted that the Community legislation did not violate German fundamental 
rights. The reservations noted by the Constitutional Court included the fact that the 
European Parliament was not at the time directly elected44 and that the Community law 
did not include a precise catalogue of fundamental rights.45  
The Solange I decision46 did not necessarily imply that the EEC had to accede to the 
ECHR. The Community could have developed its own bill of rights, which would have 
provided the rights protection required. This was indeed the path followed by the 
Community institutions when they adopted the Joint Declaration on Fundamental 
Rights on April 5, 1977. The Declaration recalled the “prime” importance they attached 
to fundamental rights and in particular to the ECHR.47 The Commission itself, in its 
memorandum on the accession to the ECHR, stressed the compatibility of the two way 
of proceeding.48 Proponents of this route reasoned with Member States whose 
constitutions contained guarantees of rights, while this did not prevent them from 
become parties to the Convention.  
 
This “incorporation route” was long and tortuous, leaving the debate open for more 
than thirty years. The Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission on Human Rights of 1977 accelerated the process of incorporation, but 
without reaching relevant achievements. The first judgments of the Court requiring the 
Community to respect fundamental rights made no direct reference to the ECHR.49  At 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44   The first elections were held in 1979. 
45   On the other side, the dissenting opinion emphasized that the German Constitutional Court was bound 
by the EC law. 
46   May 29, 1974 
47   O.J. 1977, C 103. 
48   “It should be clearly stated from the outset that accession of the European Communities to the ECHR 
does not form an obstacle to the preparation of a special Community catalogue, nor does it prevent in 
any way the Court of Justice of the European Communities from further developing its exemplary case 
law on the protection of fundamental rights” Memorandum of 4 April 1979, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, supp. 2/79, para 8. 
49   Case 4/73, Nold [1974] ECR 491, refers generally to indications drawn from international instruments. 
Similarly, six years later Case 136/79, Panasonic, [1980] ECR 2033, refers to both the common 
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the time, not all Member States had ratified the Convention. The first direct reference 
appeared shortly after the ratification of the Convention by France in May 1974, in 
Rutili50, even if the Convention did not yet appear to be incorporated as such.  After 
those sentences discussion about the matter continued to be at the center of the 
European arena, and the option of concluding an accession agreement remained open 
and was proposed by the Commission in 1979.51 Nevertheless, for a long time this 
proposal was unheeded and it was not until the Belgian Presidency in the second half 
of 1993 that an ad hoc working group was formed to examine the issue. As it’s well 
known, unlike the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community was not 
generally known in the past as a human rights organization and certainly did not see 
itself as such. Instead, it saw itself as pioneering a historically unique experiment of 
cross-border economic integration, an experiment that was not obviously or visibly 
based on high principles such as human rights. The main aim of the EEC was to 
ensure economic and social progress “by common action in eliminating the barriers 
which divide Europe"52, and not the protection of rights. More and more sectors of the 
national economies were hence forth to be integrated into a common market.  
Market integration in the EEC was to be advanced by conferring four freedoms: free 
movement of workers, the right of establishment, free movement of capital, and the 
right to provide services. It is of course possible to view the four freedoms listed above 
from the perspective of human rights theory and doctrine, but the reality is that they 
were granted because of their purely instrumental value in helping to forge a new 
common market.  
Through the project of constructing a common market, it was hoped that the EEC 
model would lead to more political integration in two ways. First, any common market 
used to require common efforts at maintaining and stabilizing it. National rules would 
not do, since there was always the standing danger that such laws would reflect 
national interests and not a common European public interest. Second, all markets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constitutional traditions and the international instruments to which Member States “collaborated or of 
which they are signatories”. 
50   “Taken as a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of Members States ... are a specific 
manifestation of the more general principle enshrined in ... the Convention for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms ... ratified by all Member States...”, Case 36/75, Rutili, [1975] ECR 
1219. 
51   D.Ehlers, U.Beckel, European Fundamentl Rights and Freedoms, De Gruyter Recht, Berlin, 2007, 
p.14. 
52   Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty – original text: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0023  
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used to have impacts that require regulation. Effective regulation inevitably entails a 
common approach, something that can only be achieved through more political 
integration. Hence it was hoped at least in some quarters that there would be a natural 
spillover from the exigencies of economic integration into an unstoppable dynamic for 
political integration. 
The Council of Europe and the European Community shared the same ultimate goal of 
a Europe at peace with itself and its neighbors but despite this the original treaties did 
not spell out a vision of political integration, and since these treaties focused mainly on 
means (especially economic means) rather than ends, they allowed those who held 
opposed visions of the ultimate ends of European integration to sign up together to the 
technocratic process of economic integration. In other words, the focus on economic 
means allowed those countries that viewed Europe as a transcendent ideal and those 
countries that viewed Europe as founded on (and bounded by) the nation- state to 
contribute equally to the economic experiment.  
The argument between these competing visions of Europe provided the prism through 
which human rights have became viewed in the European context. The argument for 
more visible human rights provision in European treaty law fitted perfectly with the 
march towards greater political integration and the movement towards a federal 
Europe. But here laid the problem; many who favor a Europe of the nations argued 
against more human rights provision because it would have entailed ceding more 
sovereign power to the Institutions of the Community. 
 
1.7 THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 1970s AND THE 1990s 
 
1.7.1   THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE 1970s 
  
When the Member States of the European Community decided in September 1970 to 
coordinate their foreign policies through European Political Cooperation (EPC), they 
faced the problem that the social and political conditions shaping foreign policy in each 
Member State were extremely diverse. In the absence of a clearly homogeneous 
European identity, which could form the basis for a common foreign policy, the Member 
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States sought to identify certain common values, drawn from the process of European 
Integration, which could serve as the basis for foreign policy coordination. The 1973 
Copenhagen Declaration on the European Identity, in which the Member States first 
sought to define their position and responsibilities in foreign affairs, noted that the 
Member States were “determinated to defend the principles of representative 
democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights”.53 In the 
following years, EPC issued innumerable reports and declarations in which the 
Member States reiterated the principles which guided European foreign policy: 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and respect for international 
law; a commitment to democracy and human rights; the use of diplomacy rather than 
coercion in international relations; the need for international cooperation to promote 
economic and social progress; and the need for indigenous peoples to determine their 
own fate.54 
The Member States thus placed the principles that underpinned their communal 
relations at the heart of their relations with the rest of the world. The modern state 
system, based on sovereign equality and non-interference on domestic affairs, has 
often been seen as a guarantor of order in international relations as it enables 
coexistence between states with different values, while foreign policy which seeks to 
promote human rights has been stigmatized as dangerously idealistic and naïve.55 The 
Treaty of Rome, however, had transformed the nature of statehood in Western Europe. 
The founding member States of the European Community agreed to establish a post-
modern state system, whereby they ceded part of their sovereign powers to 
international institutions and replaced the traditional distinction between domestic and 
foreign affairs with a system of mutual interference in each other’s internal affairs in the 
belief that their future security and prosperity could best be ensured by transparency, 
openness and interdependence.56 This system was underpinned by respect for human 
rights, ensured not only through the developing jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights but also through adherence to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, democracy, which was a prerequisite for membership of the Community, and 
the rule of law, ensured through the independence and legal supremacy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53   Bulletin of the European Communities 12/1973. 
54   The most detailed examination of EPC documentation has shown that human rights, democracy and 
self-determination were mentioned in more than half of all EPC statements issued between 1970 and 
1989. S Stavridis, Foreign Policy and Democratic Principles: The Case of European Political 
Cooperation, Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 1991. 
55   H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.112. 
56   R. Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order, 1966, p.89. 
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European Court.  
As far as concern the countries out of the Community, until the end of the Cold War, 
they have often been suspicious of the concept of human rights precisely because of 
their European nature. For the developing countries, sovereignty represented a 
powerful instrument for shaping their national identities and the principal normative and 
ideological defense against foreign domination. They were generally hostile to any 
actions, including the promotion of human rights, which could be seen as interference 
in their domestic affairs. Moreover, countries which had achieved self-determination 
only after many years of colonial subjugation saw considerable irony in their former 
imperial masters seeking to base foreign policy on human rights.57 The Member States 
decision to place human rights at the center of the emerging European foreign policy 
guaranteed that they would be drawn into conflict with the developing states if they 
attempted to match their words with actions. 
Despite the rhetoric of a common attachment to human rights in foreign policy, the 
weight that different Member States placed on human rights in their bilateral foreign 
policies has varied significantly. Although the dynamic of European integration led the 
Member States to identify human rights as a central principle of European foreign 
policy, differences in national interests and attitudes have led each Member of the 
Community to form its own view on the correct approach to human rights issues 
abroad. As consequence, despite the achievement of a common European 
commitment to human rights, the States ‘collective human rights policy has remained 
extremely limited.   
 
1.7.2   THE FIRST EEC APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS   
 
The first strong concerns for human rights in the external policy of the EEC started to 
emerge in the late 1970s, when atrocious violations of human rights occurred in 
countries that were bound to the EEC by virtue of an agreement. These violations 
occurred in countries such as Uganda, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57   E.g. in June 1994, Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian Deputy prime Minister, complained: “To allow 
ourselves to be lectured and hectored on freedom and human rights after one hundred years of 
struggle to regain our liberty and human dignity, by those who participated in or benefited from our 
subjugation, is willingly to suffer impudence. Far Eastern Economic Review The Pacific Century, 2 
June 1994, at 20.  
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Liberia, which were party to Lomé I Convention58 and entitled by virtue of the 
agreement, to certain trade preferences and financial and technical aid. Strongly 
inspired by the public opinion, the then European Commissioner for Development, 
Cheyson, started to raise the question of human rights in external relations.59 
The approach towards human rights policy started to appear de facto, without a clear 
legal basis, and with a focus on punitive measures as a response to violations.60  Aid to 
Uganda (which had been granted under the Lomé I Convention) was suspended in 
response to human rights violations committed by the government of Idi Amin, that 
according to Amnesty International report, was guilty of provoking thousands of deaths 
and of using tortures as a widespread practice. Thus, in 1977 the EEC saw its own 
development aid was benefiting a government involved in atrocious violations of human 
rights without knowing how to react. The main preoccupation at this point was the 
misuse of EEC founds, meaning the fear that these founds were used in such a 
manner as to contribute to human rights violations. Politically, the EEC had to respond 
to the accusation that, through its assistance, it was in fact helping to perpetuate 
repression in such countries. Legally speaking, the EEC became forced to consider 
whether it was to continue to comply with its treaty obligations.  
Six months later, the Council agreed to take steps within the framework of its 
relationship with Uganda under the Lomé I Convention  “to ensure that any assistance 
given by the Community to Uganda does not in any way have as its effect a 
reinforcement or prolongation of the denial of basic human rights to its people.”61 The 
statement, successively defined as the “Uganda Guidelines”, shaped a new EEC 
approach. The Community was committed to highly respect the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, and for this reason there was no intention of suspending the agreement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58   The first Lomé Convention (1975-1980) provided Community support for the aspirations of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States toward a New International Economic Order. The preamble included the 
language of the 1974 UN Declaration on the Establishment of New International Economic Order. The 
Commission, as part of its support for the developing countries, rejected any reference, which could 
constitute an interference in the internal affairs of these countries.   
T.King, Human rights in the Development Policy of the European Community: Toward a European 
World Order? , vol.XXVIII, 1997, p.53. 
59   K. Arts, Implementing the Right to Development?,  Human Rights in Developing Countries, Nordic 
Human Rights Publications, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p.50 
60   The EEC had also reacted to violations of human rights in Chile after Pinochet’s blody coup. Debates 
in the European Parliament signalled alarm and concern about atrocious human rights violations in 
Chile. The discussions concerned the question of continuing economic aid to Chile and maintaining an 
EEC Delegation office in the capital. Although food aid to Chile was never interrupted, the European 
Community operations in the Santiago office were significantly reduced. The EEC office in Latin 
America was relocated to Caracas.  Amy Young Anawaty, Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lomé II 
Convention, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, No.1 vol.13, 1980., p.96. 
61   Statement of the Council, Bullettin EC of 21.06.1977. 
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However, the Uganda guidelines were characterized by a public condemnation of the 
situation and by the threat that steps could be taken within the framework of the 
agreement. But these guidelines remained ambiguous. They neither mentioned any 
possible legal basis for taking steps, nor did they clarify the types of violations that 
could be considered serious enough to justify any action.62 
The Lomé I agreement, which was the basis for the relations with Uganda, remained in 
force, although development aid was partially suspended.63 The significance of the 
policy imposed on Uganda was that latter became of general application.64 However, 
integration of human rights concerns into the EEC external relations policy was done 
reluctantly and in small steps.  A second test was provided by violations of human 
rights occurred in Central African Republic, where, after a first denial of the 
Commission to suspend its cooperation programme, it decided to finally refer to 
Uganda Guidelines. In short, the EEC’s approach toward human rights began to 
emerge as a response to atrocious violations of human rights which had occurred in 
countries bound by bilateral agreements and during this period, the approach was 
characterized by a scrupulous respect of the principle pacta sunt servanda which 
always used to prevail. Despite this, part of the development aid was suspended in 
exceptional cases as a response to atrocious and systematic violations of civil and 
political rights, in particular, the right to life. Often the EEC tried to readdress part of the 
aid through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in order to ensure that the aid 
benefited the population and not the government.  The primary concern at this stage 
was to prevent EEC founds from being involved in violations. European public opinion, 
often channeled through the Parliament, was instrumental to that effect. Reports of 
NGOs, such as AI, were taken as the basis for issuing condemnations. Finally, if 
suspension of some founds was undertaken, this was done unilaterally by the EEC. 
Neither dialogue nor consultations with the other side were held. In addition, the legal 
basis for the suspension was not clear.65  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62   T.Kings, Human Rights in the Development…, p.112. 
63   A number of projects in Uganda began to be scrutinized by the Commission in order to ensure that the 
Government did not misuse aid. The EEC decided to freeze aid worth 6.5 million pounds for the 
improvement of Uganda’s transport system. Even though the aid project was initially intended to 
improve Uganda roads, there was a fear that the vehicles might be used by the regime to transport 
political prisoners.  The Guardian, EEC halts Uganda aid of 23 June 1977  
64   Meno Kamminga, Human Rights and the Lomé Conventions, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 
No.1, 1989, p.30. 
65    Ibid., p.34.	  
	  	   35	  
1.7.3 THE NEGOTIATION OF LOMÉ CONVENTION II AND III  
 
Thanks to the Uganda guidelines, and to the emerging internal concern for human 
rights, the idea of a clause on this matter was included in the new negotiations of the 
Lomé agreements. The three institutions, the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, had issued a joint declaration in which they stressed the prime 
importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights and their powers and in 
the pursuance of the aims of the EEC.66 This declaration reflected the case law of the 
Court, and was thus primarily intended to have effects in the internal field. It stated:  
1. The European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Commission stress the 
prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental human rights, as 
derived in particular from the Constitutions of the Member States and the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
2.  In exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European 
Communities, they respect and continue to respect these rights.  
 
Under the pressure of Netherlands67 and Great Britain, in the first ministerial meeting 
between the EEC and the ACP (African, Carribean and Pacific) States, which were 
parties of Lomé I , the former proposed the inclusion of human rights references in the 
New Convention. Some moderates accepted to open discussion on the matter, but 
opposition was stronger, and, at the end, in a climate of confusion, the ACP/EEC 
consultative Assembly approved a final declaration affirming that there would be some 
mention to the UDHR in the new Convention. Nevertheless, the declaration had short 
life due to the unilateral resolutions of the ACP Council of Ministers, who considered 
the Lomé Convention to be essentially an economic agreement and therefore 
inappropriate for human rights discussion.68 
When formal negotiations for the renewal of Lomé were launched in July 1978, 
Commissioner Cheyson proposed the inclusion of a reference in the preamble to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66   Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Commission in OJ C 
103/1 of 27.4.1997. 
67   In 1979 The Dutch Government approved its first internal memorandum on human rights in its foreign 
policy, which explicitly emphasized  its commitment to promote human rights as a part of its overall 
foreign policy. Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, Macmillan Press LTD, 
1996, pp. 85-89.  
68   René J.H. Smits, The Second Lomé Convention: an Assessment with Special Reference to Human 
Rights, Legal Issues of European Integration, No.1, 1980, p.50. 
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most fundamental rights, together with a unilateral declaration by the EEC in which it 
would reserve the right to publicly condemn violations of such rights. The then Nine 
Member States had agreed to incorporate a modest human rights reference in the 
preamble69. At the opening of the negotiations, the EEC summarized the general view 
of the Member States in the following terms: “These ACP-EEC relations must be 
founded on the principles that form the cornerstone of liberty, justice and peace in the 
world as incorporated in the UN Charter and the UDHR.”70 
Although the Nine agreed on the inclusion of human rights references, the Member 
States were divided on the legal effect that such a reference should have taken.  
Opposing Netherlands and Great Britain there were States as Belgium, France and 
Germany, which preferred no more than a short and vague reference to human rights. 
According to Belgium human rights would have created an interference with internal 
affairs, while France didn’t agree on the creation of a link between aid and human 
rights. Of Course as far as concern the countries outside Europe, those as Uganda, 
Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, their position were even more 
stronger than the French one, and so contributed to amplify the battle that EEC was 
fighting but that had already lost since the beginning.  The arguments invoked by the 
ACP side in order to oppose human rights references were the following: 1. Lomé was 
mainly a forum for economics and trade. Human rights issues had no place in an 
agreement on trade and economic cooperation. It was the United Nations, and not the 
EEC, which had the necessary competence in the area; 2. Human rights were used as 
a weapon during the Cold War and could be easily amenable to manipulation; 3. EEC 
countries also violated human rights; they placed too much emphasis on civil and 
political rights, discriminating against economic, social and cultural rights.71  
Not only were the ACP countries reluctant to accept the inclusion of human rights 
references in the new agreements, but also the European Community itself was 
divided. As it has been pointed out already, there were disagreements amongst the 
Member States on the legal value to attribute to the references. In addition, the attempt 
to criticize the human rights record of recently decolonized countries was , at that time 
an issue of enormous political sensitivity.  
In the joint parliamentary meetings, that saw the presence of both the EEC and ACP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69   A.Y.Anawaty, Human Rights and the ACP-EC…, p.60. 
70   Ministerial Conference Opening the negotiations of the New ACP-EEC Convention.  
71   Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2003, p. 51.  
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countries, the question of human rights became with the years a always more 
important subject of discussion.  At the same time, consequently to the parliamentary 
declaration that emerged as a result of a meeting, the European electorate became 
always more the instigator of a human rights policy, which was channeled through the 
Parliament. After its first direct elections in June 1979, the Parliament gained legitimacy 
and got the opportunity to speak more strongly in favor of human rights.72 
The year 1979 was characterized on one side by significant internal pressure coming 
from European public opinion, which could not be ignored; on the other there was 
indirect external pressure from Carter Administration and its emphasis on human rights 
in US foreign policy. In the absence of truly legislative powers, and coinciding with its 
first direct elections, the Parliament became the main advocate for the setting-up of a 
human rights policy in the external sphere for the European Economic Community. 
However, the Parliament had to face reality: at that time the EEC was not able to 
establish a human rights policy, and this was proven by the fact that the Lomé II 
Convention did not include any references to human rights.73 The external and also 
internal74 opposition to the inclusion of Human rights and the opposite side represented 
by EEC states such as Netherlands and UK which sustained human rights legal 
inclusion on the Convention, pressed the EEC to solve the question through vague 
internal declarations. But these declarations did not modify the EEC’s philosophy, and 
left enact the so-called “Uganda Guidelines” doctrine. At the same time, the European 
public opinion was increasingly pushing for the inclusion of human rights references in 
the Convention. The result was an increasingly intense debate on the place of human 
rights in development cooperation, which took place in the Community institutions and, 
in particular, within the European Parliament.  
 
Negotiations for the renewal of Lomé II Convention started at the end of 1983, the 
European Parliament strongly requested the Commission to pressure the ACP 
countries into accepting binding human rights references in the new Convention.75 
Debates continued to see on one side the EEC highlighting the necessity of civil and 
political rights, and on the other the ACP side, stressing its main concern for economic 
social and cultural rights.  However, something during those years in the global 
scenario had changed. In 1981, in fact, the African Charter of Human and People’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72   Ibid. p. 53.  
73   There was merely a reference to the UN Charter in the preamble of the Convention. 
74   E.g. France  
75   Resolution of the European Parliament “On Human Rights in the World” OJ C 161/1 of 20.6.1983, p.64. 	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rights was signed in Nairobi, showing certain commitments of those countries in human 
rights. Thus a new approach was taken: instead of blocking the issue, as it had been 
the case in the Lomé II negotiations, the ACP countries agreed to discuss human rights 
issues, imposing however their own conditions. Economic, social and cultural rights, as 
well as rights to development, for example, had to be included as human rights, also 
the conditions of ACP workers in the EEC had to be considered a human rights issue.  
In other terms, the ACP countries began to accept a human rights debate but always 
with some reservation and always sustaining the EEC wasn’t the appropriate entity to 
foster and implement human rights. Finally the EEC had to retreat several steps from 
its fist demands, arriving at the end of the negotiations, asking only for some 
references to the UN Charter and the UDHR. Once again human rights obtained  
political rather than legal values.  
 
1.8 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER THE DIRECT SUFFRAGE  
 
Since the 1970s the European Parliament (EP) had been in charge of dealing with 
questions of human rights in the world. However, it was not until the 1980s, after the 
first direct elections of the EP, that the human rights question started to gain 
importance. The Parliament began to receive a large number of reports of human rights 
violations from the entire world. In order to deal with these questions, a Parliamentarian 
Working Party on Human Rights was set up, and later on this working group was 
upgraded to the status of “subcommittee”.76  The election of the first European 
Parliament by direct suffrage represented a turning point in the creation of a human 
rights policy. Enjoying a new democratic legitimacy but lacking political power, the 
Parliament saw human rights as an issue that could draw attention to the Parliament’s 
role as guardian of democratic values. 77  
Human Rights became an important potential vehicle for integration, in the Parliament’s 
eyes, as they were common to all Member States. They formed part of the European 
vision and became a factor of identity. This newly discovered identity in human rights 
terms began to export the values it represented.  In May 1983 the Parliament issued its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76   Memorandum European Parliament and Human Rights, European Centre, Kirchberg, Luxembourg, 
March 1989, p.8.  
77   T.King, Human rights in the Development Policy of the European Community: Towards a European 
World Order? , NYIL, 1997, p.57.  
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first report on “human rights in the world” in which it deplored the violations of human 
rights happening in the five continents.78 Since then, reports on human rights in third 
countries have been drafted annually. The first report dealt with both the political and 
legal legitimacy of invoking human rights concerns. Concerning political legitimacy, the 
parliament was said to be an institution at that point directly elected by citizens, which 
would be expected to deal with human rights questions. 79 Regarding legal legitimacy, 
the Parliament affirmed that the basis for dealing with human rights questions was 
supported by international law. The parliament identified an EEC duty to deal with 
these questions, which derived from the UN Charter and from the Bill of Rights. As a 
response to its electorate, the Parliament was building up a principle of European 
Responsibility: “Fundamental human rights are universal and the Community has a 
duty to encourage respect for this rights and in particular in countries with which it has 
close ties”. 80 
The Parliament invited the Commission to draw up proposals aimed at incorporating 
human rights considerations into external relations with a view to the gradual 
establishment of a comprehensive human rights policy. The first report “on human 
rights in the world” has been important for several reasons: Firstly, it has represented 
the starting point of Parliamentary pressure for the setting up of a true human rights 
policy. Secondly, it has confirmed that the main instigator of human rights concerns 
was European public opinion, the demands of which were faithfully channelled through 
the European Parliament. Third, it has demonstrated that the search for legitimacy 
couldn’t stop with political considerations, but had also to be grounded in international 
law. Finally it has illustrated the Parliament’s active contribution to the establishment of 
a genuine principle of European responsibility.  From 1983 onwards, parliamentary 
resolutions on human rights began to rise. In June of that year, the Joint EEC/Latin 
America parliamentary conference adopted a declaration, which affirmed that 
cooperation between these parties had to rest on common values, “such as the 
defence of human rights”. The declaration also affirmed that one of the aims of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78   The report was divided into several parts. Firstly, it provided an overview of the motions of resolutions 
issued on to violations of human rights in the world enacted after 1979. Secondly, there were a number 
of arguments advanced in order to justify the report.  Thirdly, it summarised violations of fundamental 
rights in countries of all continents: countries that had close ties with the Community and South Africa; 
countries of the American continent; countries of Asia; African and Middle Eastern countries, which 
were not party to the Lomé Convention and did not have preferential agreements; Lomé Convention 
countries; countries which had signed the Helsinki Final Act and Albania. Finally, there was a survey of 
EEC policy including European political cooperation and action before United Nations, and a survey of 
the actions undertaken by the Parliament itself.  
79   The Parliament received thus increasing pressure from NGOs.  
80   Resolution of the Parliament “on human rights in the world” OJ C 161/58 of 20.06.1983. 
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political cooperation was to achieve respect of human rights.81 In its second report on 
human rights in the world, the Parliament recalled public opinion demands on a policy 
on human rights. But then it added an economic rationale: the EEC (in contrast to other 
regional or universal organizations) had considerable political and economic means at 
its disposal, which could be used to enhance respect for human rights. Consequently, it 
called on the Commission to study: “The current and potential modalities for linking 
community aid with minimum conditions of human rights protection, through the 
provision of food supplies after disaster or during emergencies should not be made 
conditional on this”. 82  
In a further resolution the Parliament regretted that references to human rights in the 
Lomé Convention were not more specific and did not have a more definite value. 
Human rights references didn’t have to be reduced to the Lomé context, but at the 
same time, a reference in Lomé would have set up a precedent and lead to similar 
provisions being incorporated in other external agreements. Although theoretically 
human rights were indivisible, the Parliament affirmed that civil and political rights were 
a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Consequently, the Parliamentary human rights focus became, in particular, limited to 
civil and political rights. This has been demonstrated by the fact that when the 
Parliament used to condemn human rights violations all over the world, it was only the 
latter category which were brought to attention. This selectivity had to be understood 
within the context of the pressure of public opinion, which focused on the most 
shocking of violations.83  In a final resolution “on the creation of the framework for 
dialogue to foster observance of internationally accepted standards of human rights in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81   The VI EEC-Latin America Parliamentary Conference was held in Brussels on the 13-16 June 1983.  
82   T.King, Human Rights in the Development Policy..., p.62.	  	  
83   Ibid., In the framework of the three first resolutions of human rights in the world, the Parliament 
emphasised three fundamental rights, which were, the right to life, the right of respect for the physical 
and moral integrity of the person and the right to a fair trial. However, the Parliament affirmed that 
human rights were indivisible.  On the involvement of the Parliament in foreign policy issues, King has 
argued that “the willingness of legislators to speak independently rather than diplomatically has 
underpinned government’s traditional reluctance to cede control of foreign affairs to the legislature, as 
they fear disruption from below of the orderly pursuit of national interest. The public, it is argued, tends 
to think in terms of good and evil, a way of thinking totally opposed to the successful conduct of foreign 
policy, which requires a long term view, frequent compromise and, above all, the unrelenting promotion 
of the national interest. To allow legislative control of foreign policy would be to permit members of 
parliament to project the ignorance and caprices of the electorate into decisions of crucial national 
importance. The danger of disruption from below in foreign policy was even greater at the Community 
level than at the national, as the identity which exists in national parliaments between the executive 
and the majority in the legislature does not exist at the European Parliament. Owing no political 
allegiance to the executive organs of the Community, MEPs enjoy an unfettered freedom to criticise all 
aspects of executive action and are far more likely than national legislators to view human rights as an 
all-important goal in foreign relations. 
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the European Community and those countries with which it has closer ties”84 the 
Parliament set out the basis of its strategy. When the EEC was concluding association, 
preferential and cooperation agreements with third countries, it was not merely creating 
commercial ties. Those agreements had a stronger meaning; they could have been a 
factor for peace and stability in international relations. The EEC had to be vigilant 
towards respect for human rights on the world. This implied that its agreements would 
have been more meaningful if they were to include specific references to common 
commitments on human rights.  The Parliament thus strongly urged the initiation of 
dialogue on human rights matters as well as the insertion of references to human rights 
into association, preferential, and cooperation agreements with third countries.  As to 
the content of those provisions, the proposal had to refer to the International Covenants 
and be formulated on bilateral terms. Although the idea of including human rights 
references in the body of external agreements was not new, this resolution represented 
the first time that the Parliament explicitly demanded an express inclusion of human 
rights instruments in the body of the whole range of agreements concluded by the 
EEC.  
 
1.9 LOME’ IV AGREEMENT: THE CREATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
 
In its 1985/1986 reports on human rights in the world, the Parliament had requested 
the Commission to submit a proposal for a Community act, which would have provided 
a clear legal mandate for the Community in the field of human rights. The Commission, 
however, didn’t give a positive answer to the request. According to the Commission, a 
legal act creating a human rights policy as an end in itself could have well exceeded 
the objectives of the EEC, which did not include the promotion of human rights. 
However, the Commission drew a distinction between taking human rights issues into 
account in the exercise of its existing powers (which it could do) and setting up a 
genuine Community policy to promote human rights, for which the Treaty of Rome 
provided no mandate.  
In the subsequent years the Commission was newly invited to present a proposal in 
“the appropriate form of Community act” which would have given legal force to the 
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1977 and 1986 Declarations on Human Rights, the references in the preamble of the 
Single European Act, and the references to human rights in the preambles of certain 
agreements with third countries. 85 Except for the 1977 inter-institutional declaration on 
human rights, these documents referred to the necessity to take human rights into 
account, in particular, in the external relations of the EEC. These documents, and their 
content remained largely political and no duties to pursue an active external policy 
derived from them.  The human rights clause, which was included in the Lomé IV 
agreement for the first time, reflected this ambivalence. Even though in principle it had 
a legal nature, the authentic political meaning of the reference was reflected through its 
elaborated and lengthy wording.   
In the light of the demands of the Parliament, during the last years of the 1980s, and 
whilst nevertheless scrupulously respecting the limits of Community competences on 
the matter, the Commission proposed the inclusion of a human rights clause in the 
Lomé IV Convention. Then the Single European Act (SEA) granted new powers to the 
Parliament, in particular, the right to assent to association agreements by an absolute 
majority of its members.86  When the SEA entered into force, it soon became clear that 
the Parliament was only going to give its assent to agreements containing human rights 
provisions. The new provision of the SEA thus represented a powerful weapon in the 
hands of the Parliament, which would have helped it to achieve its desire for human 
rights provisions to be inserted into its agreements.87 
In 1989, the Lomé IV agreement was signed with a specific human rights clause in its 
body. The clause contained in Article 5, was the result of a decade of intense internal 
discussions and negotiations in joint ministerial and parliamentary bodies, as well as 
external pressure from the Parliament.  On the other hand, the EC’s internal 
commitments on human rights made its position stronger, more confident, and 
politically credible when it requested the inclusion of human rights references in the 
body of Lomé IV.88 At the same time, economic conditions in the ACP states had 
collapsed, making those countries very dependent on foreign aid in meeting basic 
foreign exchanges needs, domestic requirements and recurring costs. By this stage, 
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the political situation of the ACP countries had changed almost beyond recognition. 
The Soviet Union was increasingly reluctant to support these countries and their 
bargaining power had become very weak. 89 On the other hand, developments in 
international law made the Latin American countries more familiar and confident with 
human rights questions.  Amongst these developments there was the already 
mentioned UN Declaration on the Right to Development, and the entry into force of the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.90 Finally, the references to human 
dignity in Lomé III encouraged the belief that both parties had already set up 
commitments in the field of human rights. In other words, a precedent had somehow 
been created, allowing the Community to argue that the issue was no longer new. 
The new economic and international climate undermined ACP resistance to European 
demands for the incorporation of human rights and democracy in development 
cooperation relations.91 The starting point of this trend was an ACP ministerial 
declaration adopted at the end of 1987. The Kingston Declaration, as it was called, 
referred to human dignity and included a programme of action against apartheid. It thus 
included the principles of equality and human dignity, and recalled the commitments 
undertaken in the Annex to Lomé III. The Declaration not only favoured the 
Community’s demands for stronger human rights references, but also was used to ask 
the Community to impose sanctions on South Africa in response to those countries’ 
apartheid practices. 
On year later, a joint ACP/EEC conference was held on the occasion of the 40th 
anniversary of the UDHR. This Conference was entitled “on human dignity and the 
ACP/EEC Convention”.92 But this time the European Community action was stronger 
and made the ACP countries less reluctant to accept human rights references; now 
their claim with respect to development was a human right and their concern for the 
abolition of the apartheid was, beyond doubt, a human rights matter.93 At the opening 
of the Convention negotiations both the EEC and the other countries had agreed to 
highlight the importance of human rights, the link between the promotion of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89   T.King, Human Rights in the Development Policy..., p.64. 
90   The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights had entered into force on 21 October 1986.  
91   Demetrios James Marantis, Human Rights, Democracy and Development: the European Community 
Model, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol.7, 1994, p.8.	  	  
92   Europe No.4910, Human Rights: Seminar of the foundation ACP/EEC, of 8 December 1988, p.4.  
93   However there was still some fear of neo-colonialism. During the conference, the ACP side explained 
that they had ideological reasons to contest human rights. Claims on respect of human rights they 
could breach their sovereignty and their political independence. See Specificité et Universalité des 
Droits de l’Homme: un Séminaire de la Foundation pour la Coopération Culturelle ACP-CEE, Le 
Courrier No.114 of Mars-Avril 1989, p.10. 
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dignity and development, and the interdependence of categories of rights.94 With the 
last Lomé Convention, thus, the discussion moved to a different level. The question 
was not anymore if to include human rights references, but was about the content of 
those references.  In other words the 1990s signed one of the most relevant changes in 
human rights history, seeing human rights as a certitude that has to be regulated 
instead of a facultative clause.  
Finally at the end of the 1989, the Lomé IV Convention was adopted with an innovative, 
although rhetorical, human rights clause within the body of the agreement. The 
preamble added two paragraphs. One referred to universal instruments  (the UDHR 
and the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) and the other mentioned regional instruments binding each of the 
Parties, the African Charter for most of the ACP states and the ECHR for the EC side.  
Under the heading “ Objectives and Principles of Cooperation”, the first ever human 
rights clause was divided into three long paragraphs. The first recalled the link between 
human rights and development and the commitment to adopt a positive approach. The 
second paragraph affirmed the Parties’ attachment to human rights and the principle of 
indivisibility of categories of rights, whether civil and political or social or economic, with 
special emphasis placed on the latter category of rights.  Finally, a third paragraph 
affirmed the positive approach to be followed and announced that financial resources 
had to be allocated in order to promote human rights.95 Article 5 also mentioned good 
governance for the first time as a particular aim of cooperation operations excluding it, 
however, from the essential elements of the agreement. Most importantly, it 
implemented the two-track approach to development cooperation which the Council 
laid out in its Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy, and Development. 
The negative side of the coin was that a suspension procedure to be applied in the 
event of persistent violations of human rights, was not included.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94   Lomé IV: Conseil Ministériel ACP-EEC de Brazaville: le Déblocage Politique des Negociations, Le 
Courrier No.114 of Mars-Avril 1989, p.4.	  
95   Appendix II, Abstracts for the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Lomé 15 December 1989 in NQHR, No.3, 
1990, p.326. 
96   However, some authors have argued that the Convention allowed indirectly for the suspension of its 
privileges. Human Rights were considered, in reality, an essential element and condition for 
development and objective of the cooperation. Article 10 provided that the parties “should refrain from 
any measure which can jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Convention”. Consequently, 
the EC could have suspended privileges to the ACP states violating such obligations, following the 
procedure of previous consultations  enshrined in Article 12. See Joost Korte, Human Righs and the 
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (Lomé IV) , NQRH, No.3, 1990, p.294.  
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Because there was no mention of a right to suspend cooperation in the case of 
violation of human rights, it seemed that the EEC’s major interests were not 
represented at this stage. Human Rights conditionality was, from now on, enshrined in 
a bilateral agreement-and thus in a legal text. Traditionally of a highly political 
character, conditionality now had a legal dimension. Another particularity was the 
emphasis on positive measures. There was no mention of the possibility of suspending 
the agreement in the event that the parties should have violated human rights. 
However, even if this was not stated expressly, this seemed to have been the final 
intention of the EEC. It is implied from the previous negotiations for the Lomé 
agreements that the EEC wished to grant itself the possibility of suspending the 
agreement on the basis of the clause. 97  
Lomé IV agreement thus marked the beginning of both economic and political 
conditionality in EU development policy. In previous agreements, the ACP countries 
had successfully prevented the EU from introducing clauses on democracy and human 
rights. Likewise, they had preserved the right to determine their own aid priorities 
thereby excluding the incorporation of structural adjustment programmes implemented 
by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Lomé IV, by contrast, included 
provisions on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law for the first time, without, 
however, linking them to specific sanctions. In cases of violation, the EU undertook to 
examine appropriate measures, which, however, were not specified.  Lomé IV required 
a mid-term review of the financial protocol of agreement, which the EU used to 
strengthen political conditionality as well.  For violations of democracy, human rights 
and rule of law, however, the EU reserved itself to invok the suspension clause several 
times in the 1990s, e.g. against Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Niger, and Sierra Leone.98 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97   E. Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2003, p.84. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ENTERING THE 1990s: THE PATH TOWARD A NEW EUROPEAN 
ASSET. WHICH CONSEQUENCES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIELD? 
 
 
2.1 THE END OF THE COLD WAR  
 
The institutionalization and consolidation of an EEC human rights policy in the 
agreements with other countries coincided with the end of the cold war, and the 
upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe gave it the final impulse.99  
The environment created by the end of the cold war further favoured the human rights 
cause. International relations were injected with new found potential due in particular to 
the new international setting which finally allowed the UN to carry out its foundational 
purpose, including the promotion of human rights and democratic freedoms.100  
Bilateral relations between the EEC and the Central and Eastern Europe changed 
dramatically, leading to the signing of new economic and trade agreements which 
reflected such changes. In addition, the Western Economic Summit of the G7, which in 
1989 took place in Paris, decided to grant assistance to the economic restructuring of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and mandated the Commission to coordinate the 
operations.101 The seven major industrial nations affirmed that human rights were a 
matter of international concern and committed themselves to encouraging and 
promoting universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.102 
Following the G7 mandate, the Commission then acquired a large degree of 
responsibility to consolidate the transition process in Eastern Europe, with a human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99   K. Tomasevski, Aid to Eastern Europe, in Human Rights in Developing Countries, Nordic Human 
Rights Publications, Kluwer Law International, Yearbook 1993, p.21. 
100  B. Andreassen and T. Swineheart, Introduction in Human Rights in Developing Countries, Nordic 
Human Rights Publications, Kluwer Law International, Yearbook 1990, p.8.  
101  XXIIIrd. General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, External Relations, third 
chapter, 1989, p.718.  
102  Western Economic Summit, Bulletin EC 7/8-1989, p.131.	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rights component attached. The European Council meeting in Madrid affirmed the 
determination of the European Community in playing an active role in supporting and 
encouraging positive changes and reform. Meeting in Strasburg at the end of the year, 
the European Council spoke of a “common responsibility which devolves on them in 
this decisive phase of the future of Europe”.103 Reacting to this challenge, the 
Commission very soon proposed the conclusion of new agreements to support the 
reforms,104 and the proposal was fully endorsed by the Council. In a further 
Communication, the Commission linked the implementation of these agreements to 
compliance with principles of democracy and economic liberalization in future 
association countries.105 Thus, by wielding its economic and political instruments on a 
conditional basis, the EC hoped to encourage its eastern neighbours to carry out 
reforms and prevent a return to communist rules. The success of reforms was 
considered crucial for ensuring long-term stability and security in Europe.106 
The events in Central and Eastern Europe contributed, at best, to fill the Community 
with a certain sense of responsibility with respect to the promotion of human rights 
worldwide, which did not stop at the European borders. This sense of responsibility 
was however, the achievement of a process that had already begun. The new 
generations of agreements of the 1990s, in fact used to include human rights 
references.  Facing reluctance from some of the partners to have these references 
included, the EEC used similar strategies as those it had used in the case of Lomé. 
Human Rights concerns were already part of the acquis. This was illustrated by 
numerous preambles of the agreements signed in the 1980s and EEC internal 
documents. The challenge was then to find a more appropriate wording for these 
concerns, which implied their movement from the political into the legal sphere.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103  Declaration of the European Council meeting in Strasburg, Bulletin EC 12-1989.  
104  Commission Communication on the impact of recent developments in Eastern Europe on the 
Communities relations with the countries concerned, of 18.01.1990 in Bulletin EC 1/2 – 1990, p.70.  On 
the very same day the Parliament approved a resolution on Central and Eastern Europe in which 
insisted that measures to help those countries should be taken on the basis of their needs as well as 
their commitment to undertake political and economic reforms.  
105  Commission Communication “on the impact of recent developments in Eastern Europe on the 
Communities relations with the countries concerned” of 18.01.1990 in Bulletin EC 1/2 – 1990, p.70.  
106  However the EEC had already used conditionality patterns, albeit implicitly, for the purpose of 
accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. E. Fierro, Human Rights Approach…, p. 93. 
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In the delicate political climate of the early 1990s, the European Economic Community 
decided to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and human rights promotion 
worldwide through for example, cooperation agreements.107 
 
As the European Council had recognized, the end of the decade of the 1980s was 
marked by contrasts in the field of human rights. According to different authors “the end 
of the cold war has had a dual impact on international human rights, contributing both 
to violations of rights and renewed efforts to ameliorate those violations.”108 On the one 
hand, the European Community’s actions were favored by a climate of hope and 
euphoria, which was provoked, in particular, by the perspectives of democratization of 
the whole European continent. On the other hand negative events illustrated the still 
present lack, namely, the absence of legal tools to responds to challenges. Reactions 
to human rights violations were thus necessary, but in the absence of a satisfactory 
internal framework, the EEC used to react, during those years, on a case-by-case 
basis, following a flexible approach.   
The collapse of communism in Europe had a domino effect, as a number of previously 
hesitant states decided to accept human rights treaties.109  The post-Cold war era 
created also an environment in which old arguments came back to light. The already 
mentioned G7 Western Economic Summit at this time affirmed that human rights were 
a matter of international concern. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act mandated respect for 
human rights, on the one hand, and respect for the principle of non-intervention in 
internal affairs, on the other. The first line of defence of Eastern European states 
against any criticism of their human rights record was to invoke the second principle (it 
constituted interference in their domestic affairs), thus, any discussion on human rights 
was continuously at stake.110 
In 1991, the OSCE countries met on the occasion of the Conference of the Human 
Dimension in Moscow.111 They agreed on a text in which they affirmed that issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107  For instance, the European Council meeting in Strasbourg issued a Declaration on the eve of the 
general elections in Chile in which it declared its intention to contribute to the economic and social 
development of a democratic Chile and its intention to use its new agreement for that purpose. See 
Declaration of the European Council meeting in Strasbourg. See note 27	  
108  David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights After the Cold War”, NQHR, No. 4 , 1993, p.394. 
109  Ibid. p.397. 
110  Jan Helgesen, Between Helsinki and beyond? Human rights in the CSCE Process,  in Human Rights 
in a changing East/West Perspective, 1990, pp.241-264.   
111  The Vienna concluding documents of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
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relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law were 
not internal, but of international concern. The Moscow document, however, remained a 
political commitment, without creating legal effects. Inspired by the developments in 
international law and international relations the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council each reaffirmed their firm belief that violations of human rights did justify 
interference in internal affairs. 
 
2.2. THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSE OF 1991  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has intensified its efforts in promoting human 
rights and democracy introducing democracy and human rights clauses in all its 
agreements with third countries. While the cooperation and association policy of the EU 
was differentiated in its goals and strategies, it has been mainstreamed with regard to 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and quickly moved in all the areas of the 
EU’s external relations. Nevertheless, the already “old” human rights debate continued 
also in the internal sphere. The question of the status of human rights within the EC/EU 
in fact reached the top of the political agenda in the 1990s.  
In that period, developments on human rights evolved rapidly. At the multilateral level, 
the Twelve had made, for the first time, a joint intervention in the UN Commission of 
Human Rights,112 and declared before the UN General Assembly that their commitment 
to human rights in the world emerged from the values on which the European 
Communities were founded.  In the internal sphere, the Parliament issued its 1989 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Liberties, consisting of 28 Articles 
encompassing civil, political, social and economic rights applicable to all Community 
nationals. The Declaration was aimed at strengthening the protection of human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a concluding document. The second conference was held in Copenhagen from the 5 June to the 29 
June 1990. The third meeting was scheduled in Moscow from the 10 September to the 4 October. See 
Thomas Buergenthal, The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A new Public Order for Europe, Human Rights 
Law Journal, vol.11, 1990, pp.217-218.	  	  
112  Statement by Foreign Ministry of Spain on behalf of the Twelve at the 45th session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, European Political Cooperation, press release, Geneva 22 February 
1989. According to the statement “since it is the first time that the Twelve Member States of the 
European Community address the Human Rights Commission through a single voice, allowing me to 
recall before this important body of the United Nations that respect for human rights is one of the 
cornerstone upon which European Cooperation has been built over the past thirty years (…) As we laid 
down in the 1986 Brussels Ministerial Statement, and have reaffirmed on many different occasions 
since then, the Twelve are deeply committed to respect, protection and further promotion of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, in the context of the principles of parliamentary democracy and the 
rule of law…”.  
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at the internal level and at affirming a European Identity. To complete the picture, in 
December 1989, the European Council in Strasbourg adopted a Charter on Social 
Rights and announced a new stage in the EEC’s common commitment to respect 
human rights.  
In 1991 the Commission, ready to face the challenge, issued a communication “on 
human rights, democracy and development cooperation”113 which basically gave a 
mandate to include the human rights clauses systematically in all the agreements 
concluded by the Communities. However, the mandate was done in the form of a 
resolution and not as a binding decision.  This human rights clause, since then included 
in all the bilateral agreements of the Community, at the beginning of the 1990s applied 
to countries of at least three continents. In those years the EC included more or less 
systematically the human rights clause in its bilateral trade and cooperation 
agreements with third countries, including association agreements such as the Europe 
agreements, Mediterranean agreements and the Lomé Convention. A Council decision 
of May 1995 spelled out the basic modalities of this clause, with the aim of ensuring 
consistency in the text used and its application, and since then the human rights clause 
was included in all subsequently negotiated bilateral agreements. 
An important reason for including this standard clause in agreements with third 
countries was to spell out the right of the Community to suspend or terminate an 
agreement for reasons connected with non-respect of human rights by the third country 
concerned. Before the human rights clause, the EC had to rely on general international 
law to suspend an agreement, as happened with regard to Ex-Yugoslavia in 1991.114 
It has to be underlined that the human rights clause did not transform the basic nature 
of agreements which were otherwise concerned with matters not directly related to the 
promotion of human rights. It simply constituted a mutual reaffirmation of commonly 
shared values and principles, a precondition for economic and other cooperation under 
the agreements, which expressly allowed for and regulated suspension in case of non-
compliance with these values. This approach seemed to have been confirmed by the 
ECJ in the case Portugal v. Council of 1996, where the Court observed that an 
important function of the human rights clause could have been to secure the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Commission Communication to the Council and the Parliament, SEC (61) 91 of 25 March 1991.  
114  The trade concessions of the 1983 Cooperation Agreement were suspended by Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 3300/91 of 11 November 1991 and the whole Agreement by a Council decision, taken 
together with the Representatives of the Member States, meeting within the Council.  
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suspend or terminate an agreement if the third state had not respected human rights.115 
In other words, such a clause did not seek to establish new standards in the 
international protection of human rights. It merely reaffirms existing commitments that, 
as general international law, already bound all states as well as the EC in its capacity 
as a subject of international law. 
The basic term of reference for the human rights clause was the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948.116 As consequence, in a Declaration adopted by the 
Luxembourg Summit of 12-13 December 1997, the European Council reaffirmed the 
EU's commitment to the respect and defense of the rights enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration117.  Despite the reconnaissance of the clause as an “essential element”, its 
inclusion in the agreements was not sufficient itself to create a solid EEC human rights 
policy, but it constituted the first step in the right direction. However, the Community 
efforts were concentrated in the external dimension, highly ignoring the internal one.  
The 1989 Parliamentary Declaration, as explained previously, did not obtain a large 
success and at the same time the adoption of the first parliamentary resolution on 
human rights within the European Community resulted in controversy. The 
Community’s legal competence was at stake, as was the definition of human rights 
itself for the Community. By contrast, Parliamentary reports “on human rights in the 
world” and thus in the external sphere, continued to flow naturally without controversy. 
The treaty on the European Union, signed in Maastricht in December 1991, (which 
entered into force in 1993) reflected this ambivalence too.   
 
2.3 MAASTRICHT TREATY AND THE NEW LEGAL BASIS FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
The period between the completion of the Single European Act in 1986 and the 
Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1993 marked seven years of dramatic changes, both 
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116  Article 5 of the Lomé Convention IV did not mention the Universal Declaration, but the Declaration, 
together with the two International Covenants of 1966.   
117  At this regard it should be emphasized that these conclusions did not necessarily imply that each and 
every word of the Universal Declaration became universally binding. In fact, the standard EC human 
rights clause referred to “democratic principles and basic human rights, as proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration”, rather than to the provisions of the Declaration as such.  
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regionally and globally. As already mentioned, the late 1980’s were the final 
culminating years of the Cold War era. Events such as the fall of communism in former 
Soviet satellite states and more importantly the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 sparked 
major changes within the perspectives of European integration. The reunification of 
Germany brought back the feelings of the brutal war years, and a democratization 
processes begun in all the former communist states, offering new perspectives for 
closer cooperation in an extended Europe. Furthermore, the growing enthusiasm for a 
common market was justified by numerous European companies expanding beyond 
their conventional state borders. The unstoppable momentum toward a unified 
Germany concentrated the minds of Germany’s partners. After initial hesitations, most 
European finance ministers concluded on the basis of the 1988 Delors Committee 
Report118 that economic and monetary union was the best way to harness the 
economic might of the new unified Germany within the European Framework. Plans for 
the second preparatory stage of monetary union moved fast. By February 7, 1992, the 
same year in which the single market was to be completed, the new treaty was ready 
for signing in Maastricht.   
Despite the premises, from a certain point of view Maastricht has been in many ways 
an unsatisfactory treaty, merging together the very disparate views of member states in 
a series of awkward compromises, as the protection of fundamental rights illustrates. 
The many declarations and preambles of the previous fifteen years did not help, as 
expected, the Treaty to enforce the fundamental rights of European’s citizens that were 
now enshrined at the European Union’s core. The European Court of Justice continued 
to be restricted. In the eyes of at least some member states, the unnoticed activism of 
the 1970s Court of Justice had, by the 1990s, developed into a threat to national 
sovereignty. The European Union’s evolution toward guaranteeing democracy and 
human rights was indeed not to the taste of all member states. France and the United 
Kingdom were far from enthusiastic. The United Kingdom had long opposed any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118  In June 1988, the European Council meeting in Hanover, Germany, set up the Committee for the 
Study of Economic and Monetary Union, chaired by the then President of the Commission, Jacques 
Delors, and including all EC central bank governors. Their unanimous report, submitted in April 1989, 
defined the monetary union objective as a complete liberalization of capital movements, full integration 
of financial markets, irreversible convertibility of currencies, irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and 
the possible replacement of national currencies with a single currency. The report indicated that this 
could be achieved in three stages, moving from closer economic and monetary coordination to a single 
currency with an independent European Central Bank and rules to govern the size and financing of 
national budget deficits. See European Commission official website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/road/delors_report_en.htm 
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strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament. Its Conservative government, 
which was in power from June 1979 until May 1997, was also profoundly suspicious of 
the ECJ, which it regarded as an instrument to bring about closer integration.   
Largely because of the British government’s opposition, the jurisdiction of the Court 
was extended very little if at all by the Maastricht Treaty. Article L of the Treaty limited 
the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to the existing treaties, as amended by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and to the interpretation of any conventions made under the 
intergovernmental third pillar concerning the fields of justice.119 
This reluctance demonstrated that, despite the governments of the Twelve committed 
themselves to securing the ratification of the Treaty on European Union before the end 
of 1992, they underestimated the difficulties that it would have encountered. With the 
slowdown in growth in 1992, the rise in unemployment rates and the powerlessness of 
the Twelve to intervene in the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the general conditions 
were less favorable for a united Europe.120 The very purpose of the European Union 
might have been called into question. The hostility of United Kingdom and Denmark, 
which were the most contrary to the Treaty, and the concern of Germany for the single 
currency and the attribution of more powers and legitimacy to a “powerful” organ made 
the signatory phase long and tortuous, but finally ended in 1993 with the opening of a 
new era for the European Union’s countries and citizens.  
The premises, nevertheless, already showed that the spirit of this new Union had many 
difficulties in dealing with a unique policy on the respect of citizens’ rights and human 
rights. The signature of this fundamental change for the European countries was 
mostly based on economic and strategic issues, making the Member States choose 
once again the state sovereignty first.  The Member’s choices that saw the prevail of 
self interests in front of human rights and democratic principles didn’t compromised the 
new treaty’s basis. For the first time in a European treaty, references were made to the 
individual citizens, thanks to the establishment of a number of rights, even if limited, 
pertaining to citizens of the European Union. The Treaty in this sense marked an 
unprecedented milestone in the process of European integration and development. It 
elaborated and implemented concepts discussed in the previous Single European Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119  S. Power and G. Allison, Realizing Human Rights. Moving from Inspiration to Impact. St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 2000, p.98. 
120  See Historical Events in the European Integration Process (1945-2014), Hard-won ratification at: 
www.cvce.eu 
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of 1986, and not only established the European Monetary Union but it paved the way 
for further developments such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, and 
others that were to follow. In practical terms, the Treaty created the notion of European 
Citizenship with all its benefits and responsibilities, including the freedom to travel and  
work, the notion of solidarity, the question of social cohesion, etc. It also created the 
framework for new possibilities of economic exchange and development.121  
One of the most symbolic innovation of November 1, 1993 , as far as concerned the 
human rights area, has been the introduction of human rights provisions on the body of 
the text. For the first time human rights are not relied anymore to the preamble but they 
obtained their own spot in the treaty.  Anyhow the final draft of the treaty had weak 
provisions in the pursuit of a human rights policy in the internal sphere.  A more solid 
legal basis for the inclusion of human rights clauses was instead related to the external 
one.   
Internally, Maastricht crystallized the already classic jurisprudence of the European 
Court in the field of human rights. According with the jurisprudence, fundamental rights 
provided an integral part of the general principles of law ensured by the Court. Article 
F2 of the Common provision of the TEU provided that “the Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November and as 
they result form the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as general 
principles of Community law”.122   
With regard to external actions, the Treaty stated that it was one of the main objectives 
of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) “to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. In the same way it stated the European Community development 
cooperation policy “shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.”  
These provisions constituted an advance in the development of an essentially 
economic Community into a political body. The founding Treaties, in fact, made no 
explicit reference to human rights or the relevant international instruments; such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121  A. Rogobete, Why is the Maastricht Treaty considered to be so significant?, Royal Holloway, University 
of London , 2010, p.126. 
122  B. Brandtner and A. Rosas, Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An 
Analysis of Doctrine and Practice, EJIL, No.3 vol.9, 1998, p.74 
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reference was not going to make an appearance until thirty years later, in the preamble 
to the Single European Act and then now in the Maastricht treaty, in which political 
cooperation has been then formally enshrined.  
Prior to the Single European Act (1986), in the absence of formal references to these 
issues, the criteria of human rights and democratic principles were gradually introduced 
in the Community’s external relations through the positions adopted by the community 
institutions and the heads of states or government. This process had emphasized the 
legal, political and moral values that made up the European identity, particularly the 
principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.123 
Before Maastricht, within the Community itself, a relevant role had been played by the 
Court of Justice in compensating for the lack of Community legislation protecting basic 
rights, by developing a body of original case law in which basic human rights were 
considered an integral part of the general principles common to the legal system of all 
Member States, which in turn used to provide the basis for Community law, of which 
the Court was the guardian. The Court adopted a series of rules in which these general 
principles were defined as being based on the traditions common to all the nationals’ 
constitutions concerned and on the relevant international and regional instruments, 
particularly the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed on 4 November 1950.  
Starting with the SEA, the position adopted by the Community in this sphere became 
increasingly operational in application, identifying priorities for action and paving the 
way for the incorporation of respect for human rights in the Treaty on European Union.  
By way of example, the Luxemburg European Council of 28-29 June 1991 illustrated 
this commitment by adopting a declaration on human rights that established the 
principles and the main features of a political platform actively promoting human rights 
and democratic principles. A few months later, the Council and the representatives of 
the Member States meeting within the Council adopted a resolution on human rights, 
democracy and development laying down the guidelines, procedures and priorities for 
improving the consistency and cohesion of the whole range of development initiatives. 
124 
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81, Memorandum on the European Union and Human Rights relations. S.d. s.f. p.2. 
124  Ibid. p.4 
	  	   57	  
Finally, after two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) held in Rome in 1990, one 
devoted to Economic and Monetary Union and the other to Political Union125, it was 
decided that the two parts negotiated separately should be combined into a single 
Treaty on European Union. Under the Dutch Presidency, the Maastricht European 
Council of 9 and 10 December 1991 finalised the Treaty, after final legal adaptations 
and negotiations among experts. On 3 February 1992, the Treaties establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) were also amended. 
A total of 17 protocols and, in a Final Act, 33 political declarations were annexed. The 
Treaty was initially scheduled to come into force on 1 January 1993 at the earliest, 
provided all the European Community Member States had ratified it. However as 
happened for the signatures, ratification by parliaments or by referendums proved to be 
more difficult than envisaged, and the Treaty of Maastricht did not come into effect until 
1 November 1993. 
At the same time, accession request had already started. For their part, the Twelve 
looked favorably on the accession of the applicant countries, as far as they were all 
democratic, their standard of living was high and they would therefore, in theory, have 
less need for Community subsidies.  The European Council, meeting in Copenhagen in 
June 1993 for confirmation of some applicant countries126 also noted that several of the 
countries of Central and Eastner Europe that were emerging from the disintegrating 
Soviet bloc wanted to become full members of the European Union, and set explicit 
conditions based on human rights and democracy principles that applicant states would 
be required to meet before membership would be granted.127 Precisely the condition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125  The first meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Twelve held in Rome on 27 and 
28 October 1990 provided the outlines of a Treaty on EMU and a Treaty on Political Union. On 14 and 
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of the Twelve, officially inaugurated the two conferences, which were tasked with amending the Treaty 
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126  Finland, Sweden and Norway.  
127  Having confirmed that the accession of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway had to be accomplished 
by I January 1995, the European Council welcomed the adoption by the Commission of its opinions in 
respect of the membership applications from Cyprus and Malta. It also conveyed a very explicit political 
message to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe by providing them with the assurance that, in 
accordance with the Commission communication towards a closer association with the countries of 
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open up Community markets. Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993- Conclusion of the 
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stated “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities.” The Council also laid down in some detail the process for 
European Union enlargement which required new members to accept in toto the acquis 
communautaire.  
 
2.4 THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CFSP OF THE 1990s 
 
2.4.1 JOINT ACTIONS AND COMMON POSITIONS 
 
The spread of liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War and after the submission of 
numerous applications to the Maastricht Treaty appeared to set the stage for a new 
international order in which human rights would have played a central role.  
The transformation of the Eastern bloc states from modern states insistent on their 
sovereignty and the importance of peaceful coexistence to post-modern states wishful 
to accept international supervision of human rights and democracy suggested that the 
post-modern approach to statehood was spreading beyond Western Europe. 
Moreover, as the European Commission noted in its Communication on human rights 
policy for the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union “reduced the importance of the 
alliance factor which had long determinated relations between industrialized and 
developing countries and made reactions to a given situation a function of geo-political 
considerations”128. The collapse of the centrally planned economies seemed to set the 
seal on the growing international consensus that free markets, underpinned by human 
rights and democracy, were essential to economic development. Finally, popular 
pressure in the developing world for an end to authoritarian government was matched 
by growing reluctance among European citizens to carry on supporting dictatorial or 
corrupt foreign regimes. It was thus unsurprising that the Treaty on European Union, 
which represented the Member States’ response to the international situation arising at 
the end of the Cold War, placed human rights at the centre of the new Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which replaced EPC. The latter had been 
criticized as excessively reactive and declaratory, lacking in proactivity and instruments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  European Commission, Human Rights, Democracy and Development Policy, 25 March 1991 
SEC(91)61.  
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with which to follow up announcements; the CFSP was designed to tackle these 
weaknesses. Article J.1(2) of the TEU provided that one of the objectives of the CFSP 
should have been “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.  
The TEU replaced the Member States’ obligation under Article 30(2)(d) Single 
European Act to avoid actions impairing their effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations with a more onerous obligation under Article J.1(4) to “support 
the Union’s external and security policy actively unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and 
mutual solidarity”. Two new instruments for CFSP were established; the Common 
Position and Joint Action. While Article 30(2)(c) SEA had merely provided that common 
positions should “constitute a point of reference for the policies” of the Member States, 
under Article J.2 TEU the Member States had to ensure their national policies conform 
to Common Positions and had to coordinate their action in international organizations 
and conferences in order to uphold the Common Position. Article J.3 TEU provided that 
the Council of Ministers may have adopted, on the basis of general guidelines from the 
European Council,129 Joint Actions that had to commit the Member States in the 
positions adopted and in the conduct of their activity. Joint Actions were intended to 
enable the Member States to display greater cohesion and political authority in their 
response to major foreign policy issues. The effectiveness of these innovations, 
however, was undermined as each Member State retained a veto concerning the 
adoption of Joint Actions and Common Positions.  
The introduction of the CFSP made little difference to the number of statements and 
quotes concerning human rights made by the Member States. The annual Memoranda 
to Parliament record that the Union published more than 80 declarations concerning 
human rights in 1994130, 69 in 1995131, and 40 declarations in 1996132. The European 
Parliament during those years continued to complain and to express concern about the 
vagueness of the Memoranda.133 The Memorandum indeed for 1996 was 
characteristically uninformative. Some countries with serious human rights problems, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129  The Lisbon European Council decided among the objectives of joint actions were to be the 
strenghtening of democratic principles and institutions and respect for human and minority rights and 
the promotion of good government. Bulletin 6/1992, at para. I.31.  
130  CFSP Unit, General Secretariat of the Council, Memorandum of the European Parliament on the 
activities of the European Union in the field of human rights, DOC 5644/2/94, at para. 19.  
131  CFSP Unit, General Secretariat of the Counicl, Annual Memorandum to the European Parliament on 
the activities of the European Union in the field of Human Rights 1995, DOC 5468/96, at 5. 
132  CFSP Unit, General Secretariat of the Council, Annual Memorandum on the activities of the European 
Union in the field of human rights 1996, DOC 11446/97, at 5.  
133  OJ C 126/1995; OJ C 20/1996. 
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such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Syria were omitted from the Memorandum 
altogether. The Memorandum referred to the adoption of political initiatives concerning 
Afghanistan, Burma, China and Indonesia but revealed nothing about the effectiveness 
of these initiatives. Many other countries with grave human rights problems, such as 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan, were mentioned only briefly.134 
A subsequent review of the European Union’s human rights policy suggested that an 
Annual Report on human rights, based on reports from the Commission’s overseas 
delegations, had to be drawn up to ensure that human rights formed a “constant and 
stable feature of the Union’s foreign policy posture”.135 In its Declaration on the 50th 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1998, the 
European Council agreed to consider the possible publication of an annual human 
rights report and the following month the Council invited the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) to work out the general structure of the report.136 This 
seemed to represent a significant commitment by Member States, as it was likely both 
to generate annual friction with the countries criticized and to draw public attention in 
Europe to human rights abuses, so stimulating greater public pressure for action.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Eastern European states in the OSCE have in 
general been eager to follow the EU Member States’ lead on issues of human rights 
and democracy, also  because they had to embrace the Union’s norms in these areas 
in order to accede to the Union. The member States have continued to participate 
actively in the OSCE by, for example, presenting joint papers on all agenda items at 
review meetings and adopting Joint Actions and Common Positions. 137 
The problem of those Joint Actions, within the area of the CFSP, was that they could 
only be adopted unanimously. Joint Actions, which were intended to allow the Union to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134  Van der Klaauw, European Union: Council Memorandum of EU Activities in the Field of Human Rights 
during 1996, NQHR 230, 1998, p.142. 
135  Alston and Weiler, An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy,  EJIL, 1998.  
136  CFSP Statement 14128/98 10 December 1998; EIS European Report No 2368, 6 March 1999, Section 
V, at 5.  
137  Joint Actions often consisted of launching or extending an out-of-area civilian or military operation 
under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Some Joint Actions have also included the 
appointment of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), senior diplomats assigned to a sensitive country 
or region in order to give the EU extra political clout. A Joint Action might also provide financial or other 
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(the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example) or peace building (the Organization for Security 
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deal with important foreign policy issues, have in practice been adopted only on 
uncontroversial issues where the interest of all Member States could have been 
accommodated and when the country which was the target of the Joint Action was 
happy with the proposed action.138 In the field of human rights, Joint Actions have 
represented a success for the CFSP, as before the TEU Member States had made no 
attempt to become involved collectively in these actions but had instead contributed to 
help United Nations in its missions.  
 
2.4.2 THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE UNION’S RESPONSE TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFRICA  
 
The CFSP has had a small success in producing a vigorous Union response to 
violations of human rights. Following the execution in November 1995 of Ken Saro-
Wiwa139 and eight other members of the Ogoni tribe in Nigeria, the Council adopted two 
Common Positions imposing a number of minor sanctions: the restriction of the grant of 
visas to members of Nigerian government and security forces, the imposition of an 
arms embargo, the expulsion of all military personnel at Nigerian embassies and the 
withdrawal of the equivalent personnel from Nigeria and the denial of visas to Nigerian 
sport teams.140 Although the European Parliament called unanimously for the Council 
to introduce an oil embargo, the Council, motivated by fears of an increase in oil prices, 
concerned about European banks’ exposure to Nigerian debt and worried about the 
effect on European companies with substantial investments in the Nigerian oil industry, 
refused to go beyond these limited sanctions.  
During the same years, Belgium and France, the two Member States with the closest 
ties with Rwanda, enjoyed significant potential leverage in view of the very substantial 
and increasing levels of economic assistance which they provided. However, although 
France had declared that its economic aid to Africa was conditional upon the 
observation of human rights, in practice French policy towards Rwanda was driven not 
by concern for human rights but by a determination to fight Anglo-Saxon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  N.Winn, The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: The EU Joint Action as an Effective Foreign Policy 
Instrument?,  International Relations, 1997, p.75. 
139  (1941-1945) He was a nigerian writer, hanged in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani 
Abacha. His execution, consequently to his fight against the environmental degradation and the 
multinational petroleum industries, provoked international outrage and resulted in Nigeria’s suspension 
from the Commonwealth of Nations for over three years. 
140  Decision 95/515/CFSP OJ L 298/1995; Decision 95/544/CFSP OJ L 309/1995. 
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encroachment, in the shape of Tutsi rebels supported by Uganda, on its traditional 
sphere of influence in Africa.141 Neither Belgium nor France reduced development aid 
in response to increasingly severe human rights violations in Rwanda, sending in this 
way a clear message to the African government that support would continue regardless 
of human rights abuses.142 France moreover continued to supply and service much of 
the materiel used by the Rwandan army, even after the imposition of the United 
Nations arms embargo in May 1994. The French determination to pursue its own 
agenda in the Great Lakes region prevented the European Union from reacting 
promptly to the genocide in 1994 and limited the Union’s response to declarations and 
belated gestures of concern. The Council was unable to adopt a Common Position until 
the main period of genocide had finished in October 1994, which belatedly called for 
the provision of humanitarian aid, the deployment of human rights observers and UN 
forces and the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal.143 The Union’s 
failure to act more quickly in this case was especially tragic as, given Rwanda’s 
dependence on economic aid, the Union’s influence was huge.144 
The Union’s response to the massacres of refugees in Zaire in late 1996 was much the 
same as its response to the Rwandan genocide; the Council adopted a Joint Action 
only after much of the killing was over. Although it was apparent from September 1996 
that massacres were occurring among Rwandan refugees145, it was not until 22 
November 1996 that the Council adopted a Joint Action pledging humanitarian aid for 
the refugees and support for a multinational force to implement Security Council 
Resolutions. As the implementation of this decision could have required the use of 
military force, the Council asked the Western European Union to examine how it could 
have contributed to implementation; the use of the Western European countries outside 
Europe to prevent attacks on refugees would have been a remarkable innovation. In 
the event, once refugees had started to move home in large numbers, the political will 
to intervene evaporated. Although it was clear that the refugees were being harried 
viciously during their fight, the Member States were content to let events unfold. The 
Council subsequently adopted two Joint Actions pledging support for democratic 
transition in Zaire through the establishment of a European electoral unit and a 
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142  Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and 
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contribution to the United Nations Special Found. The most difficult human rights issue 
that faced the Union, however, was weather to resume aid to the government while it 
continued to obstruct the work of the United Nations investigation into the refugee 
massacres. Resuming economic aid could have well encouraged stability and 
economic activity, thereby moving the country towards the establishment of democracy 
and the rule of law, yet simultaneously implied indifference to the slaughter and a 
failure to break the culture of impunity central to human rights abuses.  
In May 1998, the Council adopted a Common Position which provided that the Union 
would have supported the ongoing establishment of democracy in Africa by 
encouraging respect for civil and political social, economic and cultural human rights; 
respect for basic democratic principles, including the right to choose leaders in free 
elections, the separation of powers and freedom of expression, association and 
political organization; the rule of law including a legislative and judicial system giving 
full effect to human rights and fair, accessible and independent judicial system; and 
good governance, including the transparent and accountable management of a 
countries’ resources. The Union would have increased support for African countries 
where positive changes had occurred and consider “appropriate responses” to negative 
changes. The Common Position thus repeated the stance set out in the human rights, 
democracy and development Resolution adopted by the Council in 1991146, which had 
since formed the basis for Community development policy.147 The Common Position 
was more modest than the 1991 Resolution, which made reductions in military 
expenditure a condition of further Community aid148 and which applied to all developing 
countries.  The Common position not only substantially expanded the brief reference to 
human rights and democracy in Article J.1(2) TEU, but also served as a framework for 
the actions of the Member States. It is notable that seven years elapsed before the 
Member States accepted that the principles contained in 1991 Resolution would have 
governed CFSP policy and their bilateral relations with the African States as well as 
Community development policy.  This showed how the European Union implied lots of 
efforts and time to learn and finally work as a whole unique organ instead of a set of 
different parties with different goals.  
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2.4.3 THE ARDUOUS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES 
 
It is the Council policy toward China, which has proved, in the words of Chris Patten149, 
“the most embarrassing indication of the gulf between European rhetoric and reality”.150 
In response to Tiananmen Square massacre, in 1990 the Member States first co-
sponsored a resolution before the Human Rights Commission condemning China’s 
human rights record and subsequently co-sponsored similar resolutions each year. 
These resolutions represented a notable success for EPC and CFSP, as alone each 
Member State might have hesitated to sponsor a critical resolution for fear of 
commercial retaliation from one of Europe’s most important export markets. In 1997, 
however, France, Germany Italy and Spain withdrew their backing for the resolution151; 
the alteration in French policy, which was seen as crucial, was attributed to French 
reluctance to upset China shortly before President Chirac paid a state visit to Beijing 
during which he was to sign an export contract for Airbus.152 As the Dutch Presidency 
noted, the French decision put “the essence of the human rights policy of the European 
Union at stake”.153 Denmark, with the support of nine Member States, subsequently 
sponsored the resolution; China retaliated by cancelling a visit by Zhu Rongji, the Vice-
Premier, to Denmark and some of its co-sponsors.154 In February 1998 the Member 
States put an end to discussion by agreeing not to sponsor Resolutions on China 
before future sessions of the Human Rights Commission.155 
In a Communication on relations with China in early 1998, the European Commission 
argued that resumption of dialogue with China would be more productive than 
condemnation that China would inevitably rejected; an “EU-China human rights 
dialogue without any preconditions gives the EU a real opportunity to pursue intense 
discussions which , coupled with specific cooperation projects, remains at present the 
most appropriate means of contributing to human rights in China”.156 Agreeing with the 
Commission’s analysis, the Member States announced that the Union would support 
China’s transition to an open society based on the rule of law and human rights by 
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funding a number of projects, including a programme of human rights training and 
exchange visits for Chinese lawyers, judges, civil servants and village governors, a 
legal aid programme to improve access to justice by the population and a joint seminar 
in Beijing to study human rights and the administration of justice. In early 1998, the 
British Presidency drew attention to China’s agreements to sign the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the release of several well-known dissidents and cooperation 
for the first time with UN human rights mechanism as evidence that the new policy 
produced change for the better.157 The European Parliament remained skeptical, 
calling on the Member States to co-sponsor a Resolution on China before future 
sessions of Human Rights Commission and calling on the Presidency to submit regular 
reports on the Union’s activities concerning human rights in China, an invitation which 
the Council has shown no sign of accepting. Moreover, in hearings before the 
European Parliament, the prominent dissident Wei Jingsheng criticized the new policy 
as a “big step backwards” which had disheartened human rights activists in China; in 
his view, only strong external pressure would produce change.158 Further doubt was 
thrown on the effectiveness of the Union’s policy of dialogue in autumn 1998, when the 
earlier loosening of restrictions on political debate suddenly ended , with the detention 
of numerous political activists, the banning of several political organizations and the 
closure of certain newspapers.159 Instead of protesting at the imposition of long prison 
sentences on three leading dissidents, in December 1998, the Member States didn’t 
respond in public to the new wave of authoritarian measures. China in the years later 
represented an especially delicate test of the Union’s commitment to human rights; 
while it could have become impossible to hold human rights dialogue with a 
government which was firmly suppressing political dissident, the Member States has 
been likely to be most reluctant to resume annual confrontation with China over human 
rights.  
Differently from what happened in the African continent, the continuing economic 
success of the East Asian states seemed to demonstrate that authoritarian government 
could, when combined with certain cultural factors, produce dynamic growth. During 
the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and subsequently, these states 
reiterated their commitment to the principle of non-intervention and castigated 
European attempts to raise human rights issues as an irrelevance given the evident 
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success of “Asian values” in reducing poverty and promoting development.160 At the 
same time, the more global market arising after the end of the Cold War greatly 
stimulated international economic competition. Faced with economic recession, the 
Member States were extremely keen to increase exports to the Asian “tiger 
economies”, a goal which was unlikely to be realized if relations were poisoned by 
wrangling over human rights. Relations with ASEAN have thus provided the hardest 
test of the Member States’ commitment to human rights as, despite the Member States’ 
eagerness to improve trade with the region, it is impossible to ignore the flagrant 
abuses in Burma and East Timor.  Portugal accession to the Community in 1986 first 
put East Timor on the EPC agenda, even though other Member States, especially 
Germany and the United Kingdom, were reluctant to draw attention to this issue; 
between 1975 and 1982 the Twelve, with the exception of Greece and Ireland, had 
abstained on all UN General Assembly votes concerning East Timor.161 After 1986, 
East Timor began to feature in EPC declarations on human rights, but it was not until 
the 1991 Dili massacre162 that EPC condemned Indonesian behavior in East Timor. 
However, British, Dutch and German pressure ensured that the texts were milder than 
Portugal had demanded; while criticizing the armed forces, the statements largely 
accepted the findings of the Indonesian commission of inquiry. In July 1992, the 
Council discussed negotiating a new cooperation agreement with ASEAN to replace 
the existing 1980 agreement between the Community and those countries, but Portugal 
vetoed the start of negotiations because of its concern over East Timor. In an effort to 
persuade Portugal to withdraw its veto, in June 1996 the Council adopted a Common 
Position on East Timor, which expressed support for the talks taking place under the 
control of the UN Secretary-General and called upon the Indonesian government to 
adopt effective measures leading to a significant improvement in the human rights 
situation in East Timor.163 Even such muted criticism drew a sharp reaction, with the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister denouncing the Common Position as “tantamount to a 
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declaration of war”,164 and led ASEAN to consider whether the Union should continue 
to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum.165 
Asian foreign ministers made clear before the first Asia-Europe summit meeting 
(ASEM) in March 1996 that “sensitive, controversial and irrelevant issues” had to be 
avoided and the Indonesian Foreign Minister sought to extract a guarantee that the 
issue of East Timor would not be raised.166 Although human rights issues were 
discussed in bilateral meetings between heads of government at the summit, the 
Chairman’s Statement noted blandly that while the parties affirmed their strong 
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, political dialogue between 
the two regions would take place in conformity with the norm of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of the partners.  
In 1996, Denmark pressed for the symbolic sanctions already implemented against 
Burma by EPC to be strengthened. The Union’s response was minimal; in October 
1996, the Council adopted a Common Position which condemned continuing human 
rights abuses in Burma, confirmed the existing sanctions, introduced a ban on entry 
visas for senior members of the SLORC167 and the military and suspended high-level 
bilateral government contacts with Burma.168 Despite this condemnation of the SLORC, 
several Member States continued vigorously to promote trade with Burma.169 The 
Union’s reaction to the admission of Burma to ASEAN in July 1997 was muted; the 
Council made no criticism of the decision, although it did note that human rights 
situation in Burma precluded Burma’s accession to the EC-ASEAN Cooperation 
Agreement. The Member States have subsequently encountered some difficulty in 
maintaining their dialogue with ASEAN while refusing to deal with Burma. A specialist 
ASEAN-EU cooperation conference in November 1997 was postponed because the 
Union refused to attend if Burma was allowed to participate.170 The Union also refused 
to invite Burma to the second ASEM summit in April 1998, arguing that membership of 
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ASEAN did not automatically entitle a state to participate in ASEM.171 Although this 
decision drew sharp criticism from Malaysia it did not make good its threat to boycott 
the meeting. The quid pro quo for accepting Burma’s exclusion appeared to be the 
complete exclusion of human rights issues from the summit itself. The Union’s desire to 
avoid conflicts with ASEAN countries was strong and it was further demonstrated by 
the British Presidency’s vigorous lobbying at the 1998 UN Human Rights Commission 
against the adoption of a strong resolution on East Timor. 
 
2.5 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UNION’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES  
 
As the paragraphs above show that, the Union’s human rights approach with other 
countries has in general remained limited to issuing condemnatory declarations for the 
entire time of the 1990s. This “declaratory strategy” on human rights was not futile, as 
the Union’s repeated denunciations of violations have helped to make clear that human 
rights abuses were no longer acceptable to the community. In the mid 1990s although 
post-modern states accepted that the protection of human rights was in the long term 
fundamental to international order and stability, in the short term states were often 
reluctant to raise human rights issues for fear of disrupting good diplomatic relations. 
Collective action through the CFSP however had a positive effect which could reduce 
the costs traditionally associated with human rights diplomacy.172 As the European 
Union used to gain authority as a political actor on the world stage, third states started 
to be increasingly keen to maintain a friendly dialogue with the Union and anxious to 
avoid economic sanctions, which were far more punitive weapon when imposed by the 
Community rather than by a single member State. Moreover, any state contemplating 
retaliation in response to criticism of its human rights record was evidently far less likely 
to retail against the Union than against a single member State. Nevertheless, not all 
member States have been persuaded that the costs of human rights diplomacy 
adopted by the Union was reduced to an acceptable level. The different assessments 
by Member States, in fact lead to not only a huge battle based on budget lines in the 
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subsequent years, but also to a different assessment of the importance of human rights 
issues.  While unanimity was required to adopt Joint Actions and Common Positions, 
any Member State, concerned that action might endanger its economic or political 
interests, could have blocked actions and the Union’s human rights policy would have 
moved slower. Fearful that the national interests entrenched in the Council may give 
effective response to human rights issues, the European Parliament called for the 
Intergovernmental Conference to increase its powers over the CFSP by requiring the 
Council to act on a resolution adopted by Parliament by a two-thirds majority in the field 
of human rights and democracy.173 Permitting the Parliamentary control of the Union 
Foreign Security Policy in any field, let alone the sensitive area of human rights, was 
inacceptable to most Member States and it was not surprising that this suggestion did 
not find its way into the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
 
2.6 ON THE ROAD TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM  
 
The Treaty on the European Union, signed in Maastricht in February 1992, provided for 
amendments to be made, in the light of experience acquired, to those provisions which 
were felt to be inadequate during the negotiations. Article N in the Final Provisions laid 
down that any Member State, or the European Commission, might submit proposals for 
the amendment of the Treaties to the Council. The latter, after consulting the European 
Parliament, and, where appropriate, the Commission, could deliver an opinion in favor 
of calling an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), to be convened by the Presidency. 
A “review clause” in Article N provided for the calling of such a conference in 1996.  
In hindsight, the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union were too 
optimistic in setting the date of 1996 for the next IGC. The ratification of the TEU 
proved far more arduous and took much longer than expected, and between 1993-
1995 the attention of the Community institutions and the Member States was 
concentrated upon the negotiations for the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
and upon the preparatory steps in the creation of Economic and Monetary Union. The 
modifications eventually agreed upon in the Treaty of Amsterdam might have been 
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more far-reaching had the Intergovernmental Conference been held a year or two 
later.174 
In any event, the European Council and the institutions were determined that the IGC 
should be well prepared. The European Council created a Reflection Group175 in June 
1995, consisting of two senior representatives from each Member State, chaired by 
Ambassador Carlos Westerdorp of Spain. In an extraordinary step, the European 
Council invited two representatives of the Parliament to participate in the Reflection 
Group's work, an invitation that Parliament eagerly accepted in an effort to influence 
the Reflection Group toward greater amenability to further democratization of the 
institutions. Each of the Community institutions, including for the first time the Court of 
Justice, was also requested to provide a report with observations on the functioning of 
the institutions and possible further Treaty changes. 
The Reflection Group provided its report, A Strategy for Europe,176 to the Madrid 
European Council in December 1995, which made considerable use of it in setting the 
initial agenda for the 1996 IGC.177  
The Turin European Council on March 29, 1996,178 set the formal agenda for the IGC, 
laying stress upon the preparations for the future enlargement to include Central 
European states, bringing the Union closer to its citizens, notably by restructuring the 
Cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs, making the institutions more democratic, 
efficient, and transparent, especially by widening the scope of co-decision and 
examining the modes of Council voting, and strengthening the external relations 
capacity of the Union, especially by improved procedures and structure in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The Intergovernmental Conference (commonly designated 
as the "Turin IGC") presented a draft treaty to the Amsterdam European Council in 
June 1997, thus working for slightly more than a year. The Commission, under the 
leadership of President Jacques Santer and Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, was very 
much involved in the IGC debates and in its drafting process. The Parliament followed 
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closely the evolution of the debates and drafting, providing its views regularly. Although 
the Court of Justice remained apart, its 1995 report undoubtedly weighed heavily in any 
IGC consideration of the Court's role and jurisdiction. 
The Amsterdam European Council of June 16-17, 1997, resolved some outstanding 
issues, usually through the mode of complex Protocols, and, after some sprucing up 
over the summer, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 2, 1997.  
From a general perspective it could be said that the Treaty has been a huge success if 
compared with to the various positions of the member states in 1995, but compared to 
the institutional agenda , it has been largely a failure.179 In terms of institutional 
structure and operations, undoubtedly the most important achievement of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam has been the modification of the co-decision procedure to put the 
Parliament on a par with the Council and to add new legislative fields to those in which 
the co-decision procedure was used. With regard to the scope of action of the 
European Community, some expansion and increased emphasis has been given in the 
fields of the environment, health, consumer protection and culture. In addition, a major 
development has been the gradual transfer of the sectors of visas, asylum rights, 
immigration, and controls on external frontiers to the Community from the prior 
intergovernmental procedures in the third pillar, Cooperation injustice and Home 
Affairs. 
As far as concern human rights and fundamental freedoms, efforts by the European 
Parliament, to include in the Treaty a catalogue of rights, remained mostly 
unsuccessful. However, the commitment to the principles of liberty and democracy, the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, already 
expressed after Maastricht in paragraph 3 of the TEU Preamble, were maintained.  
This commitment was extended to fundamental social rights as defined in the 
European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers180, and to other 
fundamental values common to European citizens.  
During the drafting years, there was no doubt that the Union legal order should 
guarantee an adequate protection of fundamental human rights, which has become the 
core of Europe's democratic society. Indeed, Amsterdam, while maintaining the 
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Maastricht’s principles intact, placed a greater emphasis on rights protection, notably 
through the insertion of a new Article F.1 of the TEU that enabled the Council, acting in 
its composition of Heads of State or Government, to assess penalties on Member 
States that violate the principles of democracy, rule of law, and basic rights. Moreover, 
the Amsterdam Treaty expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Article L of 
the TEU to cover claims that Community institutions have violated fundamental rights. 
Also potentially of high importance has been the new Article 6 of the EC Treaty, which 
empowered the Council to adopt measures to "combat discrimination based on sex, 
social or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
Specifically, article F (renumbered article 6) of the Maastricht Treaty that contained a 
reference to fundamental rights in its second paragraph, remained unchanged in the 
Amsterdam Treaty181. Instead, the first paragraph of the same article, was amended in 
the new Treaty as follows: 
“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States”.182 
 Thus, as specified in an amended Article 49 TEU (formerly Article 0), States wishing to 
join the European Union had to respect these principles. These changes have been a 
natural follow-up to the political criteria for membership of the Union set by the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993. The new Article 6 TEU reflected 
the Copenhagen criteria, with the exception that the protection of minorities was 
omitted and an extra reference to liberty was included. Through these paragraphs the 
Treaty reaffirmed the fundamental principles on which the Union was founded and 
strengthened the Union's commitment to fundamental rights. Moreover, the new Article 
7 TEU enabled the Council to take action in the event of serious and persistent 
breaches of fundamental rights occurring in any Member State.183 This article has been 
even more significant, due to its content, according to which “any Member State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181  “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as general principles of Community law.” 
182  Previously the first paragraph only stated: “The Union shall respect the national identities of the 
Member States, whose system of government are founded on the principle of democracy.”  
183  “Where such a determination has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to 
suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in 
question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in 
the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a 
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. The obligation of the Member 
State in question under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State”.	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violating human rights in a serious and persistent way might  have some  of its rights 
deriving from the Treaty suspended, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the 
Article.” However, Article 7 contained some procedural barriers that made it (politically) 
difficult for the Council to determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach of 
the principles mentioned in Article 6. Indeed, according to the procedure, a proposal 
had to be submitted by one third of the Member States or by the Commission, but it 
would have been of course unlikely that Member States wanted to accuse each other 
of breaches of human rights. Furthermore, the Member States behind the proposal 
needed to find the support of one-third of the Member States to be able to submit it to 
the Council. In effect, this might mean that most proposals for the Council to determine 
a breach of fundamental or human rights would have come from the Commission. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TOWARD THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE EUROPEAN 
INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
3.1 THE BUDGET LINES’ BATTLE: CHAPTER B7-70  
 
The beginning of the 1990s witnessed the creation of several budget lines, created at 
the behest of the Parliament and managed by the Commission, aimed at promoting 
human rights.184 A substantial amount of funds had thus to be devoted to the promotion 
of human rights, generally via NGOs.185 In 1992, the Commission published its first 
annul report “on the application of the Council resolution on human rights, democracy 
and development of November 1991” enumerating the various projects which had been 
undertaken.  According to the report, the Commission had, in the previous years, spent 
around 12 million ECU in the promotion of human rights, and in addition, 
supplementary credits had been devoted in the framework of the Lomé Conventions.186 
From 1992 onwards, Commission reports started to be produced regularly on an 
annual basis. These reports used to provide an overview of the projects undertaken to 
promote human rights. Importantly, each year the budget increased and sometimes 
doubled. In 1993, the annual budget increased  from 12 million ECU to reach an annual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  However it seems that the first budget heading devoted to promote human rights was introduced in 
1978, with an allocation of 200.000 Ecu. Other headings were added in the subsequent years. See 
Daniela Napoli, “The European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights” in The  Euorpean Union and 
Human Rights in Nanette A.Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds.) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p.305.  
185  However, in some cases, especially in the recent years, the Commission has awarded some funds to 
intergovernamental organizations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. See European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Compedium 2000.  
186  HAEU, AV-63, Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen “rapport sur la 
mise en oeuvre de la resolution du Conseil et de ses Etats Membres reunis au sein du Conseil sur les 
droits de l’homme, la democratie et les developpement du 28 novembre 1991”, Bruxelles le 21 octobre 
1992.  
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amount of 39 million ECU.187 By 1994, the budget increased to 59 million ECU188, and 
in a few years the annual expenditure reached 100 million EUR. 
In the 1994 budget, at the Parliament’s request, all headings relating to the promotion 
of human rights and democratic principles were brought together in a single chapter: 
Chapter B7-7, entitled “European Initiatives in support of Democracy and the protection 
of Human Rights”(EIDHR).189  However, this formal arrangement did not solve the 
question of economic and social rights, which had to be dealt with under other budget 
lines190,  and failed to establish clear priorities, and thus strategies to attain these 
priorities. Besides, one of the most critical points was the question of its legal basis that 
was not entirely clear.  
Despite the above mentioned issues, that took much work and time of the Commission, 
the new lines designed demonstrated how the importance of democracy for the EU 
was not just limited to declarations. This is why the EU created several policy 
instruments to try to promote democracy, including positive and negative conditionality, 
democracy aid, political dialogue and election observation.  
Democracy has been a condition for membership since 1978, when the European 
Council declared that “respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  Rapport de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlament Européen “sur la mise en 1993 de la résolution 
du Conseil et des Etats membres réunis au sein du Conseil sur les droits de l’homme, la démocratie et 
le développement” in COM (94) 42 final, Bruxelles 23.02.1994. It is also significant to point out that the 
Commission mandated an evaluation of its positive  measures in favour of human rights and 
democracy from 1991 to 1993. See Wolfgang Heinz, Hildegard Lingnau and Peter Waller, Evaluation 
des Mesures Positives de la CE en Faveur des Droits de l’Homme et la Démocratie (1991-1993), 
Institut Allemand de Developpement (IAD), Berlin, 1995.  
188  Anexo 1 del informe de la Comision “sobre la aplicacion de las acciones de fomento de los derechos 
humanos y de la democratizacion (para el año 1995)” COM (96) 672 final, Bruselas 17.01.1997.  
189   The European Community has developed a comprehensive set of measures for responding to 
different aspects of human rights and democracy. The breakdown of these measures are along 
thematic and geographical lines:  
B7-700 Support for democracy for countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the Republics 
formerly part of Yugoslavia  
B7-701 Support for democracy in the independent states of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia.  
B7-7020 Human rights and democracy in developing countries, especially ACP countries  
B7-7021 Human Rights and democracy in the countries of Southern Africa  
B7-7022 Special programme for democracy and good governance in Nigeria  
B7-703 Democratisation process in Latin America  
B7-704 Subsidies for certain activities of organizations pursuing human rights objectives  
B7-705 MEDA Programme for Democracy and Human Rights  
B7-706 Support for the activities of International Criminal Tribunals and to the setting-up of a 
permanent International Criminal Court  
B7-707 Human rights in Asian countries  
B7-709 Support for, and supervision of, electoral processes 
190  B. Simma, Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner and Constanze Schulte, Human Rights in Development 
Cooperation, The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.605.  
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European Communities.” The 1993 Copenhagen conditions for EU membership stated 
that applicants must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. Third 
countries beyond Europe were also subject to conditionality. The ‘human rights clause, 
as already explained in a previous paragraph, defined respect for human rights and 
democratic principles as an essential provision in the EU’s cooperation and association 
agreements with all third countries. And new democracies – such as South Africa in 
1994 – received promises of aid and agreements so as to encourage and consolidate 
democratic reforms. 
From 1986 the Community began to give small amounts of aid to some third countries 
specifically to foster democratic reforms. By putting high-level policy statements into 
practice through incorporating them into regional aid, they created geographically 
based cooperation programmes, each with a distinct legal, financial and administrative 
framework. An innovation in terms of logic of action and instruments was the 
"European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights” launched in 1994 by the 
European Parliament.191 The new framework that merged into the “European 
Instrument for Democracy and Humans Rights” (EIDHR) in 2006 will group together the 
budget headings for the promotion of human rights, democratisation, and conflict 
prevention across countries, also allowing cooperation with non-state actors in third 
countries.  
All of the EU’s political dialogues with third countries and regional groupings were 
supposed to cover issues relating to human rights and democratisation. Finally, since 
the early 1990s, the EU has launched numerous missions, under the EIDHR 
programme, to observe elections in third countries to help ensure that they were 
conducted freely and fairly.192  
On the other hand, despite the initial good intentions, there have been reasons to doubt 
the extent to which democracy promotion really mattered for the EU. As the 1990s 
demonstrated, the issue of granting founds and the ways in which to direct those 
founds has been one of the most debated questions by the Council and Commission, 
often without arising the best outcome for the affirmation of democracy and human 
rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191  HAEU, AV-63, Information Note, Background of EIDHR, Brussels 8 October 1998, p.2. 
192  Ibid. p.4. 
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As already mentioned, the EIDHR represented a small percentage of the EU’s external 
action budget, and during the 1997-1998 the Directorate General for External Relations 
worked to keep the Initiative alive and to obtain enough funds to promote its basic 
principles.  EIDHR funds have not been used extensively in regions of the world that 
were more sensitive to outside ‘interference’ on issues of domestic jurisdiction. Most of 
the EU’s external aid used to go to traditional development activities and 
reconstruction, and there’s always been a strong tendency to assume that political 
change would have followed naturally from economic reform.  
The EU’s political dialogues with third countries have always been short meetings with 
long agendas that included numerous topics in addition to human rights and 
democracy concerns, but rarely there have been dialogues on human rights alone.193 
These inconsistencies did not fit very well with the EU’s declared foreign policy 
ambitions, hard choices have to be made about priorities, especially in the short term, 
and human rights were rarely one of them. Along with it, while democracy promotion 
has been clearly an important foreign policy aim for the EU, and resources has always 
been devoted to it, not by any means it have come top of the EU’s hierarchy of 
interests. This hierarchy has had its consequences in the struggle to promote EIDHR 
and other programmes that will be analysed in the next paragraphs. 
In 1997 for instance, the Commission tried to address the last point, that is, the legal 
basis and presented a proposal of Council regulation entitled “on the development an 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect of human rights”. However, 
the Council Legal Service did not share the view of the Commission and affirmed “in 
any case no measure in this area could be directed towards actions promoting the 
observance of human rights and democratic principles by and in the Member 
States”194.  
Among the elements of crisis that driven the Commission to a breaking point in 1998, 
there has been the problem of the European Human Rights Foundation, and the 
missed renewal of the Commission contract with it after May 1998. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193  HAEU, AV-65, Memo providing terms of reference for technical and administrative assistance for the 
European initiative for democracy and human rights, s.f., 30 September 1998. 
194  Weiler and Fries, A Human Rights Policy for the European Community and the Union: the Question of 
Competences”, The European Union and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999.  
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3.2 THE EHRF AND ITS CONTRACT WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
In 1976 the European Parliament voted 200.000 ECU for the benefit of “activities of 
non-governmental organizations pursuing humanitarian objectives and concerned with 
the defence of human rights. However, one of the principal non-governmental 
organization, Amnesty International, did not take up the funds because of a perception 
that it would have put at risk its independence and fall under the control of a public 
authority.  Confronted with this situation, the European Parliament and Commission 
approached NGOs to assist with the setting up of a body that would intervene between 
the Community Institutions and the intended recipients of Community budget founds. 
This had the merit to ensure that the project selection procedure would have been free 
from meddlesome parliamentary lobbing, undertaken by personnel equipped with the 
necessary skills and experience, and the whole managed by a neutral body in the 
competitive world of NGOs.195 However, the initiative proved unattractive to NGOs, until 
the then Secretary General of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals, offered to resign 
his position and, on condition that the Commission met expenses, established what 
became the European Human Rights Foundation. The inaugural meeting of the EHRF 
was held on 19 December 1980.  
Initially, the Foundation secretariat was based in London and comprised Mr. Peter 
Ashman196 as Director. The legal seat of the Foundation was established in the 
Netherlands as this location was considered to offer the most favourable fiscal and 
legal conditions. During its first 11 years of existence, the work of the Foundation 
comprised the distribution of small grants from its found: the European Human Rights 
Found. 197 
In 1992 the Commission founded the move of certain operations of the Foundation 
from London to Brussels. The object was to facilitate frequent contact with the 
Community institutions, in fact Mr. Ashman was able to assist the Secretariat General 
with its work on human rights projects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195  HAEU, AV-63, Briefing for Commissioner Van den Broek, Foreign Affairs Committee 30.09.1998 
196  Mr. Ashman was approached by Mr. Ennals. See HAEU, AV-65, Relation on the European Human 
Rights Foundation, EU Commission for External Relations, 30.09.1998. 
197  Ibid. 
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During the same period, there was a pilot call for macro project proposals under 
PHARE198. The Commission and Parliament perceived this initial experience as a 
success and so agreed to move beyond the pilot phase. A contract was signed with the 
Foundation in January 1994 to administer the macro project programme for PHARE. 
The Foundation then established its main office in Brussels, while maintaining also the 
London seat, as was the legal one in Netherlands. In the same year offices in Prague 
and Warsaw were opened, and by 1995 the Foundation had an additional office in 
Brussels dedicated to the DG IA.199  
From 1989 until January 1997, there was a creditable development of the response of 
the Commission pressure from public opinion and from the European Parliament that 
there was the need to be active in various geographical areas, and in different issues 
related to democratization and human rights. The Commission sought and found 
outside skills to compensate for its relative inexperience in this field by retaining the 
services of the European Human Rights Foundation. 200 As a non-profit making 
foundation established precisely for the sort of work which it then has done for the 
Commission, there has never been a time tendering found appropriate. Contracts have 
always been concluded following direct negotiations. The work for the EHRF comprised 
the technical appraisal of projects applications, the on-going monitoring of projects, 
assessments of interim and final reports, and advice to potential and unsuccessful 
applicants. According to the Commission, it was precisely the specialist nature of this 
work, and the accumulated experience of the EHRF, which made these tasks 
inappropriate to contract by competition and contributed to the last attempt at tendering 
being unsuccessful.201 The Commission retained also that the organization of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198  Phare and Democracy Programme was a financial instrument of the European Union (EU) for 
cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries to support their transition to market oriented 
economy and their accession to EU. 
199  During the period covered by the audit, the management of the human rights and democracy 
programmes was spread across several departments of the Commission. A department in DG I. A was 
responsible for the programmes in central and eastern Europe and the new independent States and 
provided overall coordination through an interdepartmental group. DG VIII had a unit responsible for 
these measures in the ACP States, and, for most of the period covered, was also responsible for 
human rights and democracy measures in Asia. DG I. B managed the programmes for Latin America 
and the Mediterranean, and in 1998 took over from DG VIII responsibility for the human rights and 
democracy measures in Asia. As part of the reorganization of the Commission departments in 1999, a 
part of DG I. A and DG I. B became part of DG external relations and DG VIII became DG 
Development. 
See Eur-Lex, Access to the European Union law: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000Y0810(01) 
200  HAEU, AV-65, Document: Reform of Democratization and Human Rights Programme Management. 
The Need for Interim Continued Support from EHRF. 
201  HAEU, AV-63, Letter from Tom Spencer (Committee of Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy) 
to Mr José Marìa Gil-Robles, President of the Europen Parliament, Bruxelles 5 May 1998. 
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programme of multiple and heterogeneous activities could only be carried out 
effectively by the Commission, given its limited human resources, by resources to 
outside support. Over the life of the Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme the EHRF 
has provided such support202. Thus the management of the human rights budget lines 
was fully within the Commission, but the EHRF provided a team of experts to vet 
proposals, analyze reports and support thematic work. 203 
If formally the Foundation has been contracted by DGIA to provide technical assistance 
for specific actions within fixed deadlines with payment dependent on the submission of 
reports or invoices, in practice this used to involve the Foundation in the staffing and 
equipping of two principal offices in Brussels: one for the management of macro 
projects (which was the main action of the Human Rights and Democracy Initiative), 
and then the Found and the performance of the continuing functions of an office 
dedicated to DGIA.  
From its inception until 1992, the core work of the Foundation has been to distribute 
grants to a maximum of 10.000 ECU to human rights NGOs small projects with the 
minimum of ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny. This way of working was dictated largely by 
the limited Community funding that did not found many large projects. 204 
In June 1992 the role of the Foundation as an agency for the processing, evaluation 
and monitoring of applications for grant aid and the payment of small grants, was 
substantially modified to embrace the provision of direct assistance to the Commission 
by Mr. Ashman, secretary in the evaluation and selection of applications for the funding 
of human rights macro projects. It was thus agreed to place this working relationship on 
a contractual basis. However, a delay in signing the initial contract meant that there 
were no calls for proposals to NGOs in 1993. Accordingly, the 1993 budget 
appropriations funded the projects selected from the first call for proposals in 1994, and 
1994 budget appropriations funded the projects funded from the second call for 
proposals in October of the same year.205 
The launch of the Democracy Programme by the Commission following an initiative of 
the European Parliament, was marked by the circulation of guidelines to known NGOs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202  HAEU, AV-65, Angel Viñas speech, s.d. 
203  HAEU, AV-65,  Urgent Note for the attention of Mr Burghardt, Director-General, Subject: Continuity of 
Human Rights and Democratisation Programme Support: the European Human Rights Foundation., 
Brussels, 25 June 1997, D(97)18702. 
204  HAE, AV-65, Note de dossier, Angel Viñas, Bruxelles, le 3 mars 1997. 
205  HAEU, AV-81, Annex 3 of the “Written procedure for the contracting of the European Human Rights 
Foundation”, Brussels, 31 July 1998.  	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in PHARE countries in August 1992. By November of the same year 350 proposals 
were received. By April 1993, 52 projects had been selected by DG IA with help from 
the Foundation who was contracted as an external consultant. The large number of 
proposal received, as the decision to extent the programme to TACIS countries from 
1993, persuaded the Commission to let a contract in 1994 with the Foundation for the 
management of the macro projects scheme.206  In those years, the EHRF was also 
given an annual subvention to provide “prestations de services” to Commission staff 
managing the budget lines under B7-7. This involved EHRF staff working on 
administrative aspects of the projects – checking for compliance with criteria, assisting 
with evaluation, negotiating budgets, preparing papers for inter-service groups 
meetings, preparing contracts and letters of notification of results, drafting reports, and 
checking narrative and financial reports sent in by projects operators. Among its 
competences there was no delegation of Commission powers, and the arrangement 
ceased at the end of May 1998.  
 
3.3 THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR 1998 
 
Given that the European Human Rights Foundation was not a Community institution, it 
was decided in 1997 that the contracting of the Foundation by direct agreement was no 
longer appropriate after so many years have passed with such a regime, and that a 
competitive tendering process should be conducted to select a successor 
organization.207  Reorganization within DG IA of the Commission had resulted in the 
regrouping of both general human rights support and the Phare and Tacis Democracy 
Programmes under one unit. It was therefore decided in 1997 that there should be a 
call for proposals for the regrouped services needed in the field of human rights and 
democratization.  
In January 1998, an open invitation for pre-qualification was published in the Official 
Journal and on Internet to identify contractors potentially interested to supply expertise 
and technical assistance as described in a summary of the terms of reference. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 The programme units in PHARE and TACIS functioned as programme coordinators  until 1996 when 
they were amalgamated into a new PTDP Programme Unit. See HAEU, AV-65, The management of 
macro projects, EHRF, 30/09/1998.  
207 HAEU, AV-81, File Note, subject: Plenary Session of the European Parliament. Statement by Mr. Van 
den Broek on Human Rights and Democratization budget management of 17th November 1998. , 
Brussels 18.11.1998.  
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selection of interested contractors there were no reasons to exclude the proposal of the 
Foundation, which for its services had been appreciated by the Commission, and of 
which, the European Court of Auditors in a sector letter, had confirmed the integrity and 
quality.  
A restricted tender was subsequently launched on 15 March 1998 with deadline of 6 
May 1998. The subsequent identification of the offer, which was technically and 
economically the most advantageous, was done without regard to the services 
provided by organizations in the past. It was thus that the proposal of the EHRF was 
recommended to the Commission to be the basis of a contract on the strength of its 
tender proposal alone.  
Being the assistance of the EHRF or a successor organization absolutely essential for 
the work of the programme, it was planned that the new contract had to be in place at 
the end of May 1998. The tender process was planned in such a way that there was no 
interruption following the end of contractual arrangements with the EHRF at the end of 
May. A slight delay, however, resulted in the written procedure for the commitment of 
funds being overtaken by the Court of Justice ruling 106/96, which effectively blocked 
all new commitments until the end of July 1998. The decision of the Court of Justice 
with regard to budget lines without agreed legal bases has only served to confirm that 
the environment of the programme was stormy and uncertain. The securing of 
technical assistance to follow up on the arrangements with the European Human 
Rights Foundation was thrown into doubt at the last minute by the ruling, and 
numerous important projects were at best going to be delayed.208 This temporary 
freeze of the budget lines of Chapter B7-7 has thrown human rights management into a 
crisis: the Director General was incapable of handling the policy work and the 
communications with applicant organizations without support. After May 1998 the 
decision not to proceed with the contracting of the European Human  
Rights Foundation and the establishment of the SCR209 made the Commission face 
new challenges that had not been considered before.210  At the Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 28 October 1998, Mr McMillan-Scott reported that the Commission 
would not renew the contract with EHRF. According to the report, the Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208  HAEU, AV-71, Document on the 1998 Approach to Human Rights, s.d, s.f. 
209  Joint RELEX service for the management of Community aid to non-member countries. 
210  For more information see HAEU, AV-80, Note to Mr. Burghardt, Director General, Subject: Human 
Rights Budget: Current Situation. , Angel Viñas, 23 October 1998, AV/JL D(98).  
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used purely technical problem, which could have been resolved, as a pretext to end the 
cooperation with EHRF. 211 
The newspapers in that period talked about “extremely grave”212 consequences. 
According to The Guardian the Human Rights Program was run and founded through 
the EHRF to promote rights all over the world, but in voting the funds to achieve this 
end, the parliament failed to vote funds for the administrative means and proper legal 
basis to carry them out. It seemed the Commission allowed the foundation to finance 
its own administrative and monitoring costs out of operational budget, a procedure of 
dubious legality. This has panicked the Commission, already battered by a wave of 
fraud and maladministration scandals. An article of the newspaper dedicated to the 
issue wrote  “To get out of the mess, the Commission has decided to close the 
foundation and start again with the plan for a new independent agency to support 
human rights”. 213 
Within the Commission, the creation of a new settlement became one of the core 
issues between 1998-1999. There were arguments both in favour of a new human 
rights agency (i.e. increased visibility and operational capacity) and against it (i.e. loss 
of political influence of the Commission as well as a lengthy and difficult process). 
Before launching such a proposal, the Commission needed however, to clarify the 
Agency’s remit and decide on the allocation of its own resources.  
Despite the negative developments brought confusion to the management of the 
human rights budget lines, in that context the idea of a EU Agency for Human Rights 
has come again to the discussion table. The creation of a new structure was proposed 
several years before, by the DGVIII and discussed by the RELEX Director General. 
The proposal was left aside because it was limited to developing countries. The 
European Parliament, in its Lenz Report214 and the draft Roubatis report, had already 
also tabled the idea.  Also the Vienna Conference on the Human Rights EU Agenda for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211  HAEU, AV-81, Note for the file, Subject: Debate in Parliament on the implementation of the Human 
Rights and Democracy programmes and on the contract with the EHRF. , Reinhold Hack, Brussels 29 
October 1998, DG1A.3/RH/lac, (confidential). 
212  HAEU, AV-81, New Human Rights body planned in wake of Brussels bungling, The Guardian, Martin 
Walker in Brussels, 9 November 1998. 
213  Ibid. 
214  Report on setting up a single co-ordinating structure within the European Commission responsible for 
human rights and democratization. Rapporteur: Mrs. M. Lenz. 4 December 1997. A4-0393/97. See 
HAEU, AV-81, Information Note, Subject: Human rights Agency, Carmen Marques Ruiz, Brussels, 9 
November 1998, DG1A/A2/CMR D(98) hragl. 
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the year 2000, on October 1997, proposed the creation of an European Human Rights 
Monitoring Agency.215   
The initial idea for the creation of an Agency was about to start from the model of the 
structure of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EMCRX) 
adding to it an Advisory Committee and a General Assembly of NGOs. The Agency 
should have been an independent organism in which the EU institutions would 
participate but which they would not control.  However, despite the new agency could 
have been a new symbol to commemorate the 50th year anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and could have favoured the quick mobilization of 
financial resources, the starting of this project was considered premature due to the 
Commission’s situation, which was undergoing a period of reflection on structural 
reform. Moreover it was underlined the risk of duplication of structures and the 
subsequent creation of rivalries between the Agency and the Commission. Finally it 
could not be hided the general scepticism due to the uncertain legal status of this kind 
of agency.216  
In 1998 the European Union faced many developments driven by a sort of incertitude 
about the future. Those developments included the judgement of the Court of 12 May 
1998; the sector letter of the Court of Auditors on the European Human Rights 
Foundation of 30 September 1998 and the final decision not to proceed with the 
contracting of the European Human Rights Foundation.  Considering that, since the 
1980s the European Commission has been entrusted by the European Union with the 
task of implementing activities to promote human rights in third countries, and to vote 
for a series of geographical specific budget lines, most of the consequences of this 
critical years directly addressed the Directorate General for External Relations, DG IA, 
which was the structure in charge of the Human Rights sphere. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215  Leading by example a human rights agenda for the European Union for the year 2000. Agenda of the 
Comité des Sages and Final Project Report. Florence 1998. See HAEU, Ibid. 23 
216  According to the Maastricht Treaty human rights fell within both Community competences and CFSP 
competences. Therefore the creation of an EU Human Rights Agency would require the adoption of 
two kinds of instruments: a regulation and a joint action. At Community level, the Agency should create 
by a Council regulation having as a legal basis art. 235 TEC, art.130w TEC (Community development 
policy) and  Article F par.2 (respect of fundamental rights by the EU). At CFSP level, a joint action 
based on art.J3 TUE would have to be adopted by the Council.216 At that point, once Amsterdam treaty  
entered into force, the creation of the Human Rights Agency could have been the subject of a common 
strategy adopted by the European Council, based on art. 13 par.2 of the Treaty. See HAEU, AV-81, 
Information Note par. 7 What a European Agency on Human Rights could be, Carmen Marques Ruiz, 
Brussels, 9 November 1998, DG1A/A2/CMR D (98) hragl.  
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Despite the obstacles, the human rights activity, which during the previous years 
(always under the Directorate) evolved from a kind of activities based on verification 
and possible sanction to another based on constructive engagement and dialogue, 
tryied to maintain the same approach, bearing obviously some reorientation and 
adjustments. This approach was characterized by focus on key priorities and ensuring 
support to the transformation of the transition countries, many of which were to become 
members of the EU. The thematic priorities remained support for democracy, the rule 
of law, development of a pluralist democratic society, and support for confidence 
building measures217. According to official sources the emphasis remained on a 
positive, practical and constructive approach to the support of democracy and the 
promotion of human rights, both through NGO activities and through international 
organizations, using the full range of instruments, among which training, seminars, 
advisers etc. 218  
 
3.4 SAVING EIDHR 
 
In 1997, three years after the launch, EIDHR was carefully and systematically built 
upon a wide range of experiences. The initiative had incorporated many of the lessons 
learned by the European Commission in dealing with issues not only in Europe but also 
in other part of the world. Last but not least it had increased the awareness of 
possibilities for effective actions.  
The Initiative provided added value in relation to the other Community instruments, it 
complemented the Community programmes carried out with governments such as 
the EDF, TACIS, ALA, MEDA, CARDS, PHARE and the rapid reaction 
mechanism (RRM), and it could be implemented with different partners, particularly 
NGOs and international organizations.  
At this point it was time to handle the Initiative with a strategic purpose. This involved 
the need to graduate from the all-encompassing approach followed in the past, and 
which had been absolutely invaluable in order to obtain field experiences, which the EU 
was lacking.  New challenge was to identify a more sophisticated line of action which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217  HAEU, AV-80, File Note, Technical assistance to the Unit dealing with human rights (first in the 
Secretariat General and subsequently DG IA), Brussels, 18 November 1998, D(98).  
218  HAEU, AV-63, Briefing for Commissioner Van den Broek,  Speaking Notes: 1. 1998 Approach to 
Democratization and Human Rights, Foreign Affair Committee, 30.06.1998.  
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should make the Initiative supportive of the broad orientations pursued by the EU in 
contributing to the strengthening of societies which, while still in transition, have made 
such progress that in many cases the prospect of Union membership has become an 
immediate policy goal.219  
However, the 1998 new challenges, created some slowdown also in the EIDHR 
programme. On one hand they had an immediate and potentially disastrous impact on 
work in progress on human rights and democratization supported through the 1998 
budget. On the other, they had an impact on the longer term inter-institutional 
relationship between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. As far as 
concern the immediate problem of which the 1998 budget was concerned, following the 
ruling of the Court of Justice on the 12th May 1998, the Commission decided on 10th 
June to suspend all new activities on affected budget lines, pending a through review. It 
was in such a way that all new commitments and contracts on Chapter B7-7 the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, were stopped.220 Mary 
Robinson, addressing the European Parliament on the 23rd June of the same year, 
drew attention to the tragic juxtaposition of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the stand-still problems of the Human Rights and 
Democratization activities of the European Commission. According to her speech, 
many NGOs and other organizations were seriously affected by the suspension of 
funding and were raising their voices in protest at the injustice of an inter-institutional 
dispute affecting the fight for human rights led by organizations and individuals who 
have counted on the EU for support.  
Following the ruling of the Court, the Commission decided on 10 June to examine all 
budget lines without a legal base and to suspend their execution temporarily. During 
the review the Commission decided to suspend new commitment, but to pay for the 
already committed.221 On June 23, a Budgetary trialogue took place between the 
budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) and the Commission. In 
that context the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission had a thorough 
and constructive discussion on the situation created by the Court ruling and on possible 
decisions to be taken both for the execution of the 1998 budget and for future budget 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219  HAEU, AV-63, Information note on the state of play of the EU human rights regulation, Jeremy Lester, 
Directorate General 1A Office, Brussels 1998.	  
220  HAEU, AV63, Briefing for Commissioner Van den Broek, Impact of the Court of Justice Ruling C-
106/96, Foreign Affairs Committee 30.06.98.  
221  (IP/98/520) See HAEU, AV63, Budgetary trialogue, Note bio aux Bureaux Nationaux, Martine 
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exercises. In the end the institutions agreed on a specific Action Plan according to 
which the Council and the Parliament had to accelerate the adoption of legal bases for 
which the Commission had already made proposals. The Commission had to intensify 
19 legal proceedings that were not concluded yet, and to accelerate its assessment of 
the budget lines concerned in the 1998 budget with a view to providing results for the 
subsequent meeting of 17 July 1998 between the Budget Council and the European 
Parliament.222 
Between May and August 1998 the European Commission for the External Relations 
worked strenuously to find a solution that could have ensured a legal continuity for the 
Chapter B7-7 of the budget. Having the Commission the responsibility and the 
obligation to ensure the proper management and an appropriate follow up of decisions 
already taken, the DG IA office proposed to launch an urgent procedure for the 
commitment of funds from the 1998 budget to permit retroactive addenda to each of 
the three expired contracts between the EHRF and the Commission. The addenda had 
to be dated from the date of expiry of the previous contract (in order to maintain the 
legal continuity) until 31.12.1998. 223 
Further support was the subject of the tender process launched early in 1998 but, 
owing to problems originating outside the Commission, the latter was unable to sign a 
contract.  Commentaries in the 1999 budget then permitted the organization of a tender 
in conformity with the financial regulations and the inter-institutional agreement of 1998, 
then extended to cover 1999, which resulted from the European Court of Justice ruling 
C/106/96.  
As expected the new tender procedure was not completed before the latter half of that 
year, with funds to be committed under the budget for the year 2000, even if the need 
for assistance was immediate. Therefore a contract by direct agreement with the EHRF 
was proposed for a period of 12 months thus allowing time for the new tender 
procedure to be completed.   
The consequence of the United Kingdom v. Commission ruling, on Human rights 
projects legal basis 224  was that the implementation of the budget line was suspended 
during at least two months and could only be resumed by virtue of an inter-institutional 
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223  HAEU, AV-63, Draft Note to Mr J.-P. Mingasson – Director General DG XIX, For the attention of Mr J. 
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agreement. United Kingdom versus Commission, coupled with Opinion 2/94 on 
Accession to the European Convention of Human Rights225, raised important doubts on 
the the reach of the EC competences in the field of human rights. Within this context, 
the Commission proposal of Council regulation gave raise to an inter-institutional 
dispute which lasted, at least, two years.  
The disputed question of the legal basis was finally solved by the enactment of two 
Council Regulations in 1999, which were based on the Commission proposals. Council 
Regulations 975/1999226 and 976/1999227 provided the legal base for implementing 
appropriations in Chapter B7-7. The Regulations “on the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” under Articles 235 and 130W of the EC Treaty came into effect 
on 11 May and provided a legal basis for all human rights and democratization 
activities under Chapter B7-70 of the EU budget by the Council of Ministers of the 
European Community.  However, according to the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) of 
6 May 1999, these figures were not binding on the Budgetary Authority, as the legal 
basis had not been adopted under co-decision. 
Under Article 308 and 179 of the EC Treaty228, as modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the regulations provided a genuine legal basis for the awarding of financial aid for the 
promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries and improved the 
transparency of the procedure. On the one hand, a Committee composed of 
representatives of the Member States was set up in order to discuss general 
guidelines, assists the Commission in the implementation of the budget and delivers its 
opinion on projects over 1 million Euro229. Then, following the enactment of the 
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regulations, a call for proposals for most of the budget headings was launched in June 
1999.230  
Albeit the two regulations solve the question of the legal basis, they were mere 
financial regulations which did not address important flaws in the implementation of the 
budget lines: they did not provide a legal basis for promoting human rights within the 
EU; they did not establish fresh strategies or contain priorities and they did not provide 
adequate rules for monitoring the situation or providing a follow-up of the projects 
undertaken. A 1999 special report of the Court of Auditors “on the management by the 
Commission of European Union support for development of human rights in third 
countries” provided strong criticism of the above-mentioned points. On the question of 
strategies, the report stated: “…the Court found little evidence that the Commission had 
effectively assessed the democracy and human rights situation and needs of 
beneficiary countries and that it had developed a strategy specifically tailored to the 
requirements of the country (identifying key problems and proposing solutions.”231  In 
addition, on the question of follow up it was provided that: “…in general, however, the 
Commission paid a little attention to the question of whether the activities would 
continue after its financing stopped. The approach of the Commission was primarily 
focused on annual financing programmes and did not seek to follow up activities once 
the financing had stopped”.232 
 
3.5 THE MAIN ISSUES CONCERNING THE COMMISSION’S INSTRUMENTS 
 
3.5.1 AIDCO V. DG RELEX: HOW MANY BUDGET LINES? 
 
The European Commission allocated over €100 million for human rights and 
democracy projects throughout the world in financial year 2000, under EIDHR, Chapter 
B7-7 of the EU Budget. The EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten233 
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231  Paragraph 22 of the report.  
232  Paragraph 47 of the report. 
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described the allocation as “a tangible affirmation of the EU's obligation to promote 
human rights and democracy world-wide”234. Substantial support was allocated to 
international organizations, including the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, 
with over €5 million for different projects of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Moreover, emphasizing the EU's commitment to develop its partnership 
with non-governmental organizations and civil society, who have always been 
important actors in the defense of human rights and democracy, the vast majority of the 
funds began to be channeled through such NGOs. However, behind this promising 
future for human rights, the fight for new achievement continued, and new reforms 
were going to take place soon. 
Until the 2000 budget, the EIDHR has been an amalgaman of a series of budget lines, 
some thematic and some with specific geographical scope. In 2000, eleven different 
geographically based human rights and democracy budget lines were adopted by the 
Budget Authority to provide the Community support for specific areas. 
In order to distinguish the work on human rights from that on mainstream programmes 
(EDF,ALA,Med,Phare,Tacis,Obnova), a radical reform needed to be done to make all 
the budget lines of the chapter thematic. This would have matched the new regulations 
(which listed the concerns to be covered) , it would have implied a fresh approach to 
technical support, and would have made clearer the relations with geographical 
services. According to the Directorate for External Relations “In this options is to be 
followed, then a revised proposal should be put to DG Budget for submission to the 
budgetary authorities, for the 2001 draft budget preparation is well under-way. The 
reform if decided, would be a radical and visible way to give effect to the regrouping 
decided by the new Commission. A thematic approach should then be used in any 
future technical assistance to the Commission. “235 In other words, the idea was that 
priorities should have been identified in terms of themes or issues aimed at addressing 
specific medium to long-term goals. They should have not been defined on the basis of 
activities, such as human rights training, nor should have they been defined in terms of 
target groups. Where the EC wished to enhance the impact on the rights of certain 
groups (for example women, children and indigenous peoples), this should have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development and cooperation programmes. He held this position within the Prodi Commission from 23 
January 2000 until 22 November 2004. 
234  “European Press Release Database, “€100 million allocated to 'European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights”, IP/00/1475, Brussels, 15 December 2000. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-00-1475_en.htm 
235  HAEU, AV-92, Briefing Note Prepared by Jeremy Lester (DG ER/B/2) Meeting with the Commission 
services on 13 January 2000. 
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addressed in the project design and the selection methodology. In line with the EC's 
Development Policy Statement, the Commission had to ensure that promotion of 
gender equality, and of children’s rights would have been mainstreamed in all thematic 
priorities pursued under the EIDHR. The same approach had to apply to the rights of 
indigenous people, in line with the Commission's working document and the Council's 
Resolution, which called for respect for the rights of indigenous peoples to be 
integrated as a cross-cutting aspect at all levels of development cooperation, including 
policy dialogue.   
At this regard the Commission proposed four thematic priorities for the EIDHR 
programme for 2002 and in the medium-term, which were (1) Support to strengthen 
democratisation, good governance and the rule of law, (2) Activities in support of the 
abolition of the death penalty, (3) Support for the fight against torture and impunity and 
for international tribunals and criminal courts, (4) Combating Racism and xenophobia 
and discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples.236 Grants for the 140 
projects selected, under the guidelines of the Human Rights Regulations and after 
consultation with the Human Rights Committee and the appropriate geographical desks 
and delegations, ranged in size from €55,000 to €2 million.237 
In 2001, the Commission services successfully argued for a significant reduction in the 
budget lines, rising in 2001 the number of five lines under Chapter B7-7. In the same 
year the Commission services responsible for Human Rights and Democracy (notably 
AIDCO and RELEX)238 had to deal with five major tasks, which were; the management 
of the on going Human Rights and Democracy programme (724 projects, distributed 
amongst 5 Budget lines); the identification of up to 150 new projects worth 102 million 
euro (involving the analysis of some 750 project proposals, once again divided into 5 
different budget lines);  the preparation and identification of strategies, budgets and 
procedures for managing projects and programmes in 2002 and beyond; winding down 
the EFHR whose contract was going to expire on 31st May 2001; and lastly defining a 
new political framework for Human Rights, Democracy and Prevention of Conflict ( new 
Communications from the Commission to the Council and Parliament).  
This was an enormous workload, and in such a politically sensitive field, two different 
lines of thinking took place. If one side there was the DG AIDCO proposal to further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236  HAEU, AV-83, An updated strategy for the European Intiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR – Chapter B7-7 of the EU budget), Brussels, 15 March 2000.  
237  Ibid. 
238  Europaid Cooperation Office 
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reduce the budget lines from five to one, and in so doing concentrating on the 
essentials, reducing needless bureaucracy, inspiring confidence amongst Member 
States and the Parliament and improving budget management and efficiency; on the 
other side the proposal of a modification of budget lines was seen by the DG RELEX 
as a reason of confusion and incertitude.239  
According to AIDCO “there was absolutely no intellectual justification for more than one 
Human Rights and Democracy budget line in 2002”240. In support of the office proposal 
there was the fact that additional budget lines involved an extra set of commitment and 
payment targets, an extra set of specific objectives and results expected, an extra set 
of specific procedures, extra explanations to beneficiaries, delegations and others who 
had to deal with each financial instrument, extra statistical and monitoring 
requirements, and of course extra human resources. The AIDCO office strongly 
affirmed that the Commission didn’t have the capacities to afford such “luxuries”. 
Moreover, once the Budget commentaries were drafted in a clear and transparency 
way, and considering the Budget Authority trusted that the Commission would have 
delivered what it wanted it to deliver, there was no reason in adding extra budget lines. 
I support of this new settlement there was also the fact that the creation, historically, of 
a mass of separate budget lines to respond to Parliamentarians wishes was a 
reflection, at that time, of a lack of confidence in the Commission. AIDCO retained with 
the new century it was time to break the cycle and prove it was not necessary to create 
extra budget lines to make a political point. Having a unified approach would have 
brought many advantages: streamlined management and procedures; clear and unified 
geographical and thematic priority setting; possibility of fewer, larger 
projects/programmes having greater impact and visibility; lack of confusion and 
arbitrary classification of projects into overlapping sectors  more efficient use of limited 
human resources.  In a note de dossier it was specifically reported “We have discussed 
the proposed fusion of HRD Budget Lines with a number of Parliamentarians including 
Terry Wynn MEP, Chairman of the Budget Committee and Matti Wouri MEP, 
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Democracy in Foreign Affairs Committee. They both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239  The number of Human Rights lines was initially reduced from 11 lines to 3(B7-701, B7-702,B7-703 
reflecting the 3 objectives in the regulations) plus 2 additional sectorial lines added by the Parliament in 
its second reading (International criminal tribunals B7-704 and electoral process B7-709).  
240  “There may have been a case in 2001 where the transition from 11 to 1 would have been an enormous 
leap”. See HAEU, AV-83, Note de Dossier, Subject: Why we need to reduce, simplify and rationalise 
the number of Human Rights and Democracy Budget Lines managed by the Commission services in 
2002. Brussels, 16th March 2001, Europeaid Cooperation Office, European Commission.	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support this approach, whilst of course giving the usual caveats about the need to sell 
this idea of their colleagues.”241   
The organization of new budget lines became the main object of an exchange of notes 
between the two opposed offices, raising the level of a true “battle of paper” that lasted 
for different months. 
In response to AIDGO the DG RELEX raised several arguments against this fusion. 
First of all the fact the Parliament would have opposed such a change, secondly the 
need to leave more time before applying a further change and lastly the conviction of 
the opposition that such fusion would not have resulted in any major improvement. The 
Europaid office, on its side, strongly opposed such affirmations, asserting the 
Commission had no choice but to continue to accelerate its reform programme. 
“Waiting another year will only exacerbate our management problems and mean that 
the concrete results of these reforms will only appear in 2005”. 242 
On 20 March 2001, four days after sending of the note de dossier of DG AIDCO, a note 
was drafted by the DG RELEX responding to the AIDCO statements, explaining the 
reasons in favour of the maintenance of five budget lines. The note reported that 
simplification and rationalisation of the budgetary procedure was important in the 
Commission reform, and shared by everyone, nevertheless the fear of new challenges 
due to a further reduction of budget lines were palpable. The DG RELEX explained 
how, following the Commission decision in 1999 to create a single unit within DG 
RELEX with the overall responsibility for human rights, it had been possible for the first 
time during 2001 budget procedure to propose a simplification of the lines. Thereby, 
from the office point of view, the Commission had already obtained a significant 
concession on the part of the budgetary Authority in the 2001 Budget. Furthermore, not 
only the Parliament was concerned with transparency in the budget, but one of the 
goals of the new nomenclature (the shift from eleven to five lines), being an important 
modification, was to make it a guide for making the goals comparable fromm year to 
year. The further modification would have only created difficulties in this sense.  To 
conclude, the DG RELEX underlined the importance in that particular moment to prove 
the positive impact of the already done reduction, before making a further modification, 
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242  Ibid.   
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and gave its consent only for eliminating the two additional sectorial lines (International 
criminal tribunals B7-704 and electoral process B7-709), maintaining the 3 main ones.  
During the budgetary hearing on 15 March 2001 AIDCO and RELEX presented their 
different views on the issue of 1 or 3 lines. DG BUDG243 supported the view of 
maintaining the budget structure with 3 lines for reasons of coherence and credibility 
towards the Budgetary Authority.  Against the proposal of one line there was the belief 
that it would have raised an issue of credibility towards the Parliament –asking for a 
further change without evidence of the value of the earlier change, it would have not 
respected the spirit of transparency in management as requested by the Budgetary 
Authority, it would have leaded to an other foreseeable difficult discussion with the 
Parliament over the budget, and finally it would have been incoherent with the 
message delivered throughout previous year towards the Parliament and the Council 
from the DG’s involved (RELEX and BUDG).244 
This intra-office discussion showed how implementation of the EIDHR has repeatedly 
been the subject of scrutiny, analysis and evaluation, particularly in 2000 and 2001, 
including by the Court of Auditors.245 Pertinent recommendations were taken into 
account both in the 2001 Commission Communication and the subsequent EIDHR 
programming for 2002-2004. During the programming period 2002- 2004 itself, the 
most relevant and representative scrutiny of the EIDHR stemmed from an Extended 
Impact Assessment carried out in 2003246,  and from five regional EIDHR conferences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
244  AV 83 Briefing Note Dubject: the RELEX position on the preparation of the 2002 budget on Human 
Rights and Democracy Budget lines, Brussels, 20 march 2001, Veronique Bagge. 
245  Report on the implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, 
SEC (2001) 801; Evaluation of voter education in the context of EU electoral support, Final Report, 
September 2001; Synthesis report on EC activities in the field of human rights, democracy and good 
governance, Reference Report, August 2001; Synthesis report on EC activities in the field of human 
rights, democracy and good governance, Synthesis Note, August 2001; Evaluation of the micro 
projects facility operating under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Final 
Report, October 2001, Eva-EU Association; European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Compendium 2000; European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Macro-projects, 
Compendium 2001; European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Micro-projects, 
Compendium 2001; Information document: European Commission actions relating to project funding 
aimed at promoting the setting up of the International Criminal Court, EuropeAid Office for Cooperation; 
Thematic evaluation of the integration of gender in EC development cooperation with third countries, 
Final Report, March 2003; see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/; Court of Auditors, 
Special Report No 12/2000 on the management by the Commission of European Union support for the 
development of human rights and democracy in third countries, together with the Commission replies 
(2000/C 230/01), OJ C 230, 10.8.2000, p. 1 
246  SEC(2003)1170: EIA carried out in preparation for the Commission’s proposal on the extension of 
Regulations (EC) Nos 975/1999 and 976/1999  
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held with local, civil society-based beneficiaries and implementing partners.247 In the 
context of the above-mentioned Extended Impact Assessment, a specific consultation 
of EIDHR beneficiary organizations took place in June 2003. Asked about their views 
on the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the EIDHR, the survey of stakeholders in 
third countries produced a generally positive assessment. General objectives of the 
EIDHR were highly relevant to the human rights and democracy needs. In terms of 
protection and promotion of human rights and democracy, the impact was positive and 
it gave effective contribution to strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations. 
However EIDHR still had many difficulties mostly due to its slowness in responding to 
the changing needs of civil society in recipient countries. A number of comments and 
observations from different European Partners concerned the need for more action at a 
regional level, and for the Commission to encourage networking and complementarity 
between civil society organizations, which received funding under the EIDHR. More 
EIDHR longer-term commitment became an always more relevant issue in order to 
increase the impact of activities. Many comments centered on the need for improved 
programming and implementation procedures. Even the selection procedures lacked in 
many aspects; a wider range of beneficiary organizations from third country civil society 
needed to be supported, and the speed of decision-making by the Commission and the 
length of time required to prepare projects was a disadvantage to many NGOs in third 
countries. Other complains regarded administrative procedures, being them 
overwhelming and too complicated. Moreover, strict compliance with the concept of 
exclusive “focus countries”248 has led to difficulties in identifying projects in almost half 
of the focus countries targeted through calls for proposals for macroprojects. This 
situation was aggravated in 2003, with the new Financial Regulation excluding the 
broad use of targeted projects by declaring them the strict exception to the general rule 
of project identification through calls for proposals. 
 
3.5.2 WHO RECEIVED EUROPEAN FUNDS? 
 
In the first years of the 2000s, Sub-Saharan Africa has remained by far the major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247  In Dakar/Senegal for Western Africa; in Cape Town for Southern Africa; in Guatemala City for Latin 
America; in Almaty/Kazakhstan for Central Asia and in Kigali/Rwanda for Central Africa, in 2003 and 
2004. 
248  Under the programming 2002-2004 only a “focus country” may be the target of EIDHR-supported 
projects (macro- or micro-projects), and their number is limited to 32 countries. 
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recipient of European democracy funding. Not surprisingly, Africa accounted for more 
than 80 percent of French governance aid, as France has always been heavily oriented 
toward officially Francophone states. Between 2000 and 2006, Africa received nearly 
30 percent of EIDHR funds, while European democracy assistance from the EC to the 
Middle East remained disproportionately low. This was in part because the Gulf States 
were considered too rich to merit anything more than a handful of small reform 
projects. The one major exception has been the high level of support provided by 
nearly all European donors to the Palestinian Territories. The United Kingdom and 
Denmark created initiatives relating to Arab political reform, but such initiatives were 
limited in scale and were increasingly oriented toward “deradicalization” projects within 
Europe rather than political reform in the Middle East. Given their proximity and political 
fragility, the Balkan states would seem likely candidates for strong European support 
across the board. But there has been a surprising variation in political reform funding 
for the Balkans from their EU neighbors. For some donors, the shifting of focus away 
from Central and Eastern Europe following the EU’s enlargement into that region 
allowed the Balkans to become a priority. Balkan states have, for example, benefited 
greatly from EC aid, with Brussels channeling large sums into Serbia and Montenegro 
for institution-building since the early 2000s, as well as a €225 million allocation 
specifically for democracy support between 2002 and 2004.249  At the same time, 
however, the Balkans receive only a small share of overall democracy aid from most 
EU member states, and some—most notably, Germany—have actually reduced their 
democracy funding to the Balkans. Moreover, European funding has only slowly shifted 
away from reconstruction toward democracy-building. 
 In 2006, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)250 has 
been created, replacing the erstwhile European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249  Richard Youngs, What has Europe been doing?, Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2 April 
2008, National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press 
250  The legal basis [Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of 20 December 2006] for the successor programme to 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council in December 2006. The Regulation, which entered into force on 1st January 2007, 
established a new financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide 
(EIDHR). It reflected the high political profile and specific Treaty mandates relating to the development 
and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The Regulation’s principal objectives reflected the Commission Communications on EU 
Election Assistance and Observation, on the EU’s role in promoting human rights and democratization 
in third countries and on a Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide under the future Financial Perspectives 2007 2013, as well as the EU Guidelines on Human 
Rights.  
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The new EIDHR spread its resources by funding projects in many countries. Nearly 
€30 million of the 2007 budget of €135 million were set aside for “difficult states”, 
including Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Syria, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe, 
that historically had been neglected. The remaining 2007 funds were divided among 47 
states, with each generally receiving between a half million and 1.5 million euros. 
Nearly a quarter of the funds overall were still going to Latin America.  Some 
Commission development programs have been especially dedicated to governance, as 
in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. More often, however, in Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, 
Pakistan, Russia, and Vietnam, for instance, only a tiny share of EC aid went to good-
governance projects. Monies available under the EC’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism251 
(renamed the Stability Instrument in 2007)252 have increased, but they funded only a 
few projects related to democracy building, including election support in Georgia, Iraq, 
and Ukraine, plus efforts to bolster state capacity in Afghanistan.253 
From the beginning civil society actors within and around the EU remained critical of 
how the EIDHR was still essentially unreformed, despite the overhauling of the 
instrument. The EIDHR in fact, could be awarded directly to civil society actors without 
government consent, but more often than not the EU allowed host governments to 
decide where funds had to be allocated. In addition, the EU has often shown itself 
extremely reluctant to offer financial support to the political opposition to authoritarian 
regimes, even though some of its member states have done. While this reflected a 
desire of the European Commission to ensure that its aid were impartial, 
disappointment became widespread as the EU did little to support the democratic 
revolutions in Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251  Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism 
[Official Journal L 57 of 27.02.2001]. This Regulation created a mechanism to enable rapid action to be 
taken in specific areas in response to or avoid real or potential crisis situations or conflicts. Financing 
took the form of grants, and the Commission, with the help of its partners, was the institution 
responsible for implementing, coordinating and evaluating the mechanism. 
252  Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the Parliament and of the Council of 12 November 2006 establishing 
an Instrument for Stability. 
253  Ibid. 
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3.6 FROM LOME’ TO COTONOU: FROM SANCTIONS TO DIALOGUE  
 
3.6.1 LOME’ IV BIS 
 
Lomé Conventions expired with the entry into the new millennium. Until the year 2000, 
four Lomé conventions were signed, and each one of them aimed to have a broader 
and enhanced relation between the partners.  
As already analysed in the first chapter, the 1970s and 1980s gave birth to three Lomé 
Conventions, but after the adoption in June 1981 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights254 by a great number of the African members of the ACP group, and 
the end of the Cold War in 1989, the need for a renewal of the last Convention started 
to spread.  Despite this “winds of change” at the negotiations for the Lomé Convention 
IV the inclusion of human rights references into the Convention itself was hardly 
contested.  
Lomé IV (1990-2000) had some different features than the others. It became the first 
development agreement to incorporate a human rights clause as a “fundamental” part 
of cooperation. Further changes were made at Lomé's IV revision five years later 
(1995-2000), where an updated clause confirmed the importance of human rights in 
cooperation. In particular, while the preamble to Lomé IV contained references to some 
of the main relevant human rights instruments, Article 5(1) of Lomé IV for the first time 
drew a direct link between development cooperation and human rights255. Having 
succeeded in incorporating references to human rights within the Lomé IV provisions 
on development cooperation, the EC proposed the introduction of an explicit 
suspension mechanism in order to strengthen the force of Article 5.256 This was 
accomplished during the 1994 Mid Term Review of the Lomé IV Convention with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254  Concluded on 26 June 1981, entered into force on 21 October 1986, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 
reprinted in: 21 ILM 59 (1982).  
255  Article 5(1) of the Lome Convention IV states that: 
Cooperation shall be directed towards development centered on man, the main protagonist and 
beneficiary of development, which entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. Cooperative 
operations shall thus be conceived in accordance with the positive approach, where respect for human 
rights is recognised as a basic factor of real development and where cooperation is conceived as 
contributing to the promotion of these rights. In this context development policy and cooperation are 
closely linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The role and potential 
of initiatives taken by individuals and groups shall also be recognised and fostered in order to achieve 
in practice real participation of the population in the development process in accordance with Article 13.  
256  Karin Arts/J. Byron, The Mid-Term Review of the Lome IV Convention: Heralding the Future?, 18 
THIRD WORLD Q. 73, 77 (1997).  
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incorporation of respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law as 
essential elements of the Lomé IV and a new Article 336a Lomé IV-bis which allowed 
for full or partial suspension of the application of Lomé IV in the event that “any party 
fails to fulfil its obligation in respect of one of the essential elements” (human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law); however, such a suspension could only take effect 
after a consultation procedure had taken place.   
Over the years the EU has found this “stick approach” a useful weapon to deploy 
against ACP governments implicated in human rights violations. It has unilaterally 
suspended Lomé benefits due to several ACP countries. In 1994, EC aid to eight ACP 
countries257 was suspended or restricted because of the security situation and hose 
countries’ failure to move towards democracy or observe human rights.258 In April 1999, 
the Commission proposed to the Council to open Article 366a Lomé IVbis consultations 
with Niger in response to the coup in that country. In a communication the Commission 
announced “in the meantime no new funding will be approved in favor of Niger other 
than for humanitarian projects directly benefiting the poorest sections of the 
population.”259 The EU also held Article 366a Lomé IV-bis consultations with the 
Government of Togo in 1998 and with the military Government of Comoros after the 
coup there in April 1999.260 
After the expiration of Lomé IV on 29 February 2000, the new partnership agreement 
between the European Union and the ACP countries was signed on 23 June 2000 in 
Cotonou, capital of Benin. The Cotonou Agreement introduced a new approach and a 
broader partnership while preserving the fundamental instruments of the partnership 
from the Lomé Conventions. Its aims were to strengthen the political dimension of the 
partnership, and to leave more space to the ACP countries for the implementation 
process of the policies by giving them more responsibility as the owner of the 
development projects.  
Cotonou represents according to some scholars the reason why even though the 
human rights clause has become a familiar feature of EU external agreements, it was 
not until the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in February 2003 that a satisfactory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257  The ACP Countries are Equitorial Guinea, The Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and 
Zaire.  
258  K. Arts, Integrating human rights into development: The case of the Lomé Convention, Brill Nijhoff, 
2000. 
259  Commission, Communication on the Opening of Consultations with Niger pursuant to Article 366a of 
the Lomé Convention, 204 COM 3 (1999).  
260  M. Bulterman, Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community, 2001, pp.252-257.  
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legal basis for the human rights clause has been settled. Until the Treaty of Nice 
doubts have been raised, particularly in light of opinion 2/94 on Accession of the 
European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in which 
paragraph 27 provided that “no treaty provision confers upon the Community any 
general power to enact general rules on human rights or to conclude international 
conventions on the field.”261 Indeed, Australia for instance, with whom the Commission 
was negotiating a trade and cooperation agreement, had challenged the inclusion of a 
human rights clause in the agreement on the ground that the EC lacked competence to 
promote human rights in the light of opinion 2/94.262 
The Treaty of Nice provided for the insertion of Article 181(a) in the EC Treaty on 
economic, financial, and technical cooperation measures with external countries, which 
encouraged EC action in this sphere to “contribute to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The treaty provisions appeared to 
make respect for human rights one of the general objectives of development 
cooperation. Thus, officially from 2003, the legal basis for the support of human rights 
and democratization activities under the ACP-EU partnership could be found in Article 
9 of the Cotonou Agreement. In particular, according to Article 9(4), “the Partnership 
shall actively support the promotion of human rights, processes of democratization, 
consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance.” Positive measures to promote 
human rights started to be pursued through a dual approach that combined both 
vertical and horizontal funding. Vertical funding within the context of the Cotonou 
Agreement has involved the EU providing direct funds from the EDF for the promotion 
of human rights and democratization activities. Along with direct financial measures to 
promote human rights and democratization, the EU has also incorporated human rights 
as cross-cutting issues in the formulation of development policy and in the 
programming and planning stages of development with ACP Countries. This approach 
was described as a horizontal approach and contributed to the notion of 
mainstreaming, which involved the integration of human rights norms into all aspects of 
policy-making and implementation.263 One medium through which the mainstreaming 
has been accomplished is political dialogue. Through political dialogue, human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261  Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights conditionality in practice, 2003, p. 245  
262  Ibid.	  
263  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The European 
Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries, 252 COM 11, 22 
(2001). 
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started to be taken into account during negotiations for the accession to the ACP 
Group, although respect for human rights and democratic principles did not become a 
precondition for membership264. 
 
3.6.2 COTONOU AND  “KEY ROLE” OF DIALOGUE IN THE NEW PARTENERSHIPS 
 
Political dialogue on the subject of human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles, 
and good governance has constituted a central feature of ACP-EU cooperation. 
According to Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, “the dialogue shall encompass a 
regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, 
democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance.” 
A long-term dialogue could have been an element in the EU’s conflict prevention 
efforts, and have had an early warning role by highlighting at an early stage human 
rights and democratization issues which could in the future lead to violent conflict as 
well as contributing to their early resolution. In this sense the opening of the ACP-EC 
partnership to non-State actors has been a breakthrough in the Cotonou Agreement. 
The new approach had to go well beyond the experience gained until then as regards 
decentralized cooperation. It involved encouraging a genuine dialogue both on 
development policies and on ACP-EU cooperation. Civil society should have 
furthermore been associated  to the political dialogue , and to the assessment of policy 
performance in the context of the reviews of ACP-EC Country Support Strategies.  
Dialogue under Cotonou started taking place in an informal fashion with regular 
meetings of the human rights NGOs (the so called Human Rights Contact Group) with 
the Commission services and the Commissioner. The Vienna Council conclusions in 
December 1998 proposed to “reflect on the usefulness of convening a periodic human 
rights discussion forum with the participation of EU institutions as well as 
representatives of academic institutions and NGOs”. Three forums were held so far in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264  During negotiations for the admission of Haiti to the Lome Convention in 1989, the Netherlands sought 
to include human rights commitments as a condition for membership. However, this was rejected by 
the majority of Member States who stated that the human rights situation had not been a precondition 
for the accession of existing ACP States and many of the Member States argued that accession to 
Lomé would be a positive step towards improving the human rights conditions in Haiti. After that, Cuba 
indicated its willingness to accede to the Cotonou Agreement ; however, this application was 
subsequently withdrawn due to alleged interference in internal affairs on the issue of human rights.  
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cooperation with the Council Presidency265 in order to achieve greater coordination 
between NGOs and to a shared platform.  
Where institutionalized, the dialogue took different forms, and that with the accession 
countries was the most advanced. In its Opinions on the Central and Eastern Europe 
countries' applications for accession to EU266, the Commission analyzed the situation 
relating to democracy, rule of law and to human rights (civil, political, economic and 
social). These opinions also covered the respect and protection of minorities, including 
their right to maintain their cultural identity, to equal treatment in social and economic 
life, and protection against hostility from the majority population (and even the police). 
In line with the Agenda 2000 approach, the Commission assessed progress towards 
meeting the accession criteria in the Regular Reports on each country. This approach 
ensured coherence between the various EU instruments and institutions, as well as co-
ordination with relevant international organizations such as the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE. Countries wishing to become members of the European Union were 
expected not only to subscribe to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights (civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights) and the respect for and 
protection of minorities, but to put these into practice. In order to help the candidate 
countries remedy the specific weaknesses identified in the Regular Reports, the 
Community established an Accession Partnership for each of the candidate countries. 
They also indicated the financial assistance available from the Community in support of 
these priorities and the conditions attached to that assistance.  
In its Communication on the Follow up to the Rio Summit267 which proposed an 
updated approach to EU-Latin America relations, the Commission identified the 
promotion and protection of human rights as the main priority in the political field, 
including the need for new 'positive' measures to strengthen respect for human rights, 
the rule of law and democratic political systems. These included a proposal for an EU-
Latin America/Caribbean discussion forum for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, based on the good experience gained in Central America where a committee of 
independent experts was set up under the San José Dialogue to discuss human rights. 
The group was tasked to submit a report with conclusions and proposals for action to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265  EU Discussion Forum, Brussels, 30 November and 1 December 1999 -  EU Human Rights conference 
“The EU and the Central Role of Human Rights and Democratic Principles in Relations with Third 
Countries”, Venice 25-28 May 2000 – EU Human Rights Forum, Paris, 13 December 2000.  
266  15 July 1997 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia). 
267  COM(2000) 670 final. 
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the 2002 EU-Latin America Summit. The Commission's later Communication on 
“Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process”268 also called for greater prominence to be 
given to human rights in Europe's relations with Mediterranean countries. It stated that 
these issues should be regularly raised by the EU side in political dialogue, and also 
with partners meetings, Association Councils and Committees with the intention of 
identifying measures which governments should take to ensure satisfactory evolution in 
this area. This dialogue could lead to the establishment of joint working groups on 
human rights at official level; these groups would have aimed to agree on a number of 
concrete benchmarks and objective criteria to be reviewed within the various 
Association Councils. With regional groupings in Asia, the EU has a political dialogue 
with the members of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including 
annual Ministerial meetings, and meets with the SAARC.269 The political dimension of 
Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) also permitted discussions on support for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.  
 
3.6.3 THE LACK OF STRATEGIES  
 
While the integration of human rights considerations into the ACP-EU partnership could 
have lead to some improvements in the human rights situation in ACP countries, the 
results has not been altogether satisfactory. Indeed, the  application of human rights in 
the Lome/Cotonou regime has mostly  been arbitrary with lack of  transparency.270 ACP 
countries such as Sudan and Haiti became targets of punitive measures by the EC271 
while other ACP countries such as Ethiopia and Zaire enjoyed continued EC financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268  COM(2000) 497 final. 
269 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the regional intergovernmental 
organization and geopolitical union of nations in South Asia. Its member states 
include Afghanistan,Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
270  According to Tomasevski, “much as with other donors, the practice was punitive and arbitrary.” See K. 
Tomasevski, Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and their Human Rights Performance, 
1997.  
271 Article 96 of the Cotonou Consultation Procedure has been used in relation to both Haiti and 
Zimbabwe. In the case of Haiti, after the general elections in 2000 the observer mission of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) noted various irregularities and fraud. According to the EU, this 
constituted a breach of Article 9, the essential element clause of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU 
invited the Government of Haiti to enter into consultations under Article 96. Haiti did not respond to the 
EU’s concerns and the Council adopted a decision on 29 January 2001 to take “appropriate measures” 
in accordance with Article 96(2).44 These measures included suspending direct budgetary aid and 
withholding future aid from the European Development Fund (EDF). This Council decision was 
renewed in December 2001, 2002, and early 2003.  
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support. Both Ethiopia and Zaire have been prominent recipients of EC aid even 
though their human rights records were clearly abysmal.272 
The explanation for this inconsistency lied in the fact that human rights were just one 
consideration guiding the foreign policy of the EU. Thus the fact that the various EU 
Member States had different political relationships with different ACP countries may 
have led them to develop different attitudes and measures in response to human rights 
violations. Moreover, the applicability of human rights in the Lomé/Cotonou regimes 
indicated that the suspension practice of the EU on human rights grounds only affected 
the financial assistance aspects and not the trade regime. A cursory look at the 
instances in which the EU adopted measures against ACP countries on the ground of 
gross violations of human rights revealed that trade aspects have always been 
exempted. For instance, in 1993 the EU announced the imposition of certain restrictive 
measures on Nigeria as a result of the state of human rights in that country. Those 
measures did not affect EU-Nigeria trade and, despite repeated calls, the EU Council 
of Ministers refused to sanction an oil embargo against Nigeria.273 A similar situation 
occurred with respect to Haiti. In response to the human rights violations in Haiti, the 
EC considered the option of imposing a trade embargo, but in the end it did not push it 
through. It based its decision on two grounds: That a trade embargo would have 
breached the Lomé Conventions trade provisions and that, in the absence of a UN 
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a trade embargo 
would have also contravened obligations of Haiti under GATT.274 This same thinking 
may have influenced the EU’s decision to suspend financial and technical assistance 
rather than impose trade restrictions in response to the genocide in Rwanda.275 Also, in 
the most recent instance in which the human rights clause was applied against the 
Republic of Guinea, the EU, in taking appropriate measures in accordance with Article 
96 of the Cotonou Agreement, specifically excluded actions against trade cooperation 
and trade linked preferences.276 
Once again, thirty years later, the European Union economic interest prevailed on 
basic principles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272   K.Arts, Integrating Human Rights…, p.370. 
273  Karin Arts, Development Co-operation and Human Rights: Turbulent Times for EU Policy, in New 
Perspectives in the European Union Political Co-operation, M. Lister ed., 1999  
274  Council Reply to EP question 593/92, rendered 22 October 1992, EPCD Bull., 1992, 490.  
275  E. U. Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the World Trade Organisation, 37(2) J. WORLD 
TRADE 241, 259 (2003), especially n. 62.  
276   Council Decision of 14 April 2005, Concluding Consultations with the Republic of Guinea under Article 
96 of the Cotonou Agreement, OJ L104, 23 April 2005.  
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3.7 CREATING AN EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AGENCY (FRA)  
 
The original proposal for a EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) was met with 
skepticism in some quarters, in particular from the Council of Europe. Discussions 
around what the scope and tasks of the FRA were characterized by, on the one hand, 
the fear that the EU was dabbling in fields in which it had no business and duplicating 
the work of the Council of Europe and, on the other hand, the sense that the EU was 
not taking seriously enough its responsibilities with regard to fundamental rights within 
its borders. The result, launched in March 2007,277 has been an agency described by 
Amnesty International as: “based on a fragmented and minimalist conception of 
‘fundamental rights’ that bars it from addressing the most pressing human rights 
challenges in the EU today”.278 
The FRA was established as the successor to the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), which was also based in Vienna. The EUMC's 
mandate was narrower than that of the FRA, as it was restricted to issues 
of racism and xenophobia.279 The mandate of the FRA has been limited strictly to 
European Community law.280 What this means, in concrete terms, is that many of the 
EU’s activities were excluded, in particular those with the greatest potential to impact 
on human rights and those with the most limited judicial oversight through the 
European Court of Justice. Thus, for example, the FRA was not able to deal with: 
counter-terrorism; the EAW281; police cooperation, including the exchange of personal 
data in the context of criminal investigations; exchange of evidence in criminal 
proceedings under the European Evidence Warrant (EEW), all areas where 
developments in the EU had potentially serious consequences for the fundamental 
rights of those concerned. Neither FRA was able to address issues related to the EU’s 
external activities, whether involving police or the military, nor with the external 
dimension of asylum and immigration questions, such as interception on the high seas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277  Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for   
Fundamental Rights, OJ L53/1, 22 February 2007. 
278 Towards a comprehensive European human rights system, the speech that Amnesty International 
would have made at the inauguration of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Amnesty International EU 
Office, 1 March 2007.  
279  The EUMC grew from the Commission on Racism and Xenophobia (CRX), established in 1994, and 
also known as the Kahn Commission. The CRX was transformed into the EUMC in June 1998; officially 
established by Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997. 
280  The the founding treaties (primary legislation) and the provisions of instruments enacted by the 
Community institutions by virtue of them (secondary legislation such as regulations, directives etc).  
281  European Arrest Warrant 
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or cooperation agreements with third countries – issues of increasing concern to 
human rights groups. The narrow mandate of the FRA has truly been an opportunity 
lost for the advancement of human rights in the EU. It was no doubt facilitated by the 
defensive posture of the Council of Europe, articulated by Jean-Claude Juncker, that 
“the future Agency must be strictly complementary to the Council of Europe’s human 
rights observation and monitoring instruments. It is essential that its mandate be limited 
to human rights issues which arise in connection with the implementation of 
Community law, i.e. strictly within the EU’s internal legal system. It may never be 
extended to general observation, using its own procedures and resources, of the 
human rights situation in Council of Europe member states.”282 
For those who did not want to see “more Europe”, this was clearly a golden opportunity 
to restrict the possible expansion of EU activity in fundamental rights. The fears 
expressed in relation to duplication and lack of coherence in the European human 
rights framework were, however, sadly short-sighted and unimaginative. It became 
clear that there were no need for the EU to duplicate the work of the numerous Council 
of Europe human rights bodies in relation to standard-setting and monitoring of the 
human rights situation in Europe. It became also clear, however, that the EU could take 
the work of those bodies and build upon it in a way that would have reflected the 
particular nature of the EU, as opposed to the Council of Europe, and that the FRA 
could have been the ideal body to translate the work of the Council of Europe into 
advice and proposals that would have been relevant for EU institutions and member 
states alike. The FRA could have been used, for example, to analyze the reports of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the European Commissioner for 
Human Rights, along with European Court of Human Rights case-law in relation to EU 
member states, in order to identify issues which might undermine the smooth 
functioning of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. If prisons in some EU member 
states were found by the Council of Europe bodies to systematically fall below 
internationally accepted standards, this would have made it difficult for other member 
states to return people to those countries in compliance with their own human rights 
obligations, both nationally and under the ECHR, thus threatening the effectiveness of 
the EAW system.283 The FRA would then have been able to provide advice to EU 
institutions and to member states as to how to address the problem within the EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, Council of Europe — European Union: ‘A sole ambition for the 
European continent’ (11 April 2006) 
283  Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee, Human Rights Protection in  
Europe: The Fundamental Rights Agency; Report with Evidence, 29th Report of Session, 2005-06. 
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framework, either through technical assistance and advice or through additional 
legislation or policy development which would have ensured the coherence of the EU’s 
approach to judicial cooperation. In addition, the FRA could provide an invaluable 
resource to the EU in its increasingly active involvement in both military aspects of 
crisis management, and engagement with third countries in the fields of police 
cooperation and agreements on managing asylum and immigration.284  
These developments continued to be at the heart of human rights concerns about the 
EU and the lack of accountability for actions taken by the EU outside the Community 
framework. In this framework the Agency should have become an important way of 
casting light on these difficult issues. However, over the years, even if there were the 
best intentions to make it successful (at least “on paper”), in practice the results haven’t 
been always the expected ones.  
 
3.8 THE EUROPEAN CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
TREATY OF LISBON 
 
The attention focused on the people of Europe and the human dimension in the 
development of the European Union, which had already found expression in the 
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in the creation of the area of freedom, 
security and justice, was also reflected in the formulation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. At the request of the European Parliament, the 
European Council, meeting in Cologne from 2 to 4 June 1999, decided to have the 
rights of European citizens codified, since ‘protection of fundamental rights is a 
founding principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy’.285 
It is true that, in the field of human rights, the Member States of the European 
Communities are signatories to the Council of Europe’s Convention of 4 November 
1950 on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded on 1 August 
1975. Although the founding treaties of the Communities did not refer explicitly to 
international agreements, the case law of the European Court of Justice has 
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established that human rights had to be a paramount reference point for the exercise of 
Community powers. Parliament and the Council have frequently reaffirmed their 
commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Since the signing of the 
Single European Act on 17 and 28 February 1986, the aim of safeguarding these rights 
and freedoms has been expressly enshrined in the Community treaties. Nevertheless, 
there seemed to be a need to draw up an instrument encompassing all the rights of 
European citizens, in other words not only the fundamental rights derived from the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States but also the civil, political, 
economic and social rights enjoyed by citizens of the European Union. Such a charter 
had to be incorporated into the Treaties so that any European citizen could refer to 
them and, if needed, assert them in a court of law. The drafting of such a charter was 
to be completed before the European Council summit in Nice, scheduled for December 
2000. At its meeting in Tampere on 15 October 1999286, the European Council 
specified the composition of the 62-member body, which gave itself the more 
prestigious title of “Convention”. The Convention held its constituent meeting on 
17 December 1999 and elected as its chairman Roman Herzog, former President of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Its deliberations were conducted with maximum 
transparency, with the transcript of public debates and the text of preparatory 
documents being made available on the Internet. There were inputs from 
representatives of the European Court of Justice, the Council of Europe, trade unions, 
non-governmental organizations and the governments of countries applying for 
accession to the EU. However, in order to establish a consensus and to make the text 
of the draft acceptable to all the Member States, the result comprehended clauses with 
a compromise nature and with careful wording.  
Many were the difficulties that had to be overcome. There was a basic need to take 
account of the differences between national legal systems, such as the contrast 
between the Latin countries’ attachment to statute law and that of the British to 
common law. Then there was the difference in interpretation between the Germans, for 
whom the law is enforceable, in the sense that an individual has a right of recourse to 
the courts to have the law applied, and the French, who distinguish between the 
general principle of the ‘droit à’ (the ‘right to’), which creates no precise obligation, and 
the ‘droit de’ (the ‘right of’), which is effectively enforceable. The aim of the drafting 
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process was to produce a clearly worded document that was publicly accessible yet 
precise enough to be a source of law if the Charter was incorporated into the Treaties 
of the European Union.  
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, the Convention made rapid progress. The 
draft was completed on 26 September 2000 and was presented to the European 
Council at its Biarritz Summit on 12 and 13 October with a view to final adoption or 
rejection at the Nice Summit. 
The preamble to the Charter placed the individual at the heart of its activities by 
establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an “area of freedom, security 
and justice”. The preamble specifies that the Union contributes to the preservation and 
development of these common values “while respecting the diversity of the cultures 
and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member 
States”[…] “with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the Union 
and the principle of subsidiarity”. On the whole, in spite of the inadequacies and 
excessive caution resulting from divergent outlooks and policies, the Charter resulted 
as a coherent entity. Its legal status, however, could not be defined a “success”. If it 
was a constitutional instrument binding the Member States, it would have been the 
subject of a ratifiable treaty. On receiving the draft in Biarritz287, the European Council 
did not wish to go so far and decided that the Charter would have simply been subject 
to approval by the Council.  
In Nice, before the opening of what proved to be a particularly difficult meeting of the 
European Council, the Heads of State or Government were content to opt for a solemn 
proclamation, jointly with Parliament and the Commission, of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, thereby shelving any discussion about the 
legal status of the text. It fell to the Convention on the Future of Europe to integrate it 
without amendment into the draft Constitutional Treaty which it adopted on 13 June 
2003 and submitted officially, in Rome on 18 July 2003, to Silvio Berlusconi, President-
in-Office of the Council of the European Union, whose task it was to open the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
was solemnly signed in Rome by the representatives of the 25 Member States on 
29 October 2004. 
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Rights of the European Union. 
	  	   111	  
To become a legally binding instrument the Charter will have to wait some years, in fact 
only in 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon, it finally obtained the legal status it deserved. 
The European Council's political assent on the "Reform Treaty" signed in Lisbon on 19 
October 2007 is a milestone in the evolution of the European legal order. It puts an end 
to the period under the "sign" of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe288 
and renounces writing the text in the form proposed by the former project, the method 
of intergovernmental conferences being preferred. The result has been a text based on 
the structure of the Treaties of Rome289 and Maastricht , which has over 250 pages and 
brings nearly 300 changes.  
The main points of reform of the Lisbon Treaty have referred to institutional changes, 
changes in the voting system, the introduction of some new Community policies, the 
reversibility of the integration process, the possibility of withdrawal of the Member 
States from the EU, respectively. Last but not least the Treaty established fundamental 
provisions on human rights protection.  
The latter provisions may be viewed in light of criticism that has been raised against the 
EU for an inconsistent and incoherent approach to fundamental rights protection.290 In 
particular, since the beginning criticism has been voiced over how the EU’s strong 
insistence on fundamental rights protection in its external relations did not appear to be 
matched by an equally strong “internal” focus on such fundamental rights protection.291 
Some commentators also took the view that the EU at its then current state (at the turn 
of the millennium) was inappropriate as a human rights organization in its own right.292 
In this light, it is clear that with the new Article 6 TEU the protection of fundamental 
rights in the EU context has been taken to a new level. While the EU perhaps cannot 
be said to have become a proper “human rights organization”, clearly steps have been 
taken in the Lisbon Treaty to highlight the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights 
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protection. An immediate example would be the obligation for the EU to accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental.  Moreover, Article 6 TEU brought about changes also for the Member 
States. By turning the Charter of Fundamental Rights into a legally binding instrument, 
Article 6 TEU obliged also the Member States to respect the provisions of the 
Charter.293  
Under the same article, the Charter of Fundamental Rights were finally be recognized 
equal legal value to that of the treaties (although its text is not included in the Treaty of 
Lisbon as it was in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty). The Charter became part of 
what is called "original" Community law. The rights protected by the Charter were 
included in chapters called "dignity", "freedom", "equality", "solidarity", "citizenship" and 
"justice". As can easily be noticed, many rights corresponded to those stated by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. To ensure the necessary consistency 
between the Charter and the Convention, the meaning and the scope of these rights, 
including the allowed restrictions, were made identical to those under the 
Convention.294 It follows that, in establishing the restrictions on these rights, the 
legislator had to respect the same rules concerning the restrictions imposed by the 
Convention, without prejudice to the autonomy of the Union law and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. A difference is that the limitations of some rights has 
not been stated like in the Convention for each of the rights they operate on, but they 
have been included in a general provision which refers to the ECHR case law and also 
to the Community institutions and to the Member States of the Union as main recipients 
of these rights295.  
The Charter also recommended that national judges and the European jurisdictions 
should have considered, as an instrument of interpretation (though not legally binding) 
the "Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights"296. They sent in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293  See Article 51(1) of the Charter. 
294  Francesca Ferraro and Jesús Carmona, Fundamental Rights in the European Union: The Role of the 
Charter after the Treaty of Lisbon, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2015. 
295  Ibid. 
296  On the role of the 'Explanations' in the interpretation of the Charter, see e.g. Jean-Paul Jacqué, 'The 
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union', in Steve Peers, 
Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Hart 
Publishing, 2014, p. 1715ff. 
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cases to the ECHR case law in order to define the meaning of the articles in the 
Charter.297 
In terms of social rights, the Charter is less developed than the European Social 
Charter. It distinguishes between subjective rights (prohibition of child labor) and 
principles that apply only to the national legislative power (right to adequate living 
conditions, right of access to placement services298).  
 
The entry into force of the Treaty represented also a step toward the EU’s accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, procedure that would have soon 
influenced the relation between the European Union and the Council of Europe. Unlike 
the project of the Constitutional Treaty that required for accession the vote of qualified 
majority and did not require ratification, the Annex-Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty stated 
that the accession would have retained the characteristics of the Union and the 
features of its law and would have not affected the competences and duties of the 
institutions, guaranteeing the status quo of the Member States towards the European 
Convention (in terms of derogations, accepted reservations, etc.).299 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 For example, in explaining Title II ("freedoms") art. 19 which guarantees protection in the event of 
removal, expulsion or extradition, the ECHR decision in the Ahmed v. Austria case and the famous 
Soering case are invoked, and in explaining Title VI concerning the right to a fair trial, the ECHR 
position in the Airey case is retained, position according to which protection should also be granted in 
the case when the absence of the person would make it inefficient to guarantee the effective access to 
justice. 
298  Catherine Haguenau-Moizard, Gazette Européenne nr. 39, 128e année, nr.170, 171, p. 32. 
299 D.Ashiagbor, N.Countouris, I.Lianos, The European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
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CONCLUSION 
	  
	  
	  
For	   a	   long	   time	   and	   similar	   to	   most	   other	   Western	   political	   systems,	   the	   EU	   ignored	   the	  
promotion	   of	   democracy,	   human	   rights,	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Its	   development	   policy	  mainly	  
focused	   on	   economic	   cooperation,	   and	   the	  Member	   States	  made	   hardly	   any	   effort	   to	   bring	  
their	  policies	  in	  line	  with	  the	  EU.	  Consequently,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  more	  based	  in	  being	  an	  
additional	  donor	  rather	  than	  a	  coordinator	  of	  European	  development	  policies.	  	  
By	  1990	  everything	  seemed	  to	  change.	  The	  EU	  started	  creating	  a	  comprehensive	  strategy	  for	  
the	  promotion	  of	  democracy,	  human	  rights,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  good	  governance	  covering	  the	  
entire	  globe.	  However,	  the	  human	  rights	  policies	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  resulted	  mostly	  beset	  
by	  a	  paradox.	   Indeed,	   if	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  Union	  has	  been	  a	  staunch	  defender	  of	  human	  
rights	  in	  both	  its	  internal	  and	  external	  affairs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  lacked	  a	  comprehensive	  or	  
coherent	  policy	  at	  both	  level,	  and	  fundamental	  doubts	  persisted	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  institutions	  
of	  the	  Union	  possessed	  adequate	  legal	  competence	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  human	  rights	  
issues	  arising	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Community	  policies.	  
On	  the	  positive	  side	  of	  the	  balance	  sheet,	  the	  EC/EU	  showed	  during	  the	  years	  between	  1950	  
and	   2000	   a	   strong	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights.	   	   The	   Amsterdam	   Treaty	   proclaimed	   “the	  
Union	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   liberty,	   democracy,	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	   freedoms	  and	  the	  rule	  of	   law”.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  any	  Member	  State	  violating	  
human	   rights	   in	   a	   “serious	   and	   persistent”	   way	   could	   lose	   its	   rights	   under	   the	   Treaty.	   The	  
European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  long	  required	  the	  Community	  to	  respect	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  
the	   European	   Council	   has	   issued	   several	   major	   statements	   emphasizing	   the	   importance	   of	  
respect	   for	   human	   rights.	   Similarly,	   the	   Community	   has	   taken	   notable	   initiatives	   in	   a	   wide	  
range	  of	   fields.	   	  This	   is	   so	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Member	  States	  were,	  and	   remained,	   the	  
principal	  guardians	  of	  human	  rights	  within	  their	  own	  territories.	  	  
Particularly	  from	  the	  1990s	  the	  Union	  revealed	  itself	  as	  a	  powerful	  and	  uniquely	  representative	  
actor	   on	   the	   international	   scene.	   It	   had	   the	   responsibility,	   reinforced	   by	   the	   capacity	   and	  
financial	  resources,	  to	   influence	  significantly	  the	  human	  rights	  policies	  of	  other	  states	  as	  well	  
as	   those	   of	   international	   organizations.	   	   Nevertheless,	   despite	   the	   frequency	   of	   statements	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underlining	   the	   importance	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   significant	  
individual	  policy	  initiatives,	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  always	  lacked	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  human	  rights	  
policy.	   This	   is	   true	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   internal	   policies	   and,	   albeit	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   its	  
external	   policies.	   In	   relation	   to	   its	   internal	   human	   rights	   situation,	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	  
Community	   have	   succeeded	   in	   cobbling	   together	   a	  makeshift	   policy,	  which	   has	   been	   barely	  
adequate,	   but	   by	   no	  means	   sufficient.	   In	   relation	   to	   its	   external	   policies,	   the	   Union	   has,	   by	  
virtue	   of	   its	   emphasis	   upon	   human	   rights	   in	   its	   relations	   with	   other	   states	   and	   its	   ringing	  
endorsements	  of	  the	  universality	  and	  indivisibility	  of	  human	  rights,	  highlighted	  the	  incongruity	  
and	  indefensibility	  of	  combining	  an	  active	  external	  policy	  stance	  with	  what	  in	  some	  areas	  came	  
close	   to	  an	  abdication	  of	   internal	   responsibility.	  At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	   the	  Union	  could	  only	  
achieve	  the	  leadership	  role	  to	  which	  it	  aspired	  through	  the	  example	  it	  had	  set	  to	  its	  partners	  
and	  other	  states.	  	  
Also	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  made	  by	  the	  Community	  in	  order	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  human	  
rights	   policies	   have	   generally	   been	   inadequate,	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   internal	   and	   external	  
matters.	  In	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  instances,	  the	  task	  has	  been	  left	  to	  entities	  with	  a	  very	  vague	  
human	  rights	  mandate,	  reinforced	  by	   little	  expertise	  and	  even	   less	   interest.	   In	  a	   few	  isolated	  
instances,	   however,	   and	   especially	   in	   relation	   to	   external	   policies,	   the	   Commission	   has	  
established	  units	  with	  a	  specific	  mandate	  (They	  include	  Unit	  2	  of	  Directorate	  A	  of	  Directorate-­‐
General	   1A,	   responsible	   for	   human	   rights	   and	   democratization,	   and	   Unit	   4	   of	   Directorate-­‐
General	  VIII	  responsible	  for	  the	  coordination	  of	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  fundamental	  
freedoms,	   democratization	   and	   institutional	   support).	   Although	   they	   faced	   many	   obstacles,	  
these	   isolated	   units	   achieved	   enormous	   results	   through	   the	   promotion	   of	   human	   rights	  
activities	   in	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   areas.	   The	  Commission’s	  budget	   lines	   are	  one	   indicator	  of	   their	  
particular	   significance	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy.	   Indeed,	   the	   “European	  
initiative	  for	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights”	  (Chapter	  B7-­‐70	  of	  the	  Community	  budget)	  began	  in	  
1994	  with	  a	  budget	  of	  59.1	  million	  euros,	  and	  already	   in	  1998	  some	  97.4	  million	  euros	  were	  
available	  for	  grants.	  Of	  course	  the	  role,	  impact	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  activities	  
would	   have	   been	   considerably	   enhanced	   if	   measures	   were	   taken	   to	   better	   deal	   with	   the	  
obstacles	  that	  impeded	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  area.	  	  
In	  2001,	  von	  Bogdandy,	  professor	  of	  public	  law	  and	  director	  at	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Institute	  for	  
Comparative	  Public	  Law	  and	  International	  Law	  in	  Heidelberg,	  provocatively	  raised	  the	  question	  
whether	  the	  EU	  was	  or	  could	  be	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “human	  rights	  organization”.	  Since	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then,	  countless	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  EU	  developing	  into	  a	  global	  or	  post	  national	  human	  
rights	  organization,	  regime	  or	  framework	  have	  been	  brought	  forward.	   
	  
Based	  on	  historical	  facts	  and	  taking	  into	  consideration	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  sources	  provided	  by	  
the	  Historical	  Archives	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  hopefully	  helped	  clarify	  the	  
contours	  of	  what	  have	  been	   the	  major	   fights	  of	   the	  European	  Union	  along	   the	  path	   through	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  organization.	  On	  those	  grounds,	  it	  also	  aimed	  to	  emphasize	  the	  
unique	  capacity	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  that	  respect,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  duties	  it	  acquired.	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